Wetzel v. Sandlow

• Decision Date: 30 March 2022
• Docket Number: A174742
• Citation: 318 Or.App. 608,509 P.3d 182
• Parties: Jerry WETZEL, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Arnold SANDLOW and Better Health Solutions, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendants-Appellants, and Mauricio Calvi, Defendant.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

318 Or.App. 608

509 P.3d 182

Jerry WETZEL, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Arnold SANDLOW and Better Health Solutions, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendants-Appellants,andMauricio Calvi, Defendant.

A174742

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and submitted January 27, 2022.

March 30, 2022

Noam Amir-Brownstein, Lake Oswego, argued the cause for appellants. Also on the briefs were Ryan D. Harris and Vial Fotheringham LLP.

Melisa A. Button, Medford, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief was Hornecker Cowling LLP.

Before James, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and Kamins, Judge.

KAMINS, J.

Better Health Solutions, Inc. (BHSI) and plaintiff entered into an agricultural lease agreement whereby BHSI would rent property from plaintiff. Ultimately, BHSI did not make any payments towards the lease and plaintiff sued both BHSI and its president (Sandlow) under a veil-piercing theory to recover the unpaid rent. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, and defendants Sandlow and BHSI now appeal, raising four assignments of error. We reject the third and fourth assignments of error without discussion.

In the first assignment of error, Sandlow contends that the trial court erred when it granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, determining that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding Sandlow's liability to plaintiff under a veil-piercing theory.¹ ORCP 47 C. In the second assignment of error, both Sandlow and BHSI argue that the trial court erred when it denied the motion to set aside the judgment for excusable neglect and surprise, ORCP 71 B, or alternatively under the trial court's inherent powers, ORCP 71 C. We conclude that there were genuine issues of material fact as to the veil-piercing claim against Sandlow but that the trial court did not err when it refused to set aside the judgment as to BHSI. Therefore, we reverse and remand the general judgment as to Sandlow, and otherwise affirm.

In 2018, plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with BHSI. That agreement was signed by Sandlow, who is the incorporator, president, secretary, and chief financial officer of BHSI. In 2020, plaintiff sued BHSI for unpaid rent, and included Sandlow under a veil-piercing theory. After unsuccessfully moving to strike himself as a party under ORCP 30, Sandlow filed a pro se answer to the amended complaint on behalf of both himself and BHSI. Plaintiff's counsel informed Sandlow that he could not file a pro se answer on behalf of BHSI under ORS 9.320, which requires a corporation to appear through an attorney. Sandlow then filed an identical answer, this time only for himself. Plaintiff moved to strike the answer that had been filed on behalf of BHSI and for a default order against BHSI. The trial court never ruled on that motion.

As BHSI was never defaulted (despite never entering an appearance that comported with the rules of civil procedure), plaintiff sought discovery in the form of requests for admissions and requests for production. BHSI did not respond to any discovery requests, and plaintiff argued that the requested admissions were admitted by default pursuant to ORCP 45 B.²

Using those admissions as support, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment against Sandlow and BHSI. Neither Sandlow nor BHSI responded to the motion nor appeared for the summary judgment hearing. A hearing was held without Sandlow or BHSI and the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff's counsel emailed a copy of the order granting the motion for summary judgment to Sandlow, who responded that he objected to the entry of the order and that he was not aware of the hearing. According to Sandlow, the motion—which was served by mailing copies to Sandlow's last known address in California—was lost in the mail. After receiving plaintiff's email, Sandlow filed a pro se motion to set aside the judgment as to both himself and BHSI, a counter motion for summary judgment on behalf of himself, and an opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to both himself and BHSI. The court, upon learning of Sandlow's objections, scheduled a hearing. At the hearing, the trial court denied Sandlow's motion to set aside the judgment as premature, denied the counter motion for summary judgment as moot, and finally signed the order granting summary judgment.

Sandlow, still acting pro se , next filed another motion to set aside the judgment on behalf of himself and BHSI under ORCP 71 B. He argued that the failure to respond to the summary judgment motion was due to surprise and excusable neglect because he did not receive notice of the motion before the hearing took place. After retaining counsel, Sandlow and BHSI submitted a reply to plaintiff's opposition to the motion to set aside, arguing in the alternative that the trial court should set aside the judgment under ORCP 71 C. The trial court then held a hearing on that motion to set aside the general judgment. Sandlow and BHSI were represented by counsel at that proceeding. The trial court ultimately denied the motion, and Sandlow and BHSI timely appealed.

