Westfield v. Yellow Cab Co. of Providence, s. 10320

Decision Date02 April 1962
Docket Number10321,Nos. 10320,s. 10320
Citation94 R.I. 206,179 A.2d 501
PartiesIrene WESTFIELD v. YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF PROVIDENCE. Howard W. WESTFIELD v. YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF PROVIDENCE. Ex.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

Stephen F. Mullen, Providence, for plaintiffs.

McGee & Doorley, Frank J. McGee, Providence, for defendant.

ROBERTS, Justice.

These are two actions of trespass on the case for negligence brought by a wife and her husband to recover for personal injury and consequential damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of a collision between two motor vehicles. The cases were tried together to a jury in the superior court and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff wife in the amount of $1,200 and for the plaintiff husband in the amount of $300. Thereafter the defendant's motion in each case for a new trial was granted, and the cases are before this court on the plaintiffs' exceptions thereto.

The collision out of which the instant litigation arose occurred shortly after noon on May 7, 1959 at the intersection of Plain and Trask streets in the city of Providence. One of the automobiles involved therein was owned by Howard W. Westfield and operated by his wife Irene Westfield, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff. The other automobile involved was a taxicab owned by defendant and operated by its employee Arthur Marsland. The plaintiff and defendant's driver were the only eye-witnesses to the accident who testified during the trial. It is not disputed that prior to the collision plaintiff was operating her car in a westerly direction along Trask street toward the easterly side of the intersection thereof with Plain street. The defendant's cab was being operated along Plain street in a northerly direction, approaching the southerly side of said intersection or, in other words, approaching the intersection from plaintiff's left.

According to plaintiff's testimony, she brought her car to what she described as 'practically a stop' at the intersection with its front bumper at that time being at the easterly line of the intersection. She testified that she then looked to her left in a southerly direction into Plain street. To her immediate left at the southeast corner of the intersection stood a large house partly surrounded by a wire fence. A bay window projected from this house on the Plain street side, and a large tree was located at the southeast corner of the intersection.

The plaintiff testified that when she looked southerly into Plain street, she was able to see into the westerly side thereof a distance which she approximated as being between 70 and 90 feet. She testified, however, that her view along the easterly side of Plain street was restricted to a distance which she approximated as being about 25 feet. Her testimony, in substance, was that the distance she could see along the easterly side of Plain street was limited by the location of the house and tree at the southeast corner of the intersection. The plaintiff further testified that she saw no vehicles on that part of Plain street within her view when she looked to her left. She then looked to her right, or in a northerly direction, along Plain street and observed no vehicles approaching from that direction. She shifted her car into first gear and drove into the intersection. When the front end of her car was approximately halfway across the intersection, she looked again to her left and for the first time saw defendant's cab. She stated that it was about 24 feet away, approaching from her left. In an attempt to avoid a collision, she increased the speed of her car, but defendant's cab struck the left side of her car just to the rear of the left front fender.

The testimony of defendant's driver is in conflict with that of plaintiff. According to his version of the accident, he had, upon reaching the southerly side of the intersection, slowed down and looked to his right, being able to see into Trask street for a distance of from 20 to 30 feet. He testified that he saw no vehicle within this portion of Trask street and proceeded to enter the intersection. He stated that when he was about halfway through the intersection, he again looked to his right and saw plaintiff's car about 20 feet away coming toward him. He then attempted to turn his car to the left to avoid the collision and, applying the brake, brought it to a stop, at which time plaintiff's car struck the right front fender of the cab.

The trial justice, in deciding the motions for a new trial, stated that in his opinion the evidence established the negligence of defendant's operator. He granted the motions, however, expressly on the ground that plaintiff was contributorily negligent when she entered the intersection in the circumstances to which she had herself testified. In other words, it is our opinion that the trial justice, in passing upon the weight of the evidence, rejected the testimony of defendant's operator and gave full credibility to the testimony of plaintiff concerning the conditions and circumstances under which she entered the intersection. He concluded from that evidence, however, that plaintiff's act in entering the intersection under such conditions constituted contributory negligence.

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1 cases
  • Colvin v. Goldenberg
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
    • February 18, 1971
    ...is a question of fact. Waltz v. Aycrigg, 103 R.I. 109, 235 A.2d 338; Ferretti v. Berry, 96 R.I. 67, 189 A.2d 344; Westfield v. Yellow Cab Co., 94 R.I. 206, 179 A.2d 501. Although in Ferreira v. McGrath Truck Leasing Corp., 104 R.I. 642, 247 A.2d 842, we did say there are 'unique' cases wher......

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