Weston v. State

• Decision Date: 02 November 1906
• Docket Number: 20,887
• Citation: Weston v. State, 167 Ind. 324, 78 N.E. 1014 (Ind. 1906)
• Parties: Weston v. The State
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

78 N.E. 1014

167 Ind. 324

Weston v. The State

No. 20,887

Supreme Court of Indiana

November 2, 1906

From Huntington Circuit Court; James C. Branyan, Judge.

Prosecution by the State of Indiana against Boston Weston.From a judgment of conviction, he appeals.

Reversed.

J. S Branyan and C. W. Watkins, for appellant.

Charles W. Miller, Attorney-General, C. C. Hadley, H. M. Dowling and W. C. Geake, for the State.

OPINION

Gillett, J.

Appellant was convicted in the court below of involuntary manslaughter.There was testimony of the following state of facts: On the evening of January 30, 1906, a party of six men went from Decatur to Huntington to attend a minstrel performance and a lodge banquet.The members of the party, or some of them at least, commenced drinking when they reached Huntington.They were quite boisterous at the performance and various members of the party, or all of them, were drinking at the banquet, which was held afterwards.At 1 o'clock a. m. they telephoned for a hack, and appellant, who was a hack driver, came in response to the message, and drove them to the depot.Upon their alighting, an altercation occurred between them and appellant over the question as to whether he was entitled to seventy-five cents in addition to the like sum which he had already received.The upshot of the quarrel was that appellant struck one of the party, Roman J. Holthouse, with his fist, knocking him down.As the latter fell, his head struck the sidewalk, causing his death.According to the testimony of appellant, while the dispute was in progress the members of the party advanced toward him, forming a semicircle, while he retreated until he stood beside his hack.Their talk was loud and profane, and their manner threatening.Appellant testified that he merely continued to assert that he was entitled to the additional fare, when the deceased, calling him a vile name and threatening to knock his head off, stepped quickly towards him.It was in these circumstances, according to appellant, that the blow was struck, and he testified that he was frightened at the time.There was testimony on behalf of the State which tended to put the matter in a different light, but in material particulars appellant was corroborated by other witnesses.

No claim is advanced that appellant intended to kill the deceased.If appellant is guilty, it must be on the theory that in striking the blow he committed an assault and battery, and that therefore the case is one in which, while he was in the commission of an unlawful act, he killed the deceased.On the other hand, if the circumstances were such as to justify appellant in striking the blow as a measure of self-defense, his act was lawful, and the killing was but a homicide by misadventure.

The trial court gave forty-eight instructions to the jury.A number of these instructions are complained of by appellant's counsel.Among them are instructions seven and seventeen.The material portion of instruction seven, so far as present purposes are concerned, reads as follows "The defendant can justify the attack upon the deceased only on the theory that at the time he struck the deceased he(defendant) was in imminent danger of great bodily harm, or in imminent danger of losing his life at the hands of the deceased."Instruction seventeen is as follows: "I instruct you, gentlemen of the jury, that the doctrine of self-defense is a humane provision of the law which gives one the right to repel force by force, when attacked, and even to take human life to avoid great bodily injury or to save one's life.In this case, if you find from the evidence that the defendant, Boston Weston, struck the deceased, Roman J. Holthouse, when he, the defendant, was in no danger of great bodily injury and in no danger of losing his life, then I instruct you, if you so find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the law of self-defense would be no defense for the defendant in this action."The principal objection which is offered to the above instructions is that they limit the right of self-defense to a situation of actual danger.We are of opinion that appellant has just cause to complain of said instructions, and particularly of the seventh.It will be observed that by the use of the word "only" in said instruction all claim of a justification for appellant's act was limited to a case in which he was in fact in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining great bodily harm.While such a situation would have authorized appellant to act in self-defense, yet his counsel properly object to the fact that the instruction denied to him the right to have the jury consider whether he honestly and reasonably believed that the danger was real.Batten v. State(1881), 80 Ind. 394;Bryant v. State(1886), 106 Ind. 549, 7 N.E. 217.Of course the defendant was not entitled to claim the benefit of a belief that danger existed unless the facts were such as to make his belief a reasonable one, but, in determining whether he had reasonable cause to entertain such belief, the matter must be judged from the standpoint of the man himself.As was said by the supreme court of Iowa: "The inquiry is, was the danger actual to the defendant's comprehension; not whether the danger...