Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Pierce County

• Decision Date: 06 August 1917
• Docket Number: 13344.
• Citation: Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Pierce County, 97 Wash. 534, 167 P. 35 (Wash. 1917)
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: WEYERHAEUSER TIMBER CO. v. PIERCE COUNTY. NORTHWESTERN IMPROVEMENT CO. v. SAME.

167 P. 35

97 Wash. 534

WEYERHAEUSER TIMBER CO. v. PIERCE COUNTY.

NORTHWESTERN IMPROVEMENT CO. v. SAME.

No. 13344.

Supreme Court of Washington

August 6, 1917

Department 2.Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; M. L. Clifford Judge.

Actions by the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company and by the Northwestern Improvement Company against Pierce County, consolidated for trial.From separate judgments for each plaintiff, both plaintiffs and defendant appeal.Remanded, with instructions to modify.

L. B. Da Ponte, W. L. McCormick, Geo. T. Reid, and J. W. Quick, all of Tacoma (F. M. Dudley, of Seattle, and H S. Griggs, of Tacoma, of counsel), for appellant.

F. G Remann, Harry E. Phelps, A. B. Bell, and Chas. Murray, all of Tacoma, for respondents.

ELLIS C.J.

The Weyerhaeuser Timber Company and the Northwestern Improvement Company began separate actions against Pierce county for the cancellation of a portion of the taxes assessed against certain timber lands for the year 1914 on the ground of overvaluation, and for recovery of excess payments made under protest.By stipulation the two actions were consolidated for trial, with an agreement that separate judgments be entered.Supplemental complaints were filed, presenting the same issue as to the assessed valuations for the year 1915, upon which taxes were not then due.The Weyerhaeuser Timber Company sought a reduction of $24,130.58 on its tax of $60,152.65 and the Northwestern Improvement Company a reduction of $5,648.65 on its tax of $9,772.34.The trial court found that plaintiffs were entitled to a 16 2/3 per cent. reduction in the amount of the valuations upon which they had been assessed, gave judgment to the Weyerhaeuser Company in the sum of $11,314.17 for the excess taxes of 1914 paid under protest, and decreed an equivalent reduction of the taxes falling due for the year 1915.In the case of the Northwestern Companythe court gave judgment cancelling its taxes in the sum of $1,628.72 for the year 1914, and in the sum of $1,642.52 for the year 1915; the variation in amounts being due to the fact that the assessor had in certain instances increased the valuation for the latter year over that of the preceding year.From these judgments the plaintiffs and defendant both appeal; the former claiming they are entitled to a further reduction in valuations, and the latter that the court erred in granting any reduction.To avoid confusion, we shall refer to the parties throughout as plaintiffs and defendant.

Plaintiffs have moved to strike the abstract of the record filed by defendant in support of its appeal.It is urged that it has no place in the record, because defendant took no exceptions to the court's findings of fact ( Harbican v. Chamberlin,82 Wash. 556, 144 P. 717); and, further, that it is useless, in that defendant's brief insufficiently refers to the pages of the abstract for verification (rule 8[71 Wash. xlviii, 132 P. xii]).Regardless of defendant's cross-appeal, its abstract may be treated as supplemental to that filed by plaintiffs on their own appeal.Such an abstract the statute permits a respondent to supply.Though not referred to in defendant's brief as freely as could be desired for the convenience of the court, this abstract has been useful alike with that of plaintiffs in marshaling the contents of a voluminous record.The motion is denied.

Plaintiffs contend that their properties were subjected to an arbitrary and excessive valuation, in that (1)they are now assessed at values placed on them at the height of a boom in the lumber industry, and that at the time of assessment, suit, and trial lumber values had depreciated from 30 to 50 per cent.; (2) that an arbitrary zone system was employed, resulting in a valuation of $1 per thousand being placed on their fir timber within one mile of a logging road or other outlet, and a reduction of 5 cents per thousand with each mile of recession from such road or outlet, regardless of logging conditions and the quality and accessibility of the timber; (3) that all hemlock, regardless of quality and accessibility, was assessed on an arbitrary valuation of 25 cents per thousand; (4) that, in addition to the valuation of the timber for more than it was worth, a land value averaging $1.75 per acre was included; and (5) that for the years 1914 and 1915 all of the property in Pierce county, save timber lands and other unimproved lands, was assessed on a basis not exceeding 50 per cent. of the true value, in compliance with the act of 1913(Rem. Code, § 9112), while timber lands and unimproved lands were assessed as before on a basis of 60 per cent., which course which arbitrary and unconstitutional.

