Westfield Ins. Co. v. Sistersville Tank Works, Inc.

Decision Date04 September 2020
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 5:18-CV-100
Citation484 F.Supp.3d 283
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia
Parties WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. SISTERSVILLE TANK WORKS, INC., Robert N. Edwards, Deborah S. Edwards, E. Jane Price, individually and as Executrix of the Estate of Robert G. Price, deceased, Gary Thomas Sandy, Peggy P. Sandy, Douglas L. Steele, and Carol Steele, Defendants, Sistersville Tank Works, Inc., Defendant, Counterclaim Plaintiff, and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. Reagle & Padden, Inc., and David C. Padden, Third-Party Defendants.

Brent K. Kesner, Ernest G. Hentschel, II, Tanya M. Kesner, Kesner & Kesner PLLC, Charleston, WV, James C. Clark, Pro Hac Vice, Jeremy R. Lacks, Pro Hac Vice, John J. Haggerty, Pro Hac Vice, Fox Rothschild, LLP, Warrington, PA, for Plaintiff.

Patrick S. Casey, Ryan P. Orth, David K. Coleman, Sandra M. Chapman, Casey & Chapman, PLLC, Wheeling, WV, for Defendant Sistersville Tank Works, Inc.

David B. Lunsford, R. Dean Hartley, Hartley Law Group, PLLC, Wheeling, WV, for Defendants Robert N. Edwards, Deborah S. Edwards, E. Jane Price, Douglas L. Steele, Carol Steele.

Danielle J. Lewis, Pro Hac Vice, Reminger Co., L.P.A., Louisville, KY, Kenton Howard Steele, Zachary B. Pyers, Rachel Lee Coles, Reminger Co., L.P.A., Columbus, OH, for Third-Party Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN PRESTON BAILEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Presently before this Court is defendant Sistersville Tank Works, Inc.'s ("STW") Motion for Summary Judgment on Behalf of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Sistersville Tank Works, Inc. [Doc. 298] and Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limit Behalf of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Sistersville Tank Works, Inc. [Doc. 299], both filed on August 30, 2019. As a preliminary matter, this Court finds good cause and hereby GRANTS STW's Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limit [Doc. 299] , and ORDERS STW's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 299-1] filed.

Similarly, plaintiff Westfield Insurance Company ("Westfield") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 302], an accompanying Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages [Doc. 303], and a Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment [Doc. 310]. Finding good cause, this Court hereby GRANTS Westfield's Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages [Doc. 303] , and ORDERS Westfield's Memorandum in Support [Doc. 310] filed.

Third-party defendants Reagle & Padden, Inc. and David C. Padden ("Padden") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 300] and accompanying Memorandum in Support [Doc. 301].

Subsequently, defendant STW filed a Response in Opposition [Doc. 311] to defendant Padden's Motion for Summary Judgment, and a Response in Opposition [Doc. 312] to plaintiff Westfield's Motion for Summary Judgment. Similarly, plaintiff Westfield then filed a Response in Opposition [Doc. 313] to defendant STV's Motion for Summary Judgment. Each party then filed associated Replies. See [Docs. 314, 315, & 316]. Having been fully briefed, this matter is now ripe for adjudication.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Westfield initiated this action for declaratory judgment against defendant STW. See [Doc. 1]. Specifically, plaintiff Westfield asks this Court to declare that it is not required to defend and indemnify defendant STW in several actions currently pending in state court in which defendant STW is accused of negligence resulting in cancer

diagnoses in the state court plaintiffs. [Id.]. Plaintiff Westfield asserts the same argument in its Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 302.].

Conversely, in its Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 298] and accompanying Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 299-1], defendant STW moves this Court to declare that plaintiff Westfield owes it a continuing duty to defend under the terms and conditions of various insurance policies issued to it by Westfield. [Id.].

Defendant STW also has several pending claims against defendant Padden related to the alleged "mis-handling" of defendant STW's underlying claims and insurance agreements. See [Doc. 11]. Defendant Padden argues in its Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 300] and accompanying Memorandum in Support [Doc. 301] that each of defendant STW's claims against it fail as a matter of law.

RELEVANT FACTS

Defendant STW is a West Virginia corporation located in Sistersville, West Virginia. [Doc. 299-1 at 2]. The corporation manufactures, repairs, and installs industrial storage tanks for the chemical, petroleum, energy, and pharmaceutical industries. [Id.]. At the time plaintiff Westfield commenced this action, defendant STW had been named as a defendant in three cases currently pending before the Circuit Court of Marshall County, West Virginia.1 [Id.]. Each of the state claimants was diagnosed with cancer

in 2014, 2015, and 2016, respectively. [Id. at 3]. In each state action, the respective plaintiffs claim their cancers were caused by exposure to harmful chemicals as a result of defendant STW's negligent manufacture, installation, repair and/or maintenance of storage tanks at the industrial sites where they were employed from the 1960s to the early 2000s. See [Doc. 299-1].

Defendant STW has utilized defendant Padden as its insurance agent since 1985. [Doc. 311 at 3]. Notably, defendant Padden acted as the insurance agent who brokered the policies at issue with the parties in the pending suit. See [Doc. 11]. Specifically, defendant STW purchased two insurance policies from plaintiff Westfield, through defendant Padden, over the course of twenty-two (22) years, from April 15, 1989, through April 15, 2010. See [Doc. 1]. Policy No. 3471223 was a commercial general liability policy with a policy period extending from April 15, 1989, to April 15, 2010 (the "1989–2010 CGL Policy"). The 1989–2010 CGL Policy specifically excluded coverages for claims arising from "products" and "completed operations." [Id. at ¶¶ 51–66]. Policy No. 3471224 was a "claims made" policy issued by plaintiff Westfield from April 15, 1989, to April 15, 2001, which provided defendant STW with "products/completed operations" coverage. [Id. at ¶¶ 48–49]. As the underlying state court claims were brought after this policy period ended, the parties agree that Policy No. 3471224 does not provide defendant STW coverage against those claims. See [Doc. 299-1].

As discovery progressed, it revealed that defendant Padden also procured insurance on defendant STW's behalf from plaintiff Westfield under a series of CGL and umbrella policies from January 1, 1985, to April 15, 1989. See [Doc. 120]. As the arguments asserted in the parties' respective Motions hinge on whether underlying coverage for the aforementioned state claims exists, this Court begins with a recitation of the following relevant facts and applicable law.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND JURISDICTION
I. Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. "The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In reviewing the supported underlying facts, all inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Additionally, the party opposing summary judgment "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. That is, once the movant has met its burden to show absence of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment must then come forward with affidavits or other evidence demonstrating there is indeed a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 323–25, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). Although all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the non-movant, the non-moving party "cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation of the building of one inference upon another." Beale v. Hardy , 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). Further, "the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

When faced with cross-motions for summary judgment, a district court is not required to grant judgment as a matter of law for one side or the other; rather, the court must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party...

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