Westfall v. Board of Com'rs of Clayton Cty.
Decision Date | 26 September 1979 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. C78-1458A. |
Citation | 477 F. Supp. 862 |
Parties | Chris WESTFALL, Individually and on behalf of the members of the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF CLAYTON COUNTY, and Lillian Castleberry, Director, Business License Department, Clayton County. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
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Andrew H. Marshall and J. Hue Henry, Athens, Ga., Barry A. Fisher Law Offices, Barry A. Fisher, Larry J. Roberts, David Grosz, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff.
John R. McCannon, George E. Glaze and Kirby A. Glaze, of Glaze, McNally & Glaze, Jonesboro, Ga., for defendants.
This civil rights action is before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment and on plaintiff's motion for an interim award of attorney's fees.
1. Plaintiff, a member of the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, brings this action on behalf of himself and other members of the church1 in order to obtain religious solicitation privileges in Clayton County. The case began on August 28, 1978, when plaintiff filed his complaint attacking certain licensing provisions of the county's Code of Ordinances as violative of the first amendment when applied to him and to others of his organization. A request for a temporary restraining order was not ruled on at that time, as defendants, apparently recognizing that their then-existing law was constitutionally defective as applied, requested a period of approximately a week in which to draft and enact a replacement. The Code of Ordinances was thereafter amended on September 5, 1978, by addition of Resolution No. 78-37, which provides for the issuance of permits for religious and charitable solicitation and governs the conduct of such solicitors. A permit and identification cards were apparently subsequently issued to members of plaintiff's church.
In general, these requirements are said to be overly broad and burdensome in light of the governmental purposes which they serve.
The applicable law is more easily stated than applied. All parties agree that plaintiff's first amendment solicitation activity is subject to such reasonable "time, place and manner" regulations as may be "necessary to further significant governmental interests". Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2303, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941). Permissible regulation, however, must not be broader than is needed to protect such interests; rather, "the breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960) (footnote omitted). Further, the regulation must be narrowly drawn so as to apprise those regulated of their duties under the law; it must not be unduly vague. See, e. g., Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620, 96 S.Ct. 1755, 48 L.Ed.2d 243 (1976).
Plaintiff does not take issue with these justifications for defendants' ordinance; their whole argument instead focuses upon whether the various portions of the county's regulatory effort go beyond what is necessary to vindicate its legitimate objectives.
The court finds no fault with defendants' limitation of solicitation to the hours from nine in the morning to six in the evening. Plaintiff's suggestion that this choice prevents members of the church from gaining access to many households altogether, as the hours coincide with the working hours of many individuals, ignores the fact that weekend solicitation is perfectly permissible. Furthermore, public solicitation of those individuals who are away from their homes is open to plaintiff and his fellow solicitors during the entire week. The hours chosen thus appear to the court to be a permissible accommodation of plaintiff's right to solicit and the county's interest in preserving the peaceful enjoyment of the home for its citizens. As for prevention of crime, plaintiff recognizes that darkness facilitates the commission of such; this appears to the court to be indisputably true, both in public and private places. While it is clear that the hours chosen by defendants do not precisely coincide with the daylight hours and as a result at certain times of the year prevent solicitation not conducted under cover of darkness, it would also appear to be clear that use of language barring solicitation during the "hours of darkness" or "after sunset" would import into defendants' ordinance the very vagueness which formed a basis for plaintiff's attack on defendants' prior law. Any choice of numbers will bear some appearance of arbitrariness by its very nature, but, if they choose to legislate in this area, defendants must choose some hours in order to warn plaintiff of his obligations. Their present choice appears to the court to be within the area of a reasonable time regulation for the prevention of crime, as it provides warning and opens most of the day to plaintiff for his activities, while barring him from solicitation during the time when criminals could most easily masquerade as solicitors.
Plaintiff's Brief, at 13. Plaintiff does not object to use of the number 25 per se. He is instead concerned that, due to sickness or absence from the county, his church at certain times will not have a full 25 persons operating in the county and, under this provision, will not be able to substitute individuals to make up the full number for the ninety-day period of any one permit. Thus, assuming that the county has a legitimate interest in controlling the total number of solicitors for various organizations which operate within its boundaries, plaintiff appears to suggest that no purpose is served by not permitting it to substitute solicitors so as to constantly operate at full strength.
Defendants justify their number limitation by pointing to a need for the ability to identify solicitors so as to prevent fraud upon the public. In addition, as just indicated, the number is described as an attempt to control the total number of solicitors operating within the county, without regard to the particular organization represented. As for their particular ordinance, defendants appear to take issue with plaintiff's description of the limitation's effect. They assert that they have interpreted it to mean "25 at one time and enforced such accordingly." Defendants' Responsive Brief, at 2.
Reasonable limitations as to number are not improper in and of themselves. See Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 94 (2d...
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