Western Waste Industries v. Purifoy, 96-416

• Citation: 326 Ark. 256,930 S.W.2d 348
• Decision Date: 14 October 1996
• Docket Number: No. 96-416,96-416
• Parties: WESTERN WASTE INDUSTRIES, Appellant, v. Hon. Philip PURIFOY, Judge, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 348

930 S.W.2d 348

326 Ark. 256

WESTERN WASTE INDUSTRIES, Appellant, v. Hon. Philip PURIFOY, Judge, Appellee.

No. 96-416.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Oct. 14, 1996.

Marcella J. Taylor, Sherry P. Bartley, Little Rock, for Appellant.

Barry A. Bryant, Texarkana, TX, for Appellee.

GLAZE, Justice.

Western Waste Industries filed this petition for writ of prohibition to prevent the Circuit Court of Miller County from asserting jurisdiction over claims Western Waste contends belong to the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission. Western Waste owned and operated a municipal solid waste landfill in Texarkana, and Toronza Wilson was its employee until Western Waste closed the landfill in 1993. Subsequently, Wilson filed claims against Western Waste with the Commission, alleging that, during her employment, she had sustained injuries due to exposure to chemicals. She also alleged that, because of her work, she had acquired carpal tunnel syndrome. On May 17, 1994, Western Waste and Wilson executed a joint petition before the Commission, settling Wilson's claims whereby Western Waste agreed to pay Wilson $12,500.00, plus attorney's fees, as a full, complete and final payment and discharge of its liability to Wilson for any past or future injuries or medical expenses relating to her employment with Western Waste.

On February 22, 1995, or nine months after the settlement of her Workers' Compensation claim, Wilson filed a personal injury suit against Western Waste and twelve other entities whom she alleged either generated or transported solid waste which was disposed of at the landfill. Wilson alleged that she sustained injury by virtue of exposure to toxic chemicals during the course of her employment at Western Waste. Wilson's complaint asserted gross negligence, strict liability, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Western Waste filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Ark.R.Civ.P. 12(b) and 12(b)(6), arguing that the Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over Wilson's claims against Western Waste and that Wilson had failed to state facts upon which relief could be granted.

In her response to the motion to dismiss, Wilson contended that her action was based upon the "intentional tort" exception to the exclusive-remedy doctrine of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act, more particularly, Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-105(a) (Repl.1996). Wilson also filed a first amended complaint which added a claim of assault to the previous claims. Western Waste renewed its motion to dismiss, and reasserted that exclusive jurisdiction was with the Commission. The circuit court denied Western Waste's motions to dismiss, and Western Waste filed its petition for writ of prohibition in this court, stating the trial court has no jurisdiction to proceed on Wilson's tort claims since those claims were properly concluded before the Commission. We agree.

We first point out that, where the encroachment on Workers' Compensation jurisdiction is clear, we have not hesitated to hold writs of prohibition are clearly warranted. Hill v. Patterson, 313 Ark. 322, 855 S.W.2d 297 (1993). When considering a petition for a writ of prohibition, jurisdiction is tested on the pleadings, not the proof. Nucor-Yamato Steel Co. v. Circuit Court, 317 Ark. 493, 878 S.W.2d 745 (1994). In addition, this court has held that prohibition is only proper when the jurisdiction of the trial court depends on a legal rather than a factual question. Id.

We conclude that, because the issue in this case is one of law with no facts in dispute, Western Waste's resort to writ of prohibition is appropriate. This court has...