"We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment to determine whether there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Evans v. City of Warrenton , 283 Or. App. 256, 258, 388 P.3d 1167 (2016). That standard requires that we view "the relevant facts and [make] all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id . at 259, 388 P.3d 1167. "[O]ur review is limited to the record that exists at the time of the court's ruling on the parties’ motions for summary judgment." Leonard v. Moran Foods, Inc. , 269 Or. App. 112, 124, 343 P.3d 693, rev. den. , 357 Or 324 (2015).³

The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment on the claim of veil-piercing without discussion on the record and signed plaintiff's proposed general judgment. Therefore, the summary judgment record was limited to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and the filings that had previously been submitted to the court.

In order to pierce the corporate veil, plaintiff has the burden to prove that (1) Sandlow had actual control of BHSI, (2) Sandlow used his control of BHSI to engage in improper conduct, and (3) plaintiff was harmed as a result of that improper conduct. State ex. rel. Neidig v. Superior National Ins. Co. , 343 Or. 434, 454-55, 173 P.3d 123 (2007).

Because it is undisputed that Sandlow held actual control of BHSI, we focus on the allegations of improper conduct. The trial court found that BHSI engaged in two types of improper conduct: inadequate capitalization and a failure to follow corporate formalities. See Amfac Foods v. Int'l Systems , 294 Or. 94, 109, 654 P.2d 1092 (1982) (recognizing that inadequate capitalization is a form of improper conduct); Rice v. Oriental Fireworks Co ., 75 Or. App. 627, 633-34, 707 P.2d 1250 (1985), rev. den. , 300 Or. 546, 715 P.2d 93 (1986) (recognizing that disregarding corporate formalities is a form of improper conduct). Sandlow contends there were genuine issues of material fact related to both the alleged inadequate capitalization and the failure to follow corporate formalities.

The trial court erred in concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding BHSI's alleged undercapitalization. When analyzing undercapitalization, "a corporation must have sufficient capital to cover its reasonably anticipated liabilities, measured by the nature and magnitude of its undertaking, the risks attendant to the particular enterprise and normal operating costs associated with its business." Klokke Corp. v. Classic Exposition, Inc ., 139 Or. App. 399, 405, 912 P.2d 929, rev. den. , 323 Or. 690, 920 P.2d 549 (1996) (quoting Gardner v. First Escrow Corp ., 72 Or. App. 715, 723, 696 P.2d 1172, rev. den. , 299 Or 314 (1985) ). There is no statutory minimum capitalization amount. Salem Tent & Awning v. Schmidt , 79 Or. App. 475, 482, 719 P.2d 899, rev. den. , 302 Or. 36, 726 P.2d 935 (1986).

The only evidence in the record regarding BHSI's capitalization at the time the summary judgment motion was granted was the certificate of incorporation that authorized BHSI to issue 100,000,000 shares valued at $.001 per share, BHSI's admission by default to being undercapitalized at the time of formation,⁴ and Sandlow's denial in the request for admissions that BHSI was inadequately capitalized.

When determining whether a corporation is inadequately capitalized, we evaluate whether there is sufficient capital to cover its anticipated liabilities. Klokke Corp. , 139 Or. App. at 405, 912 P.2d 929. The only information in the record about BHSI's anticipated liabilities was the lease agreement with plaintiff. The terms of the lease were that BHSI would pay $12,000 up front as a security deposit, $5,000 a month in rent for the first year, and $12,000 a month for the remaining four years of the lease term.

Plaintiff's summary judgment motion—which the trial court granted in its entirety—asserted that BHSI had a total market capitalization of $100 at the time of formation. However, the certificate of incorporation demonstrated that BHSI was authorized to issue 100,000,000 shares valued at $.001 per share, worth a total of $100,000. Plaintiff appears to concede the mathematical error but maintains that there was no evidence that BHSI had actually issued those shares or received that amount of capital. According to plaintiff, that lack of evidence means that there is no dispute of material fact regarding plaintiff's allegation of undercapitalization. At trial, however, plaintiff would have the burden of proof, including the burden of production, on the issue of veil-piercing. See Rowden v. Hogan Woods, LLC , 306 Or. App. 658, 680, 476 P.3d 485 (2020) ("[A] plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil must prove that a defendant had control of the limited liability company, that the defendant used that control...