Wexler v. Municipality of Anchorage

Decision Date30 March 2021
Docket NumberCase No. 3:21-cv-00059-RRB
PartiesDEMION C. WEXLER, Petitioner, v. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Alaska
ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Demion C. Wexler, representing himself from the Anchorage Correctional Complex, where he is housed as a pretrial detainee, has filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming that the state court is denying his rights in two misdemeanor criminal cases in which he is a defendant.2 Mr. Wexler also has filed an Application to Waive Prepayment of the Filing Fee.3

The Court takes judicial notice4 that, on March 1, 2021, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for the State of Alaska issued Special Order 8242, stating that"[m]isdemeanor trials may resume on April 19, 2021 under the direction of the presiding judge. The presiding judge may limit or suspend misdemeanor jury trials . . . when required for public health or to comply with local mandates."5 The public record shows that Mr. Wexler has been charged with misdemeanors involving firearms and alcohol, as well as six additional charges for violating conditions of release, after being granted release on bail.6

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

Federal courts have general habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.7 A petitioner may properly challenge state pretrial detention under § 2241.8

A court must "promptly examine" a habeas petition.9 "If it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief, the judge must dismiss the motion. . . ."10

In conducting its review of a self-represented litigant's pleadings, a court must liberally construe the pleadings and give the petitioner the benefit of the doubt.11

DISCUSSION

A writ of habeas corpus allows an individual to test the legality of being detained or held in custody by the government.12 The writ "is a vital 'instrument for the protection of individual liberty' against government power."13

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, this Court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."14 This habeas statute provides federal courts with general habeas corpusjurisdiction.15 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is the proper avenue for a state prisoner who wishes to challenge his state custody without a state judgment.16 When examining a § 2241 petition from a pretrial detainee claiming a violation of his or her right to a speedy trial, a significant delay in the proceedings must be shown.17

In McNeely v. Blanas, 336 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit found a delay of three years to be substantial, such that prejudice was presumed, triggering an inquiry under Barker v. Wingo.18 The four-part test articulated by the Supreme Court in Barker is used to determine whether government delay had abridged a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.19 The factors to be considered in a Barker inquiry include: "(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the accused's assertion of the right to speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. No single factor is necessary or sufficient."20

I. Appropriate Relief

For relief, Mr. Wexler requests that the Court grant him "[a] compassionate voluntary dismissal of the misdemeanor charges . . . [and] to dismiss the indictments due to mistrial and violation of 2nd/6th amendments and fundamental rights as an Alaskan . . . ."21 The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments bar pretrial detention unless detention is necessary to serve a compelling government interest.22 Thus, although a state may "impose conditions on an arrestee's release, such as bail . . ., [b]ail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill [its] purpose [of assuring the presence of the accused at trial] is 'excessive' under the Eighth Amendment."23 Mr. Wexler, of course, has been granted release on bail, but the state records show that he violated the conditions of his release on several occasions.

Mr. Wexler's request that the Court require charges against him in the state courts be dismissed is not appropriate.24 A speedy trial claim may be reviewedunder § 2241 if a pretrial detainee is seeking to compel the state to bring him to trial, rather than seeking dismissal of the charges.25 Thus, although a federal court can order a state court to bring a petitioner to trial, federal courts do not order that state charges be dismissed.26 The Court will not, therefore, address the merits ofany underlying charges against Mr. Wexler, or order that any state criminal charges against Mr. Wexler be dismissed.

II. Abstention

The Younger abstention doctrine provides that federal courts may not generally exercise jurisdiction when doing so would interfere with state judicial proceedings.27 The core of Younger abstention is that a federal court cannot interfere with pending state court criminal proceedings, absent a "showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief."28 A federal court

must abstain under Younger if four requirements are met: (1) a state-initiated proceeding is ongoing; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) the federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating federal constitutional issues in the state proceeding; and (4) the federal court action would enjoin the proceeding or have thepractical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with the state proceeding in a way that Younger disapproves.29

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has directly addressed abstention, regarding the claim of a state court violating the right to a speedy trial, explaining:

Younger does not "require[ ] a district court to abstain from hearing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the conditions of pretrial detention in state court" where (1) the procedure challenged in the petition is distinct from the underlying criminal prosecution and the challenge would not interfere with the prosecution, or (2) full vindication of the petitioner's pretrial rights requires intervention before trial.30

The State of Alaska has an important interest in enforcing its criminal laws, and Mr. Wexler's criminal cases in state court remain ongoing. Mr. Wexler's allegation that he is being denied his right to a speedy trial in state court, should be addressed in his state court criminal proceedings, where he may also continue to address release on bail.31 This Court should not interfere with the trial court's fact-finding responsibilities and legal decisions in that case, unless "full vindicationof the petitioner's pretrial rights requires intervention before trial."32 This does not appear to be such a case.

III. Exhaustion

Exhaustion is required under common law before bringing a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.33 Although there is no statutory exhaustion requirement for a petition brought under § 2241, principles of federalism and comity require the court to abstain until all state criminal proceedings are completed, and the petitioner exhausts the available state judicial remedies, unless extraordinary circumstances warranting federal intervention prior to a state criminal trial are found. A violation of the right to a speedy trial is not, alone, an extraordinary circumstance warranting federal intervention.34

The Court may only address Mr. Wexler's speedy trial claim after he fully exhausts the available state court remedies,35 and upon a showing that this Court should not abstain from addressing his claims.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Application to Proceed without Prepaying Fees or Costs, at Docket 4, is DENIED as moot.

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter Judgment accordingly.

Dated at Anchorage, Alaska, this 30th day of March, 2021.

/s/ Ralph R. Beistline

RALPH R. BEISTLINE

Senior United States District Judge

1. The proper respondent in a habeas proceeding is the petitioner's custodian, not a city or state government. See, e.g., Rumsfield v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-36 (2004). But that issue need not be fully addressed in this dismissal.

3. Docket 4.

4. Judicial notice is the "court's acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without requiring a party's proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact. . . ." Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Foster Poultry Farms v. Alkar-Rapidpak-MP Equip., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 983, 990 (E.D. Cal. 2012) ("Courts routinely take judicial notice of publicly available records . . . from other court proceedings.") (citing Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 498 F.3d 1031, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (additional citation omitted)); Fed. R. Evid. 201.

5. https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/covid19/docs/socj-2021-8242.pdf, Special Order 8242 at 1; see also State v. Baker, 425 P.3d 210, 212 (Alaska Ct. App. 2018) ("Alaska Criminal Rule 45 governs a defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial under Alaska law.").

6. See https://records.courts.alaska.gov/eaccess/searchresults, 3AN-19-02245CR, 3AN-20-03181CR.

9. Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts. The same procedural rules for 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and § 2255 govern 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

10. Id.

15. See Magana-...

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