Weyers v. Lear Operations Corp.
| Decision Date | 14 August 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-0877-CV-W-5.,00-0877-CV-W-5. |
| Citation | 232 F.Supp.2d 977 |
| Parties | Pamela WEYERS, Plaintiff, v. LEAR OPERATIONS CORPORATION, d/b/a Lear Corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Pending before the Court is Defendant Lear Operations Corporation, d/b/a Lear Corporation's ("Lear") Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or in the Alternative for New Trial [Doc. 72]. On October 24, 2001, a seven-member jury returned a verdict finding that Plaintiff Pamela Weyers ("Weyers") was terminated by Lear because of her age. The jury also found that Weyers had been subject to age harassment in the workplace by Lear. On Weyers' age harassment claim, the jury awarded $125,000 in actual damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. The award of punitive damages was made pursuant to the Missouri Human Rights Act. On her age discrimination claim based on Weyers' termination, the jury awarded $68,962 in actual damages and $125,000 in punitive damages. The award of punitive damages was again made pursuant to the MHRA. In addition, on both Weyers' age discrimination claim and her age harassment claim, the jury found Lear's conduct to be willful pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). For the reasons stated below, Lear's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or in the Alternative for New Trial is denied. Weyers, however, must choose between a new trial or remittitur in the amount of $293,962.
In determining whether a motion for a judgment as a matter of law should be granted, "the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). In Reeves, the Supreme Court explained that
although the court should review the records as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe .... That is, the court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that `evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.'
Id. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when all the evidence points one way and is susceptible of no reasonable inference sustaining the jury's verdict. Scott Fetzer Co. v. Williamson, 101 F.3d 549, 553 (8th Cir.1996).
Lear argues first that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Weyers' claim that she was discharged because of her age. Lear contends that there was no evidence presented at trial demonstrating that any decision-maker discriminated against Weyers on the basis of her age. Lear asserts that in order to prove a discriminatory discharge claim, a plaintiff must provide evidence of discriminatory animus on the part of decision-makers. [See Dft's Sugg. at 3]. Lear asserts there was no evidence at trial to support the proposition that the individual who made the decision to terminate Weyers' employment-Tony Mendez ("Mendez")-did so on the basis of Weyers' age. It argues that the only evidence presented concerned the conduct of Ben Brosius ("Brosius") and that there is no evidence he was involved in Weyers' termination aside from mere speculation.
It is true that "a plaintiff can meet [her] burden of proving intentional discrimination by providing evidence of remarks by decision makers reflecting a discriminatory attitude." Denesha v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 161 F.3d 491, 500 (8th Cir.1998) (citations omitted). Weyers does not direct the Court's attention to any direct remarks by Mendez demonstrating that Mendez had a discriminatory attitude. The Court does not believe, however, that Weyers' claim is therefore precluded. "A plaintiff can meet [her] burden of establishing intentional discrimination by presenting either direct or, more likely, indirect evidence of employment discrimination based on age." Madel v. FCI Marketing, Inc., 116 F.3d 1247, 1251 (8th Cir.1997) (citation omitted). In this case, the Court believes that Weyers produced indirect evidence which could allow a jury to find that she was terminated because of her age.
First, as Weyers points out, there was evidence that three out of four individuals who were terminated during Weyers' tenure with Lear were over the age of forty, but that only seventeen percent of Lear's workforce during that time was over the age of forty. [Tr. at 254-55, 383]. In addition, while Lear contends that Mendez was solely responsible for the decision to terminate Weyers, there was evidence to the contrary, along with evidence that Mendez's decision may have been influenced by Brosius. For instance, Weyers presented evidence that Brosius completed several of Weyers' performance evaluations. [Tr. at 89-90]. Further, Mendez's testimony suggested that his decision to terminate Weyers was based in part on the evaluations completed by Brosius. [Tr. at 94].
