Westin Crown Plaza Hotel Co. v. King, 65166

• Decision Date: 15 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. 65166,65166
• Citation: 664 S.W.2d 2
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: WESTIN CROWN PLAZA HOTEL COMPANY, Claridge Manor Co., Ltd., and Arrowhead Properties, Inc., Appellants, v. Richard KING, Director of Revenue, Barrett Toan, Director of Social Services, Dr. Robert Hotchkins, Director of Health, John D. Ashcroft, Attorney General, State of Missouri, Respondents.

Page 2

664 S.W.2d 2

WESTIN CROWN PLAZA HOTEL COMPANY, Claridge Manor Co., Ltd., and Arrowhead Properties, Inc., Appellants, v. Richard KING, Director of Revenue, Barrett Toan, Director of

Social Services, Dr. Robert Hotchkins, Director of

Health, John D. Ashcroft, Attorney

General, State of Missouri, Respondents.

No. 65166.

Supreme Court of Missouri,

En Banc.

Feb. 15, 1984.

Robert L. Hyder, Jefferson City, for appellants.

John Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., William E. Cornwell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondents.

BILLINGS, Judge.

Action for declaratory judgment by which plaintiffs, Westin Crown Plaza Hotel Company, Claridge Manor Co., Ltd., and Arrowhead Properties, Inc., sought to have Senate Bill 575 enacted by the 81st General Assembly declared unconstitutional. The trial court entered a partial judgment on the pleadings and declared that Senate Bill 575 does not violate Article X, Sections 16-24, of the Missouri Constitution (the Hancock Amendment). Defendants then requested and the trial court granted a second motion for judgment on the pleadings and declared that Senate Bill 575 does not violate Article III, Section 21 or 23 of the Missouri Constitution. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment with respect to the Article III allegations and we retained jurisdiction because the validity of a state statute is contested. Mo. Const. art. V, § 3. We affirm.

Plaintiffs are hotel owner-operators and claim Senate Bill 575 directly affected them by increasing the license fees charged for hotels generally and plaintiffs in particular. The license fee is paid to the state Director of Revenue and upon such payment a license is issued by the director of the Division of Health.

Plaintiffs' first attack against Senate Bill 575 complains that contrary to Section 21, Article III of the Constitution of Missouri, the bill was "so amended in its passage through either house as to change its original purpose." ¹ Their second contention is that Senate Bill 575 violates the prohibition of Section 23, Article III of the Constitution of Missouri that "[n]o bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title." ²

The title to Senate Bill No. 575, as originally introduced into the Senate of the 81st General Assembly stated as follows:

An Act to repeal sections 193.190 and 193.320, RSMo 1978, relating to fees and compensation of state and local registrars of vital statistics, and to enact in lieu thereof two new sections relating to the same subject. (emphasis added).

The first reading was given to the bill on January 6, 1982 and the bill was perfected with the same title and passed by the Senate on the third reading February 25, 1982.

On March 1, 1982 the first reading was had in the House of Representatives, and on March 18, 1982 said bill was reported as a House Committee substitute with the following title:

An Act to repeal sections 193.190, 193.320, 197.050, 197.210, 315.050, and 315.270, RSMo 1978, and section 640.100, RSMo Supp.1981, relating to certain fees related to the division of health, and to enact in lieu thereof eight new sections relating to the same subject. (emphasis added).

The bill as truly agreed to and finally passed on April 22, 1982 contained the same title last quoted.

The changes in the bill's title reflect substantive changes made to the bill itself as it passed through the legislative chambers. As originally introduced, Senate Bill 575 repealed sections 193.190 and 193.320 ³ and enacted in lieu thereof two new sections similarly numbered relating to the same subjects. Section 193.190 concerns state registrar fees charged for copies and searches of birth, death, legitimation and adoption certificates. Section 193.320 concerns compensation of local registrars for returning birth, death and stillbirth certificates to the state. Senate Bill 575 as originally introduced merely increased the fee and compensation rates for state and local registrars set forth in sections 193.190 and 193.320.

As eventually enacted, Senate Bill 575 repealed seven sections and enacted in lieu thereof eight new sections. This metamorphosis was the result of additions made to the bill as it passed through the House chambers. In addition to the original two sections contained in the bill as first passed by the Senate (§§ 193.190 and 193.320), the bill in its final form included: § 192.050, newly creating a handling charge for test performed in Division of Health laboratories; § 197.050, increasing the license fee for hospitals; § 197.210, increasing the license fee for ambulatory surgical centers; § 325.050, increasing the license fee for hotels; § 315.270, increasing the annual fee for conducting a motel or resort; and § 640.100, establishing laboratory fees for testing drinking water furnished to the public.

