Westfield Companies v. Rovan, Inc.
| Citation | 722 N.E.2d 851 |
| Decision Date | 20 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 43A03-9903-CV-112.,43A03-9903-CV-112. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
| Parties | WESTFIELD COMPANIES, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. ROVAN, INC., Brandon J. Robinson, Terry Barley and Tracy Trout, Individually and as Natural Parents and Guardians of Tiffany Bartley, a Minor, and Tyler Bartley, a Deceased Minor Child, Donald Hatfield, Individually and as Parent of Aaron Hatfield, a Deceased Minor Child, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Aaron Hatfield, Yolanda Lavon Kuda, Mother of Aaron Hatfield, Monte L. Florey, Individually and as Parent of Heather A. Florey, a Deceased Minor Child and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Heather A. Florey, Pamela A. Hiers, Mother of Heather A. Florey, and Monica Hatfield, By Her Guardian, Pamela A. Hiers, and Yaste, Zent & Rye Agency, Inc., Appellees-Defendants. |
Rebecca Hoyt Fischer, Laderer & Fischer, South Bend, Indiana, for Appellant.
W. Douglas Lemon, Millard P. Plumlee, III, Lemon, Armey, Hearn & Leininger, Warsaw, Indiana, for Monte L. Florey.
Bruce A. MacTavish, Pardieck, Gill, Vargo & MacTavish, Seymour, Indiana, Michael L. Valentine, Valentine & Miner, Warsaw, Indiana, for Donald Hatfield.
Thomas D. Blackburn, Blackburn & Green, Fort Wayne, Indiana, for Tracy Trout.
On June 12, 1998, while operating his 1997 Dodge pickup truck in Warsaw, Indiana, Brandon Robinson ("Robinson") was involved in a motor vehicle collision that left three minors dead and two others seriously injured. At issue is whether Robinson was covered under a commercial insurance policy issued by Westfield Companies ("Westfield") to his mother's company Rovan, Inc. ("Rovan") at the time of the accident.
Westfield sought declaratory judgment that the policy in question did not provide coverage for Robinson at the time of the accident. After entertaining cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Rovan. Westfield appeals and asks we either grant summary judgment in its favor or reverse, as genuine issues of material fact exist making summary judgment for Rovan inappropriate. It presents seven issues for our review that we consolidate and restate as:
1. Whether the trial court erred by finding Robinson to be covered under the commercial insurance policy issued by Westfield to Rovan; and
2. Whether there exist genuine issues of material fact.
We affirm.
Rovan is an incorporated business engaged in the repair and renovation of automobiles and recreational vehicles. Cheryl Robinson is the president of Rovan and Robinson is her son. On March 22, 1997, Westfield issued a Commercial Package (the "Policy") to Rovan pursuant to an application submitted by Rovan's insurance agency, Yaste, Zent & Rye Agency, Inc. (the "Agency"). The Policy included, among other things, commercial auto coverage. Initially no vehicles were identified in connection with the Policy. The original policy period ran from March 22, 1997 to March 22, 1998 and was renewed for the period March 22, 1998 to March 22, 1999.
On January 26, 1998, Rovan, by Cheryl Robinson, entered into a written lease agreement with Robinson whereby Rovan leased from Robinson a 1995 Chevy pickup truck. As part of that agreement, Rovan was required to provide direct primary insurance for Robinson for times when Robinson drove the 1995 Chevy. Therefore, pursuant to the lease. Cheryl Robinson notified the Agency of the agreement between Rovan and Robinson, forwarded it a copy of the lease, and requested coverage for Robinson under the Policy. Westfield issued an Amended Common Policy Declaration to the Policy adding the 1995 Chevy as a specifically described auto, effective January 23, 1998. Additionally, Form CA2001 7/97 entitled "Additional Insured—Lessor" was added as an endorsement (the "Lessor Endorsement") to the Policy. This Lessor Endorsement was intended to provide coverage for Robinson as an additional insured under the Policy when driving a vehicle he owned but had leased to Rovan.
