Westfall v. Kijakazi
| Decision Date | 02 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:20 CV 1857 ACL |
| Parties | CHRISTINA WESTFALL, Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Plaintiff Christina Westfall brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the Social Security Administration Commissioner's denial of her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act.
An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that despite Westfall's severe impairments, she was not disabled as she had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform her past relevant work.
This matter is pending before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge, with consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). A summary of the entire record is presented in the parties' briefs and is repeated here only to the extent necessary.
For the following reasons, the decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed.
Westfall filed her applications for benefits on May 13, 2019. (Tr. 197-215.) She claimed she became unable to work on May 1, 2019, due to bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, problems sleeping, and hypertension. (Tr. 209, 216, 244.) Westfall was 50 years of age at her alleged onset of disability date. Her applications were denied initially. (Tr. 131-37.) Westfall's claims were denied by an ALJ on June 11, 2020. (Tr. 55-71.) On October 27, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Westfall's claim for review. (Tr. 1-4.) Thus, the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.
In this action, Westfall raises the following arguments: (1) the ALJ “improperly discredited Plaintiff's subjective complaints based upon unsupported conclusions;” (2) the RFC “is not supported by substantial evidence;” (3) “the opinion evidence was not properly evaluated;” (4) the ALJ “failed to properly consider the issue of failure to follow prescribed treatment;” and (5) the ALJ “failed to properly consider whether plaintiff was justified in not following prescribed treatment.” (Doc. 25 at 4, 8, 10, 11, 13.)
The ALJ first found that Westfall met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2019. (Tr. 60.) She stated that Westfall has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date. Id. In addition, the ALJ concluded that Westfall had the following severe impairment: schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. Id. The ALJ found that Westfall did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Tr. 61.)
As to Westfall's RFC, the ALJ stated:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: limited to simple routine repetitive tasks, but who has sufficient concentration to persist in the performance of such tasks at an appropriate pace with standard breaks, with few changes in work setting, not at a production rate pace (so no assembly line work) only simple work related judgments, with only occasional interactions with supervisors and coworkers, no work with the general public, no tandem tasks.
(Tr. 62.)
The ALJ found that Westfall was capable of performing her past relevant work as a stores laborer. (Tr. 68.) The ALJ therefore concluded that Westfall was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from May 1, 2019, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 70.)
The ALJ's final decision reads as follows:
(Tr. 70-71.)
A. Standard of Review
The decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Estes v. Barnhart, 275 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence, but enough that a reasonable person would find it adequate to support the conclusion. Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). This “substantial evidence test,” however, is “more than a mere search of the record for evidence supporting the Commissioner's findings.” Coleman v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Substantial evidence on the record as a whole . . . requires a more scrutinizing analysis.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
To determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, the Court must review the entire administrative record and consider:
Stewart v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 581, 585-86 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). The Court must also consider any evidence which fairly detracts from the Commissioner's decision. Coleman, 498 F.3d at 770; Warburton v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1999). However, even though two inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the evidence, the Commissioner's findings may still be supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000)). “[I]f there is substantial evidence on the record as a whole, we must affirm the administrative decision, even if the record could also have supported an opposite decision.” Weikert v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Jones ex rel. Morris v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2003). Put another way, a court should “disturb the ALJ's decision only if it falls outside the available zone of choice.” Papesh v. Colvin, 786 F.3d 1126, 1131 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
III.B. Determination of Disability
A disability is defined as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 416.905. A claimant has a disability when the claimant is “not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education and work experience engage in any kind of substantial gainful work which exists … in significant numbers in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To determine whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; see Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2007). First, the Commissioner will consider a claimant's work activity. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i).
Second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner looks to see “whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities.” Dixon v. Barnhart, 343 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2003). “An impairment is not severe if it amounts only to a slight abnormality that would not significantly limit the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” Kirby, 500 F.3d at 707; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(c), 416.921(a).
The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(b). These abilities and aptitudes include (1) physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, or handling; (2) capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) understanding, reaching out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) use of judgment; (5) responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations; and (6) dealing with changes in a routine work setting. Id. § 416.921(b)(1)-(6); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987). “The sequential evaluation process may be terminated at step two only when the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments would have no more than a minimal impact on his ability to work.” Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Third if the claimant has a severe impairment, then the Commissioner will consider the medical...
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