In Madel, the plaintiff sued his former employer for discriminatory discharge and harassment in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). The facts demonstrated that Allen Carlson ("Carlson") recommended the plaintiff's termination, but that the decision to terminate was actually made by James Parker ("Parker"). Madel, 116 F.3d at 1249. In considering the plaintiff's claims, the Eighth Circuit noted the parties' agreement that all derogatory statements at issue were made by Carlson and not by Parker. Id. at 1253. The court then stated that "[w]hile statements made outside decision-makers' presence do not alone raise an inference of discrimination, they are not necessarily irrelevant." Id. (citing Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 843 (8th Cir.1997) (en banc)). After briefly discussing the decision in Ryther, the court in Madel concluded that a jury could conclude that Carlson was Parker's primary source of information regarding the plaintiff and that, despite Carlson's lack of involvement in the termination decision, his age-based statements were relevant to the analysis. Id.
Similar to Madel, the Court believes that the jury could have believed Brosius to be Mendez's primary source of information regarding Weyers. As noted, there was evidence that Mendez's decision to terminate Weyers was based in part on Brosius' evaluations of Weyers' performance. There was evidence from more than one witness that Brosius made age-based statements, suggesting that he possessed a discriminatory attitude. It is undisputed that Brosius was Weyers' team leader for part of her employment and there was evidence that Brosius had a significant amount of contact with Weyers. In contrast, there was evidence that Mendez was less involved in supervising Weyers' training and activities. [Tr. at 81]. In addition, Weyers testified that she complained to Bill Courteville ("Courteville") and Mendez that she was being harassed and treated differently because of her age [Tr. at 293-95], but that Mendez did not take her complaints seriously. [Tr. at 295].
There was also evidence at trial that Mendez was not the sole decision-maker on Weyers' termination. In addition to Brosius' evaluations of Weyers, there was evidence that Courteville was involved in Weyers' termination. Courteville, the night shift supervisor at Lear, testified that Mendez made the ultimate decision to fire Weyers. [Tr. at 447]. Courteville, however, was present with Mendez at the meeting held with Weyers wherein Weyers' employment was terminated. [Tr. 442-43]. Courteville also testified that he gave "[a] lot" of weight to Brosius' evaluations of Weyers. [Tr. at 437]. He indicated that was because Brosius observed Weyers' performance and was with her all of the time. [Tr. at 437]. Moreover, there was testimony from Mark Lamar ("Lamar") that he overheard Courteville refer to another Lear employee as "overweight and too old ... [t]o do the job." [Tr. at 137-38]. Such a comment reasonably suggests that Courteville had a discriminatory attitude toward older employees.
In addition, the Court believes that the jury could reasonably conclude that Lear's asserted reason for Weyers' termination was false. Lear claims that Weyers was terminated due to poor performance. In support of this position, there was testimony from Mendez that he personally observed and evaluated Weyers' job performance. [Tr. at 94:15-22]. Mendez stated that he terminated Weyers for "poor performance." [Tr. at 94:5]. Despite this assertion, there was evidence that Mendez never took any formal disciplinary action against Weyers prior to terminating her employment. [Tr. at 82:9-11]. Furthermore, there was testimony from some of Weyers' co-workers indicating that Weyers' job performance was satisfactory or even "real good" and that she was not given the same training and assistance as younger employees. [See Tr. at 34:5-16; 67:7-24; 70:3-8; 134:3-25; 135:13 — 136:17; 168:4-20; 182:22 — 183:15; 197:19-21; and 207:13-24]. At least one co-worker testified that when Mendez was watching Weyers' work, she was doing a good job. [Tr. 57-58]. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the jury might well have believed that Mendez was not telling the truth. Indeed, his testimony surrounding Weyers' evaluations is open to question. [Tr. 85-91]. [Also see Tr. 508-18, testimony of Jeff Sitz concerning the evaluations.] The Supreme Court in Reeves stated that "[p]roof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is ... one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and...
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