We shall first take up the claim of plaintiffs as to the valuation of the fir timber, including cedar and spruce, for the years 1914 and 1915.In order to obtain a clear understanding of the situation, it is necessary to recur to the work of the assessor's office for prior years.The evidence shows that in the year 1908 all property in Pierce county was valued by the assessor for assessment purposes on a basis of 60 per cent. of its full value.In fixing the values of fir timber, he adopted a zone system, placing the assessment value within one mile of a railroad, logging road, or other outlet at $1 per housand feet, and reducing the values 5 cents per thousand for each additional mile, until a minimum of 50 cents was reached, which minimum was thereafter applied, regardless of added distances.In making these figures it fairly appears that the assessor failed to take into consideration the elements of quality and quantity of timber, its accessibility, and the logging conditions.The values fixed by the assessor in the year 1908 were adopted in each subsequent biennial valuation for assessment without material change, and are the figures now in issue as the assessment values for the years 1914 and 1915.By the act of 1913(Rem. Code, § 9112) it is provided that 'all property shall be assessed at not to exceed fifty per cent. of its true and fair value in money.'In making his assessment for the years 1914 and 1915, the assessor reduced the value of all property excepting timber lands and unimproved property to a figure not exceeding 50 per cent. of its full value, while continuing in force the old 1908 assessment on a 60 per cent. basis, without reduction, as to timber lands and unimproved property; this notwithstanding the fact, as the evidence shows, that timber values had depreciated fully 25 per cent. at the time the assessment in dispute was made.The valuation in 1908 was made at a time when the lumber industry in this state had reached the high-water mark, from which stage it had steadily subsided until the period covered by the years 1914 and 1915.

The trial of this action was had in 1915, and the evidence of values prevailing at that time and at the time of the assessment is widely divergent; the witnesses for plaintiffs generally placing the values lower than plaintiffs concede, while the witnesses for the county in some cases exceed the assessor's values.But averaging the figures of all the witnesses on both sides we believe invariably results in a valuation lower than that fixed by the assessor.For instance, in township 16 N., range 3 E., the average assessed value is 70.8 cents per thousand, and the average value placed by the witnesses is 48 cents, while the plaintiff concedes a value of 41.5 cents.In so far as the credibility of witnesses is concerned, those for plaintiffs are sustained in large part by the cruise of timber lands made by the county in the year 1907 for use in the assessment of timber lands for taxation.This cruise is in evidence, and the court found 'that said cruise was made, and that it was a careful, accurate, and correct cruise and has been admitted to be such by both of the parties.'A sample comparison of an assessment with the cruise description will be of interest.The cruise describes the fir timber on the E. 1/2 of section 13, township 16 N., range 3 E., as small and of inferior quality, while the W. 1/2 has 'some good logs.'On 1,837 feet standing two-thirds on the east side and the balance on the west, the high assessment valuation of $1.15 is placed, which plaintiff asks to be reduced to 40 cents.The highest valuation placed on land in that township by the county's witness Flint was only $1.25, which on a 50 per cent. basis for assessment would be 62.5 cents.

The inequality in the work of the assessor finds further demonstration in his failure to place the same ratings upon different tracts of timber practically equivalent in quality quantity, and logging conditions.For instance, in township 18 N., range 6 E., the fir and cedar in section 23 is rated at $1.20, while in section 15 it is rated 85 cents.In the former the fir is 'old growth, sound and smooth,' the cedar 'strictly shingle timber, a great many trees will go to pieces in falling.'In the latter the fir is 'large, smooth, and sound, first-class timber,' and the same description applies to the cedar.Section 15 shows a somewhat higher grade, and is one-half mile nearer railroad transportation, yet is valued 35 cents lower than section 23.All the timber on which reductions are sought is located in rough, broken, and in some cases mountainous districts, where logging conditions are unfavorable, and often practically prohibitive.The figures obtained from averaging the testimony disclose an overvaluation by the assessor to the extent of at least 25 per cent., and this is supported by the disclosures of the cruises in evidence.The cruises, which are records in the assessor's office, tend to show either arbitrary action or marked inadvertence in making the valuations upon the lands here in controversy.The...