Western Waterproofing v. Springfield Housing Auth.
Decision Date | 22 September 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 86-3144.,86-3144. |
Citation | 669 F. Supp. 901 |
Parties | WESTERN WATERPROOFING COMPANY, INC., Mid-Continental Restoration Company, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. SPRINGFIELD HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Gary L. Cline, Springfield, Ill., for plaintiffs.
Donald A. LoBue, Springfield, Ill., for defendant.
As far as the Court and the parties can discern, this case presents a novel issue under Illinois law.
The ultimate issue: Whether a third party beneficiary contract action may be asserted by an unpaid subcontractor against a public entity where such entity has failed to procure from a general contractor a payment bond as required by the Illinois Bond Act.
The case is before this Court on cross motions for summary judgment. Under Count III of their complaint, Plaintiff Western Waterproofing Company, Inc., prays for judgment in the amount of $129,000. Under Count VI of their complaint, Mid-Continental Restoration Company, Inc., prays for judgment in the amount of $22,456. Defendant Springfield Housing Authority prays for judgment dismissing Counts III and VI of Plaintiffs' complaint.
Summary judgment will be granted where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(c).
The pertinent facts of this suit are undisputed. Plaintiffs were subcontractors for a federally funded construction project of the Defendant, Springfield Housing Authority (SHA). In January 1985, the SHA entered into an agreement with Bildoc, Inc. (Bildoc), for the waterproofing and weatherization of five hi-rise apartment buildings. The general contractor, Bildoc, then entered into contracts with various subcontractors which included Plaintiffs Western Waterproofing Company, Inc. (Western) and Mid-Continental Restoration Company, Inc. (Mid-Continental). Both Plaintiffs contributed labor and materials toward the completion of the project. Both were to receive payment 63 days from completion of the project. Work was completed and final payment, less retainage in the amount of $12,481.16, was made to Bildoc on December 13, 1985.
Western was to be paid $129,000 under its agreement with Bildoc. Mid-Continental was to be paid $22,456 under its agreement with Bildoc. Neither Plaintiff has received any payments for work performed.
Plaintiffs filed their complaint on May 2, 1986. They secured a default judgment against Defendant Bildoc based on Counts I and IV of the complaint in a judgment order entered July 11, 1986. The Plaintiffs have been unable to collect on this judgment. Plaintiffs then resumed proceedings in this case in February 1987 against the SHA. Plaintiffs confessed SHA's motion to strike Counts II and V of the complaint. Thus, Counts III and VI of the complaint, which allege that the Plaintiffs are third party beneficiaries of SHA's contract with Bildoc, remain unlitigated and are the subject of the cross motions for summary judgment.
The basis of the Plaintiffs' claim as a third party beneficiary of the contract between SHA and Bildoc stems from the following provision in the general contract:
The SHA failed to procure from Bildoc either a performance bond or a payment bond. Both parties agree that had a payment bond been secured the Plaintiffs, as subcontractors, would have collected monies due them under such bond. The parties further agree that subcontractors have no rights under a performance bond. Thus, the initial bone of contention is, what exactly was required under the contract. If only a performance bond was required, as stated in the body of the provision, then Western and Mid-Continental as subcontractors have no claim. If, however, a payment bond was also required as stated in the heading of the provision, then Plaintiffs have stated a colorable claim.
The nature of the bonds involved is as follows. Generally, as a condition of the construction contract between an owner (SHA) and a general contractor (Bildoc), the owner requires the contractor to obtain a surety bond. Taylor Woodrow Blitman Const. Corp. v. Southfield Gardens Co., 534 F.Supp. 340, 344 (D.Mass.1982) (footnotes omitted); see also J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 621 (2d ed. 1977). Thus, although the two bonds can be combined into a single bond, they serve separate and distinct purposes. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra.
Id. (emphasis added).1 The Act contains mandatory language directing the requirement of a payment bond to protect materialmen and subcontractors. Fodge v. Board of Educ. of the Village of Oak Park, Dist. 97, 309 Ill.App. 109, 124, 32 N.E.2d 650 (1941).
Under Illinois law, "statutory provisions applicable to a contract ... are deemed to form a part of that contract and must be construed in connection therewith." DC Electronics, Inc. v. Employers Modern Life Co., 90 Ill.App.3d 342, 348, 45 Ill.Dec. 690, 413 N.E.2d 23 (1st Dist.1980); see also Local 165, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Bradley, 149 Ill.App.3d 193, 102 Ill.Dec. 20, 32, 499 N.E.2d 577, 589 (1st Dist.1986) (involving union contract); Lehmann v. Arnold, 137 Ill.App.3d 412, 422, 91 Ill.Dec. 914, 484 N.E.2d 473 (4th Dist. 1985) (involving mortgage contract); Weisberg v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 124 Ill. App.3d 864, 868, 80 Ill.Dec. 187, 464 N.E.2d 1170 (1st Dist.1984) (involving insurance contract); National Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Karaganis, 811 F.2d 357, 362 (7th Cir. 1987) (involving insurance contract). Further, it has been held in Illinois that the "Mechanics' Liens Act becomes a part of every construction contract between an owner and contractor for the erection or improvements of a building." Deerfield Elec. Co. v. Herbert W. Jaeger & Assocs., Inc., 74 Ill.App.3d 380, 384, 30 Ill.Dec. 149, 392 N.E.2d 914 (2d Dist.1979). Similarly, this same rule should apply to the Bond Act where a contract for public work is involved as it has been held that "paragraphs 15 and 16 (of Chapter 29) are remedial and were intended to protect subcontractors and materialmen for whom no right of mechanic's lien exists against a public work." Board of Educ., ex rel. Palumbo v. Pacific Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 19 Ill.App.2d 290, 299, 153 N.E.2d 498 (1st Dist.1958). Thus, because the mechanic's lien was inapplicable under this public works contract, and because the Bond Act was established to achieve the same remedial goal as the mechanic's lien in a public works situation, it follows that the Bond Act should be read into the public works contract between SHA and Bildoc, requiring the procurement of a payment bond as required by the Bond Act.
The second reason a payment bond and not simply a performance bond is held to be required under the contract is that ambiguous contractual language is to be construed against the drafter of the language. Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Center, 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 505 N.E.2d 314 (1987). The contract was apparently drawn by the SHA and would therefore be construed against it. Under this rule, again, a payment bond would be required under the contract. Additionally, it should be noted that, the contract language notwithstanding, the Executive Director of SHA stated in his deposition that:
Having established that a payment and performance bond was necessary under the contract, the Court must now decide whether Plaintiffs are third party beneficiaries under the contract and are, therefore, able to assert the bond provision. The Court determines that they are.
There is no question that had a payment bond been procured Plaintiffs would have been third party beneficiaries under it. The question arises here, however, whether Plaintiffs are third party beneficiaries under the contract provision to procure a bond where none has been procured. The answer in...
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