Weyant v. Okst

Citation101 F.3d 845
Decision Date03 December 1996
Docket NumberNo. 1736,D,1736
PartiesLarry WEYANT and Charles Weyant, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. George S. OKST, Irvin Richard Weber, Joseph Peter Auberger, Jr., Lawrence Mueller, Defendants, George S. Okst and Joseph Peter Auberger, Jr., Defendants-Appellees. ocket 95-7090.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

Stephen Bergstein, Goshen, NY (Michael H. Sussman, Goshen, New York, on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Vincent Leong, Assistant Attorney General, New York City (Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney

General of the State of New York, Thomas D. Hughes, Assistant Solicitor General, Darell Joseph, Assistant Attorney General, New York City, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: KEARSE, MAHONEY, * and McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judges.

KEARSE, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs Larry Weyant ("Larry") and Charles Weyant ("Charles") appeal from so much of a final judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Charles L. Brieant, Judge, as dismissed their claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) against two New York State Police officers, defendants George S. Okst and Joseph Peter Auberger, Jr. Larry sought damages from Okst for false arrest and the use of excessive force; Charles sought damages from both Okst and Auberger for their refusal to allow him to obtain needed medical treatment after his arrest. The district court granted partial summary judgment (a) dismissing Larry's false-arrest claim on the ground that it was barred by a verdict of guilty returned against him in the state-court criminal prosecution that followed his arrest, and (b) dismissing Charles's claim for denial of medical care on the ground that Okst and Auberger offered plausible reasons for the denial. Larry's excessive-force claim was dismissed following a trial that ended in a jury verdict in favor of Okst. On appeal, Larry contends principally that summary judgment was improper with respect to his false-arrest claim because (a) the guilty verdict in the criminal prosecution was overturned, and the case ultimately terminated in his favor, and (b) there were genuine issues to be tried as to whether his arrest was supported by probable cause. Charles contends principally that there were genuine issues of material fact to be tried with respect to his medical-treatment claim, and hence summary judgment was inappropriate. For the reasons that follow, we agree that summary judgment was improperly granted, and we vacate so much of the judgment as dismissed the false-arrest and medical-treatment claims; we remand for trial of those claims.

I. BACKGROUND

This litigation arises out of events in connection with the November 11, 1991 arrests of the Weyants and the ensuing prosecution of Larry. The record as to those arrests and the treatment of Charles, Larry's 70-year-old father, viewed in the light most favorable to the Weyants as the parties against whom summary judgment was granted, showed the following.

A. The Arrests and the Denial of Medical Attention to Charles

Larry was the co-owner of approximately 154 acres of vacant, wooded land located in the Town of Deer Park, New York (the "Property"), which he and his friends used as a hunting camp. The main entrance to the Property was a 20-foot-wide gate; on nearby trees were posted signs stating "Private Property, Keep Out" and bearing Larry's address.

On November 11, the Weyants, with friends including John A. Cambareri, went to a hunting camp on the Property. At about five o'clock, Charles, a severe diabetic, left the campsite with Cambareri and drove down the gravel road leading to the main gate because he needed insulin.

As Charles neared the gate, several law enforcement officers, of about 20 in the immediate area, ran into the path of his car. The officers had convened to investigate a report of a "possibility of an escape attempt" from a nearby correctional facility. (Deposition of George S. Okst at 21.) One officer put a machine gun to Charles's head and threatened to "blow [his] fucking brains out." (Deposition of Charles Weyant ("Charles Dep.") at 58.) When Charles sought to ask questions, Okst and Auberger ordered him to "shut up." (Id. at 64.) Charles and Cambareri told Okst and other officers that Charles's son Larry would soon be driving down the At some point before Larry arrived on the scene, Okst and Auberger

                mountain, that the land they were on was owned privately, and that Larry was the owner.  (Deposition of John A. Cambareri ("Cambareri Dep.") at 100.)   Okst responded that he "didn't care."  (Id.)  Charles was handcuffed and placed in the back seat of Auberger's car
                

ascertained by radio there had been no escape from the federal correctional institution and Mr. Weyant and Camb[a]reri were placed under arrest for violating the New York State Environmental Conservation law which prohibits possessing jacklights for deer while a person is armed and is present on land inhabited by deer.