In March 1998, with Rovan's consent, Robinson sold the 1995 Chevy and purchased a 1998 Ford Mustang GT. Rovan and Robinson executed another written lease agreement whereby the Mustang was leased to Rovan under the same operative terms and conditions as the previous lease of the 1995 Chevy. Cheryl Robinson notified the Agency of the replacement and requested the 1995 Chevy be deleted from the Policy and the Mustang be added. She did not send the Agency a copy of the new lease. The Agency notified Westfield of the requested change and on April 20, 1998, effective retroactively to March 22, 1998, Westfield issued another Amended Common Policy Declaration that deleted the 1995 Chevy and added the Mustang. That amendment also deleted the Lessor Endorsement. This amendment to the Policy was sent by Westfield in duplicate to the Agency with the understanding a copy would then be forwarded to Rovan.
On June 8, 1998 (three days before the accident), again with Rovan's consent, Robinson sold his Mustang and purchased a 1997 Dodge pickup truck. Rovan and Robinson orally agreed that the 1997 Dodge would replace the leased 1998 Mustang under the same terms and conditions as the two prior written lease agreements. As had been the case with the prior lease agreements, Rovan was again required to provide direct primary liability insurance for Robinson as the lessor. That same day, Cheryl Robinson notified the Agency of the change and requested the Mustang be replaced with the Dodge truck under the Policy. On June 15, 1998 (two days after the accident), pursuant to Rovan's request, the Agency asked Westfield to replace the 1998 Mustang with the 1997 Dodge retroactive to June 8, 1998.
Westfield filed its complaint for declaratory judgment on November 3, 1998 seeking a judgment that the policy in question did not provide coverage for Robinson at the time of the accident. Westfield moved for summary judgment on December 11, 1998. On February 12, 1999, Rovan filed a Joint Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court entered its order granting Rovan's motion for summary judgment and denying Westfield's motion on March 10, 1999. This appeal followed.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Rovan after finding Robinson covered under the Policy despite the deletion of the Lessor Endorsement prior to the June 12, 1998 accident. Summary judgment is the appropriate method for terminating a cause of action that presents no genuine issue of material fact and which may be determined as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Taylor v. Duke, 713 N.E.2d 877, 880 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999).1
This case involves the interpretation of an insurance contract. Such cases are particularly appropriate for summary judgment as the interpretation of a contract is a matter of law. Marlatt v. United Farm Bureau Family Life Ins. Co., 640 N.E.2d 1073, 1076 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). We "consider all of the provisions of the contract to ascertain its meaning, not just individual words, phrases, or paragraphs, and must accept a construction which harmonizes the provisions rather than one which supports a conflicting version of the provisions." Anderson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 471 N.E.2d 1170, 1172 (Ind.Ct.App.1984).
At issue on appeal is the coverage provided by the Lessor Endorsement included in the Policy at the request of Rovan for the benefit of Robinson.2 Though this endorsement was deleted prior to the accident, Rovan maintains Westfield cannot now deny coverage. It argues the endorsement would have covered Robinson had it not been deleted and that the deletion was a cancellation of coverage for which Westfield failed to provide notice as required under the Policy. We agree.
Westfield argues the Lessor Endorsement issued to Rovan effective January 23, 1998 was specific to the 1995 Chevy and once that truck was sold and Rovan asked for it to be deleted from the policy, "the Lessor Endorsement was automatically deleted from the Westfield Policy as well." (Br. of Appellant at 13.) Rovan, however, argues the 1997 Dodge was a replacement auto subject to a lease3 between Rovan and Robinson and would have been covered under the express language of the Lessor Endorsement had it not been deleted from the Policy.
As mentioned above, this dispute requires us to interpret the Policy, specifically the Lessor Endorsement. When interpreting an insurance policy we give plain and ordinary meaning to language that is clear and unambiguous. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 698 N.E.2d 770, 773 (Ind.1998). Policy language is unambiguous if reasonable persons could not honestly differ as to its meaning. Id. To this end, we look to see "if policy language is susceptible to more than one interpretation." Id. If an insurance policy contains ambiguous provisions, they are construed in favor of the insured. Id. Id.
The Lessor Endorsement provides coverage to a lessor for "any `leased auto' described in the Schedule."4 (R. at 81.) The coverage extends "until the expiration date shown in the Schedule, or when the lessor ... takes possession of the `leased auto', whichever occurs first." (R. at 81.) The term "leased auto" is defined by the Lessor Endorsement as "an `auto' leased or rented to you, including any substitute, replacement or extra `auto' needed to meet seasonal or other needs, under a leasing or rental agreement that requires you to provide direct primary insurance for the lessor." (R. at 81.)
Westfield contends that the Lessor Endorsement is vehicle specific and that, for Robinson to be covered under the Policy, Rovan must have requested it be added to...
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