Plaintiffs note that the title to Senate Bill 575 as originally introduced and passed by the Senate reflected the fact that the bill concerned only two sections contained in Chapter 193, Vital Statistics. The title declared the bill an act "relating to fees and compensation of state and local registrars of vital statistics". Plaintiffs further point out the bill in its final form included sections found in Chapter 192, Division of Health, Chapter 197, Medical Treatment Facility Licenses, Chapter 315, Hotel and Tourist Camp Regulations and Chapter 640, Department of Natural Resources. Plaintiffs complain that none of the four chapters relate to the fees and compensation of state and local registrars of vital statistics and conclude that these provisions of the bill have a purpose different from the original purpose of the bill (i.e., increasing fees for registrars of vital statistics). Further, plaintiffs also argue that these latter provisions concern subjects other than those originally in the Senate bill and as a result the final bill contains more than one subject. Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the result of the foregoing is that the subject[s] of the bill is not clearly contained in its title.

We begin our analysis of plaintiffs' points by recalling several principles of constitutional interpretation. A statute has a presumption of constitutionality. State v. Newlon, 627 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 884, 103 S.Ct. 185, 74 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982). The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must plead facts in support of the attack, City of St. Louis v. Butler Co., 358 Mo. 1221, 219 S.W.2d 372 (banc 1949), and the burden of proof is on the party attacking the statute. Atkins v. Department of Building Regulations, 596 S.W.2d 426, 434 (Mo.1980). Finally, we note that we are to resolve all doubt in favor of the act's validity, State ex rel. McClellan v. Godfrey, 519 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Mo. banc 1975), and in so doing we are allowed to make every reasonable intendment to sustain the constitutionality of the statute. Allied Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bell, 353 Mo. 891, 185 S.W.2d 4, 6 (1945).

We have on several occasions been confronted with the task of examining legislative enactments in light of the constitutional limitations contained in Article III, Section 21 and 23. See e.g., Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach, 636 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. banc 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1094, 103 S.Ct. 711, 74 L.Ed.2d 942 (1983); State ex rel. Toedebusch Transfer, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 520 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. banc 1975). The purpose of these constitutional limitations is to prevent surprise or fraud upon legislators and to fairly appraise the public of the pending legislation's subject matter. State v. Ludwig, 322 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Mo. banc 1959), citing, 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 314 (1927).

In considering the claim that Senate Bill 575 violates Article III, Section 21, it is necessary to compare the purpose of the original Senate Bill 575 and of Senate Bill 575 as actually passed. "[P]urpose means the general purpose of the bill, not the mere details through which that purpose is manifested and effectuated." State ex rel. McCaffery v. Mason, 155 Mo. 486, 55 S.W 636, 640,aff'd, 179 U.S. 328, 21 S.Ct. 125, 45 L.Ed. 214 (1900). "[T]he restriction is against the introduction of matter 'not germane to the object of legislation or unrelated to its original subject,' alterations which bring about an extension or limitation of the scope of a bill are not prohibited, even new matter is not excluded, if germane." State v. Ludwig, 322 S.W.2d at 847. ⁴

The original title to Senate Bill 575 stated it was an act "relating to fees and compensation of state and local registrars of vital statistics." However, we have previously held that "the title of an act, 'through performing a most important function, is still not strictly a part of the act proper.' " Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach, 636 S.W.2d at 38. The title, not being part of the bill, can be changed without violating art. III, § 21. Id. Furthermore, in Lincoln Credit we recognized that it may be appropriate for the legislature to change the title of a bill as it proceeds through the legislature to more accurately reflect the real scope of the subject matter in the bill. Id. We cannot surmise that the original title of Senate Bill 575 was reflective of a desire to restrict the bill's original purpose to matters concerning state and local registrars. It is more compelling to reason that the bill's title was changed to more accurately reflect a broader purpose which the original bill was intended to accomplish. We find it reasonable to conclude that the original purpose of the bill was to change various fees charged by the Division of Health. The subsequent changes in the bill's title reflect the addition of several new sections in the bill designed to accomplish the original purpose of the bill, i.e., increase various fees charged by the Division of Health through its subdivisions. Thus, these later amendments merely changed the details through which the original purpose was to be manifested and...