Wethington v. Wellington Industries, Inc., IP87-1179-C.
| Decision Date | 27 November 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. IP87-1179-C.,IP87-1179-C. |
| Citation | 781 F. Supp. 1379 |
| Parties | Daniel L. WETHINGTON and Kathy Wethington, Plaintiffs, v. WELLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC., Colonial Freight Systems, Inc., and General Motors Corporation, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Robert M. Baker, III, Frederick D. Emhardt, Miller, Faires, Hebert & Woddell, P.C., Norman T. Funk, Donald D. Levenhagen, Hill Fulwider McDowell Funk & Matthews, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiffs.
Wayne C. Kreuscher, Jack M. Freeman, Barnes & Thornburg, Indianapolis, Ind., for defendants.
Plaintiff Daniel Wethington was a truck driver who on October 16, 1986, picked up one of the trailers from Colonial Freight Systems, Inc. ("Colonial"), in Indianapolis and then drove to Detroit to the terminal of Wellington Industries, Inc. ("Wellington"), in order to pick up a load of auto parts for transport to General Motors Corporation in Indianapolis. Returning from Detroit, Daniel Wethington was injured in an accident which occurred as he was negotiating a turn in Hendricks County, Indiana.
On May 21, 1990, Daniel Wethington settled a worker's compensation claim with Colonial. This settlement was approved by the Worker's Compensation Board of Indiana on July 3, 1990. Thereafter, on August 20, 1991, the plaintiffs and Colonial filed a joint motion to dismiss the complaint and a counterclaim, which this court granted on August 21, 1991.
Currently before the court is Wellington's Motion to Amend Answer to Assert Non-party Defense. The Indiana Comparative Fault Act provides that IC XX-X-XX-XX(a). The Act further provides, IC XX-X-XX-X(a). Wellington seeks to add Colonial as a nonparty.
The plaintiffs advance three arguments in opposition to Wellington's motion. Since the court agrees with the plaintiffs that as a matter of law, Colonial is not "a person who is, or may be, liable" to them, and since that status disqualifies Colonial as a nonparty, the court need not and will not reach the plaintiffs' remaining arguments.
The plaintiffs contend that Colonial is not "a person who is, or may be, liable" to them as a matter of law because "the findings of the Worker's Compensation Board of Indiana and its order provide the exclusive remedy of Mr. Wethington against Colonial...." Plaintiffs' Reply to Wellington and General Motors' Response to Colonial's Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Plaintiffs' Brief") (adopted in Plaintiffs' Response to Motion to Amend Answer to Assert Non-party Defense), p. 3. Wethington and Colonial took advantage of the settlement mechanism provided for in the Worker's Compensation Act, IC XX-X-X-XX, which states in part:
Nothing in IC 22-3-2 through IC 22-3-6 shall be construed as preventing the parties to claims under IC 22-3-2 through IC 22-3-6 from entering into voluntary agreements in settlement thereof, but no agreement by an employee or his dependents to waive his rights under IC 22-3-2 through IC 22-3-6 shall be valid nor shall any agreement of settlement or compromise of any dispute or claim for compensation under IC 22-3-2 through IC 22-3-6 be valid until approved by a member of the board, nor shall a member of the worker's compensation board approve any settlement which is not given in accordance with the rights of the parties as given in IC 22-3-2 through IC 22-3-6.
As noted above, a member of the Worker's Compensation Board approved the settlement agreement between Wethington and Colonial on July 3, 1990. The Award approved by a member of the Worker's Compensation Board provided that the money received by Wethington was "in full settlement and satisfaction of all claims which plaintiff may have against said defendant Colonial under the provisions of the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Law...."
The Worker's Compensation Act limits Wethington to this remedy against Colonial for his injuries. IC 22-3-2-6 provides:
Rights and remedies of employee exclusive. — The rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to IC 22-3-2 through IC 22-3-6 on account of personal injury or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representatives, dependents or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury or death, except for remedies available under IC 16-7-3.6 Compensation for Victims of Violent Crimes.
Since Colonial is statutorily immune from any further claims by Wethington in light of the settlement, and since those who are immune cannot be named as nonparties, Huber v. Henley, 656 F.Supp. 508, 510 (S.D.Ind.1987), the plaintiffs argue that Wellington's motion should be denied.
Wellington responds that both procedural due process and collateral estoppel principles should prevent it from being bound by the settlement between Colonial and Wethington. Wellington's due process argument involves the citation of a recent Supreme Court case for the:
"principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process." Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40, 61 S.Ct. 115, 117, 85 L.Ed. 22 (1940).... A judgment or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues as among them, but it does not conclude the rights of strangers to those proceedings.
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 2184, 104 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989) (footnote and citations omitted). The Court also stated in Martin that "a voluntary settlement in the form of a consent decree between one group of employees and their employer cannot possible `settle,' voluntarily or otherwise, the conflicting claims of another group of employees who do not join in the agreement." 490 U.S. at 768, 109 S.Ct. at 2188.
The plaintiffs argue:
Both Wellington and General Motors were well aware that the Worker's Compensation Board was going to render a decision regarding whether Mr. Wethington's claim was within the jurisdiction of that board. There is no law which would have prevented General Motors or Wellington from intervening in the Worker's Compensation case to assert how the decision of the Board might affect their rights in Federal Court.
Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 6. This argument was explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Martin.
Nonetheless, this court is not persuaded by Wellington's due process argument, such as it is. Aside from the Martin quote about notice and an opportunity to be heard, the extent of Wellington's due process argument is as follows:
Since neither Wellington nor GM were parties to the worker's compensation proceeding had there been one, both procedural due process and well entrenched principles of collateral estoppel support their right to prove that Wellington was an independent contractor.... If Colonial is now treated as an employer whose fault may not be considered by the jury, Wellington and GM's liability, if any, could significantly increase. To permit Wethington and Colonial to use a stipulation and/or settlement to increase Wellington and GM's exposure is contrary to all notions of fairness, justice and due process....
Defendant Wellington's and GM's Response to Defendant Colonial's Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Defendant's Brief"), pp. 9 and 11 (). This argument is troublesome in its generality. What in particular deprived Wellington of due process is ambiguous.
The court feels constrained to read this due process argument liberally in light of Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 940-41, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2755-56, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). Nonetheless, the court notes that a failure to identify a liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause will be fatal to Wellington's due process argument. "Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of `liberty' or `property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 901, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). The language cited above from Martin was predicated on the existence of "the rights of strangers to ... proceedings." 490 U.S. at 762, 109 S.Ct. at 2184 (emphasis added). An analysis of due process claims generally begins with an assessment of the interest asserted by the party who claims to have been denied due process. As noted by the Supreme Court in Mathews, "our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action...." 424 U.S. at 334-35, 96 S.Ct. at 903. No such interest was asserted by Wellington.
One way of construing Wellington's argument would be to read it as alleging a deprivation of due process merely by the failure to allow Wellington an opportunity to be heard at a Worker's Compensation Board hearing. As a general matter, Wellington has established no entitlement to participate in such a hearing (had there been one here) between a claimant and a putative employer. Indeed, while the plaintiffs attempt to argue that the defendants could have participated in such a hearing, all that they can offer in support of this position is speculation. Even if Wellington had been allowed to participate, there is no evidence that it would have...
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