Westlake North Property Owners Ass'n v. City of Thousand Oaks, s. 89-55377
| Decision Date | 28 September 1990 |
| Docket Number | 89-55510,89-55666 and 89-55668,Nos. 89-55377,s. 89-55377 |
| Citation | 915 F.2d 1301 |
| Parties | WESTLAKE NORTH PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, Shelby H. Moore, Jr.; Theresa A. Hooks, Appellants, v. CITY OF THOUSAND OAKS, Defendant-Appellee, Lang Ranch Company; The Anden Group, Real Parties in Interest-Appellees. WESTLAKE NORTH PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, Shelby H. Moore, Jr.; Theresa A. Hooks, Appellants, v. CITY OF THOUSAND OAKS, Defendant. Lang Ranch Company; The Housing Group; Langmoor Corporation; The Anden Group, Real Parties in Interest-Appellees. WESTLAKE NORTH PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, and Shelby H. Moore, Jr.; Theresa A. Hooks, Appellants, v. CITY OF THOUSAND OAKS, Defendant, and Lang Ranch Company, Real Party in Interest-Appellee. and The Housing Group; Langmoor Corporation; The Anden Group, Real Parties in Interest. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Shelby H. Moore, Jr., and Theresa A. Hooks, Thousand Oaks, Cal., pro se, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Mark G. Sellers, City Atty., Thousand Oaks, Cal., for defendant-appellee, City of Thousand Oaks.
Karen J. Lee, Hamilton & Samuels, Newport Beach, Cal., for real-party-in-interest-appellee, Lang Ranch Co.
Antonette B. Cordero and Susan L. Goodkin, Deputy Attys. Gen., Los Angeles, Cal., for amicus curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
Before WALLACE, THOMPSON and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.
Moore and Hooks, the attorneys for Westlake North Property Owners Association (Westlake), appeal the district court's imposition of sanctions against them. The district court's jurisdiction is in dispute. We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. We reverse the imposition of sanctions.
This case arises out of the efforts of various parties to control growth and development in the City of Thousand Oaks (City). In May of 1983, the City filed an action in California state court questioning the validity of a number of agreements between the City and Lang Ranch, a developer. The City asked for declaratory relief concerning the City's ability to contract away its zoning powers and to commit to density and zoning plans. This action was removed to federal court where it was joined with an action instituted by Lang Ranch against the City alleging that the City had violated Lang Ranch's federal constitutional rights pursuant to the takings, contract, and due process clauses of the federal constitution.
The district court advised the parties that if the matter proceeded to trial, there existed a strong possibility that Lang Ranch would prevail in some or all of its claims. Eventually, Lang Ranch and the City agreed to a stipulated judgment, which the district court approved and entered on October 28, 1986.
Nearly two years after Lang Ranch and the City had entered into the stipulated judgment, on October 27, 1988, Westlake, represented by attorneys Moore and Hooks, filed a petition for a writ of mandate in a California state court. Westlake prayed for relief in the form of (1) a Preemptory Writ of Mandate and/or Administrative Mandamus ordering the City to set aside certification of an Environmental Impact Report and approval of a tract map; (2) a Writ of Mandate issued by the state court to the City directing the City to petition the federal district court to seek modification of the stipulated judgment; (3) declaratory relief on a number of issues; (4) costs; (5) attorneys' fees; and (6) any other relief the court would grant.
The City and Lang Ranch removed this suit to the district court, arguing that it constituted a challenge to the earlier stipulated judgment. The district court exercised removal jurisdiction over the case. Westlake amended its petition and requested that the case be remanded to state court. The district court denied this request. The district court dismissed the amended petition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and determined that Westlake, as well as Moore and Hooks, should be sanctioned for filing the suit. Thereafter, Westlake reached a settlement with the City and Lang Ranch and agreed to drop all further litigation. Moore and Hooks appealed.
The narrow issue we are called upon to decide in this appeal is whether the district court properly sanctioned Moore and Hooks pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 70, and 71. Before turning to that issue, however, we must first decide whether the district court possessed jurisdiction to sanction Moore and Hooks.
Moore and Hooks contend that the district court did not properly exercise removal jurisdiction over the case and therefore could not impose sanctions upon them. We have held, however, that "[t]he fact that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case [does] not preclude it from imposing sanctions." Orange Production Credit Association v. Frontline Ventures Ltd., 792 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir.1986) (Orange Production ); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2455-56, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) (Cooter & Gell ) ( ); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1172 (5th Cir.1988) (). Thus, even if a court does not have jurisdiction over an underlying action, it may have jurisdiction to determine whether the parties have abused the judicial system and whether sanctions are appropriate to remedy such abuse.
Although the cases that articulate this jurisdictional rule arose in the rule 11 context, we see no reason why their jurisdictional holding should not extend to the sanctions imposed by the district court pursuant to rules 70 and 71. The district court imposed both the rule 11 and rules 70 and 71 sanctions to remedy what it considered an abuse of the judicial system. Because the court has power to administer sanctions for this purpose regardless of whether it lacked jurisdiction over the merits of the case, Orange Production, 792 F.2d at 801, the district court possessed jurisdiction over all the sanctions aspects of this case. As this appeal deals only with the sanctions issue, we need not reach the broader question of whether the district court possessed removal jurisdiction to hear the merits of the case.
Having established that the district court possessed jurisdiction to impose sanctions, we turn to whether the district court properly imposed sanctions on Moore and Hooks. The district court sanctioned Moore and Hooks for filing Westlake's petition for writ of mandate in state court pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 70 and 71. The court sanctioned Moore and Hooks for filing the amended petition and related pleadings in federal court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. We first address the rules 70 and 71 sanctions. Whether rules 70 and 71 give the district court power to impose sanctions upon attorneys is a question of law that we review de novo. See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984).
Rule 70 states in part that "[i]f a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver deeds or other documents or to perform any other specific act and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by the court...." Fed.R.Civ.P. 70 (emphasis added). According to its plain language, this rule applies only to parties who have failed to perform specific acts pursuant to a judgment. See McCabe v. Arave, 827 F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir.1987) () (emphasis added). Neither Moore nor Hooks is a party to any of the underlying actions; rather, they are the attorneys of one of the parties--Westlake. Consequently, rule 70 cannot apply to Moore and Hooks. The district court erred by sanctioning Moore and Hooks pursuant to rule 70.
Rule 71 provides that
[w]hen an order is made in favor of a person who is not a party to the action, that person may enforce obedience to the order by the same process as if a party; and, when obedience to an order may be lawfully enforced against a person who is not a party, that person is liable to the same process for enforcing obedience to the order as if a party.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 71. The language of rule 71 does not suggest that a court may use that rule as an independent basis for administering sanctions against an attorney. Rather, rule 71 provides that a non-party "is liable to the same process for enforcing obedience to the order as if a party." Id. As the Second Circuit has observed, "[i]t seems clear that Rule 71 was intended to assure that process be made available to enforce court orders in favor of and against persons who are properly affected by them, even if they are not parties to the action." Lasky v. Quinlan, 558 F.2d 1133, 1137 (2d Cir.1977). The district court, however, did not use rule 71 to enforce an order against Moore and Hooks. Rather, the court used rule 71 to sanction them. Such a use of rule 71 is clearly unsupported by the language and purpose of the rule. Rule 71 was designed to memorialize the common sense rule that courts can enforce their orders against both parties and non-parties. It therefore cannot provide an independent basis...
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