So, thereafter, Larry Weyant arrived and it's disputed what happened thereafter, but in any event, he was arrested, too, apparently by Trooper Okst.

(Hearing Transcript, December 16, 1994 ("Tr."), 15-16 (description by the district court); see also Cambareri Dep. at 98-99.)

When Larry drove down the mountain toward the main gate, as Charles and Cambareri had informed the officers he would, a number of officers ran toward his car with their guns drawn, forcing him to stop. One put an automatic weapon to Larry's head and said, "if you move I'll blow your fucking brains out." (Deposition of Larry Weyant ("Larry Dep.") at 38.) The officers pulled Larry from his car, handcuffed him, and put him in a second trooper's car. Larry testified that during his arrest, he spoke only to ask what was happening, to identify himself by name and address, and to state that he was the Property's owner. He testified that though the officers were shouting obscenities at him, he did not raise his voice or use profanity. (See, e.g., Larry Dep. at 170 ("These men had guns pointed at my head, told me they were going to kill me. Who in their right mind is going to start swearing and raising hell.").) Cambareri similarly testified that Larry used no profanity, merely asked what was going on, and stated that he owned the Property; the officers told Larry to "shut the fuck up." (Cambareri Dep. at 110-11.) Larry was eventually charged, in informations filed by Okst, with one count of disorderly conduct and one count of resisting arrest.

In the meantime, Charles was held in Auberger's car for some 30 minutes while the officers waited for and then dealt with Larry. Still not having taken his required dosage of insulin, Charles was slumped over in the back seat, soaked with perspiration. He testified that his tongue had swelled and he could hardly talk, that his ears were ringing, and that he kept losing consciousness. His appearance was such that, when Auberger returned to the car after assisting other officers, Auberger asked Charles what was wrong. Charles responded that "he was feeling dizzy, that he was a diabetic and he was overdue on his insulin." (Affidavit of Joseph P. Auberger, dated November 30, 1994, p 7.) Charles told Auberger that he was in insulin shock. Auberger said he would take Charles to a nearby hospital. Auberger started to drive Charles to the hospital but was stopped by Okst. Okst, notwithstanding having been told by Larry that Charles was a diabetic and having been told by Auberger that Charles was ill, instructed Auberger to take Charles to the police barracks, not to a hospital.

The Weyants and Cambareri were taken to the barracks. During the drive, Charles continued to perspire profusely, was hardly able to speak, and repeatedly lost consciousness. After they arrived, Charles again stated that he was a severe diabetic and that he needed to go to the hospital. (Cambareri Dep. at 108.) Okst responded, "We're not a goddamn taxicab." (Id. at 108-09.) Larry too made additional efforts at the barracks to get his father prompt medical care. Okst repeatedly told them "all to shut up." (Id. at 109.) Charles was held at the barracks until about 9 p.m. In the interim, no doctor saw him; Okst, who had had paramedic training, made no effort to examine him. Charles was put on a bench where he continued to perspire, suffer difficulty speaking, and sit as if in a trance.

Finally, one of the troopers telephoned Charles's wife Helen, who arrived at approximately 8 p.m. to find her husband slumped over and trembling uncontrollably. Helen told Okst that Charles needed medical attention turned to Okst and said "You did what?". Okst got very red in the face and left the room for a few minutes, and when he returned he told me that I had to leave. I told him that I would leave when I was through with Charles, to which he replied, "This is my house and you'll leave when I tell you to leave, we're not having a fucking picnic in here". Okst was getting worked up and he got closer to me, I felt as if he was going to hit me.

immediately; Okst apparently did not respond. Helen had brought insulin and food; since she had no experience in giving injections, Charles had to administer the insulin to himself. However, because he was shaking so badly, Helen began to spoon-feed him the yogurt she had brought. As she was feeding him, Charles told her that Okst had kicked and beaten Larry. Helen then

(Affidavit of Helen K. Weyant, dated December 9, 1994, p 9.) According to both Charles and Helen, Auberger jumped in front of Okst and stopped him from grabbing or hitting Helen. (Id.; Charles Dep. at 104.) Okst's intimidation caused Helen to depart before she could finish feeding Charles.

Other than Auberger's bringing him water, this was the only care Charles received for his physical condition while he was in police custody. Though he started to "perk up" a bit after Helen arrived and he had his shot (Larry Dep. at 99), Charles...

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