Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. National Electric Co.

Decision Date20 February 1905
Citation152 F. 466
PartiesWESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC & MFG. CO. v. NATIONAL ELECTRIC CO.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

Kerr Page & Cooper and Edward Rector, for complainant.

Winkler Flanders, Bottum & Fawsett, for defendant.

SEAMAN Circuit Judge.

While the validity of all the patents is assailed by the answer and testimony on the part of the defendant, the only issue pressed at the hearing and in the briefs by way of defense is noninfringement. That issue, however, rests on consideration of the prior art, and the difficulties in the way of its solution are not much simplified by passing the question of validity. Indeed, in the light of the opinions which have been handed down, discussing both prior art and alleged anticipations, and upholding the broad patents, Nos. 381,968 and 382,280, I am impressed with the view that the character of the invention and validity of those patents may justly be treated as well established. The opinions referred to are instructive as well for the purposes of the present issue of infringement, though not involving synchronous motor infringement. The case against New England Granite Co. (C.C.) 103 F. 951 (on affirmance 110 F. 753, 49 C.C.A. 151), is the leading one, with that of Royal Weaving Co. (C.C.) 115 F 733, in line; and other reported decisions are Tesla Electric Co. v. Scott & Janney et al. (C.C.) 97 F. 588; Westinghouse E. & M. Co. v. Dayton Fan & Motor Co (C.C.) 106 F. 724; Dayton Fan & Motor Co. v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 118 F. 567, 55 C.C.A. 390; Westinghouse E. & M. Co. v. Dayton Fan & Motor Co. (C.C.) 106 F. 729; Westinghouse E. & M. Co. v. Catskill Illuminating Co. (C.C.) 110 F. 377; Westinghouse E. & M. Co. v. Hiram C. Roberts et al. (C.C.) 125 F. 6; Westinghouse E. & M. Co. v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. (C.C.) 129 F. 213; Westinghouse E. & M. Co. v. Stanley Instrument Co., 133 F. 167, 68 C.C.A. 523. With the excellent and thorough review of the earlier patents and prior art, and the well-considered concurrent view of the novelty and scope of the Tesla inventions covered by the patents, thus appearing in several of these opinions, I am relieved of any need to attempt an analysis of the general showing in the present case, which departs from the prior cases only in respect of the application of the invention to the synchronous motor type. Although the inquiry thus presented is not free from difficulty, involving abstruse discussion and distinctions in the electrical art which are perplexing to the nonexpert understanding and are not clarified by the many pages of conflicting expert testimony, the arguments at the bar were clear and well directed, and I am convinced that the issue as now presented is within narrow compass and governed by tests for its solution which are not complicated. Favored with opportunity to take up the final consideration without delay, I deem it just to all interests (with the patents soon expiring) to pass the decree in conformity with my conclusions thereupon, without extended discussion of the interesting questions involved, as the time remaining at my disposal before interlocutory decree should be entered, to be seasonable for appeal, is now quite limited.

The defendant's contentions are, in substance, that the Tesla invention, embodied in each of the patents, is the 'rotating field mode of operation,' which is 'the production by the conjoint effect of out of phase currents of a progressive shifting of the polarity,' and thus 'identical in its effect with that of a rotating physical magnet'; that it is limited to a self-starting motor so operated, and both by the terms of the patents and the state of the art the defendant's synchronous motor with direct current excitation is not within the invention; that the defendant's synchronous motor is simply a reversed 'two-phase alternating current dynamo of the prior art used as a generator,' adapted to alternative use; and that the claims of patents 381,969 and 382,281, which bring in 'direct current excitation producing synchronous operation,' must be limited to such use 'after the motor is started by the Tesla means and method and brought up to speed.' If the invention is so limited by the prior art, it is plain that the defendant escapes infringement. On the other hand, if not so restricted, it is equally clear that the claims of the patents are broad enough to reach the defendant's means and method of operation. The Tesla discovery for which these patents were granted revolutionized the art of electrical power transmission, as well...

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