Weymouth v. Cnty. of Henrico
| Decision Date | 31 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:14CV419 (REP-RCY) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | DEBORAH WEYMOUTH, et al., On behalf of themselves and others similarly situated Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF HENRICO, VIRGINIA Defendant. |
This matter is before the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for Report and Recommendation on the Parties' cross motions for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 20, 22). Plaintiffs Deborah Weymouth, James Redford, James A. Hughes, and Larry W. Spencer ("Plaintiffs") all are or were Captains employed by the County of Henrico, Virginia ("Defendant") in the Henrico County Division of Fire ("HFD"). Plaintiffs bring this collective action suit on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated individuals, alleging that Defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. ("FLSA") by improperly classifying Plaintiffs as employees exempt from the FLSA's overtime compensation requirement. (Collective Action Compl. ("Compl.") at 9-12, ECF No. 1.)1
At issue in this case is whether Defendant's classification of Captains is proper and, therefore, whether Plaintiffs, under the FLSA are entitled to back pay for unpaid overtime wages. Defendant argues that it has properly classified Captains as executives who are exempt from the FLSA's overtime compensation requirements. (Mem. Supp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mem.Supp.") at 1, 16-26, ECF No. 21.) Defendant also argues that, assuming it has improperly classified Captains as exempt from overtime, Plaintiffs' damages should be limited to two years and that Plaintiffs should not receive liquidated damages. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. at 26-30.)
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant has improperly classified Captains as Exempt Executives and, therefore, that Plaintiffs are entitled to back pay. (Pls.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ( ) at 1-2, 16-23, ECF No. 23; Oral Argument Tr. ("Tr.") 3:16-18, ECF No. 33.) Plaintiffs also argue that the First Responder Regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 541.3, must inform the Court's analysis of Captains' exemption status. (See Tr. 11:6-16.) The Parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment, on which the Court heard oral argument on July 14, 2015. The Parties' motions are ripe and ready for review.
Having considered the Parties' motions, briefs, and oral argument, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that there are no genuine disputes as to any material facts, that Defendant has demonstrated with clear and convincing evidence that it has properly classified Captains as Exempt Executive employees, that Defendant did not willfully violate the FLSA, and that Defendant classified Captains as Exempt Executive employees in good faith. Therefore, the Court ultimately finds that summary judgment should be entered in favor of Defendant.
Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22) be DENIED, that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 20) be GRANTED IN PART as to the issue of Defendant's alleged violation of the FLSA's Overtime Requirement, that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 20) be DENIED IN PART AS MOOT as to the issues of the recovery period and liquidated damages, and that JUDGMENT be ENTERED in favor of Defendant.
In the alternative, the Court RECOMMENDS that Summary Judgment be GRANTED in favor of Defendant as to Plaintiffs' willfulness claim, thereby limiting any recovery to two years,and further RECOMMENDS that Summary Judgment be GRANTED in favor of Defendant as to the issue of liquidated damages, thereby barring Plaintiffs from receiving liquidated damages in this action.
Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to overtime wages because their primary duty is to fight fires (i.e., their primary duty is not managerial), they perform essentially the same functions as "Non-Exempt" Lieutenants, the First Responder Regulation applies to Plaintiffs, and the Defendant cannot show by clear and convincing evidence that Plaintiffs are properly classified as Exempt Executives under the FLSA. (Pls.' Mem. Supp. at 1-2, 16-23; Tr. 3:16-18, ECF No. 33.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to overtime wages because Plaintiffs' primary duty is management of the fire station, Plaintiffs meet the requirements to be considered "Exempt Executives" without consideration of their role in the conduct of fighting fires, and the First Responder Regulation does not replace the "Primary Duty Test." (Def.'s Mem. Supp. at 1, 16-26; Tr. 28:6-9.) Thus, Defendant argues, Plaintiffs have been properly classified as Exempt Executives under the FLSA. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. at 16.) Defendant further argues that it has acted in good faith in its classification of Plaintiffs and did not willfully violate the FLSA and, therefore, that Plaintiffs should not be entitled to liquidated damages. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. at 26-30.)
Before presenting the material facts in this case, the Court notes that Plaintiffs have alleged that there is a genuine dispute of material facts. (See Pls.' Resp. Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. ( ) at 3-8, ECF No. 24.) While Plaintiffs have provided a list of disputed facts in their Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, , as required by Local Civil Rule 56(b), Defendant provides no such listing of disputed facts in its Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment . Rather, Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs' listing of undisputed facts in theirMotion for Summary Judgment "contain omissions of fact, misstatements of the record, or unsupported opinions." (Def.'s Resp. at 2.) Indeed, Defendant has consistently maintained that the material facts in this action are not genuinely in dispute. (See at Def.'s Mem. Supp. at 6-15; Def.'s Resp. at 2-3; see also Def.'s Reply Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ("Def.'s Reply") at 5, ECF No. 27.) Rather, Defendant argues that "an intellectually rigorous review of the material facts . . . reveals that Plaintiffs' true primary duty is management of the station and its personnel." (Def.'s Resp. at 1-2.)
Having carefully reviewed the record, the Court finds that the following are undisputed facts that are material to the outcome of this case. In the instances where one of these facts has been challenged as disputed, the Court provides its reasoning for determining that the relevant material fact is actually undisputed. Having reviewed the facts, the Court finds that there are no genuine disputes as to any material facts. The parties vigorously dispute the legal conclusions drawn from the facts; however, the underlying facts themselves are not in dispute.
1. Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant as Fire Captains ("Captains") within the three-year period prior to the filing of this action. .)2
2. Defendant operates twenty fire stations, each of which has a single Captain. (Affidavit of Anthony E. McDowell ("McDowell Aff.") ¶ 5, ECF No. 21-1; Dep. of James A. Hughes ("Hughes Dep.") 34:7-12, ECF No. 21-10.)
3. Stations are staffed by Firefighters, Lieutenants, and Captains. (McDowell Aff. ¶ 6, ECF No. 21-1; see Hughes Dep. 13:1-15:16, ECF No. 21-10; Dep. of Deborah Weymouth ("Weymouth Dep.") 16:2-16:25, ECF No. 23-3.)
4. Some stations are also staffed by "specialty shops." (McDowell Aff. ¶¶ 7-8, ECF No. 21-1.)
5. Firefighters and Lieutenants are assigned to one of three shifts, designated as A, B, and C. (McDowell Aff. ¶ 6, ECF No. 21-1.)
6. Captains are assigned to one of three shifts, designated as D, E, and F. (McDowell Aff. 6, 23, ECF No. 21-1.) Captains work a different shift schedule than their subordinates, enabling them "to work with, evaluate, and supervise each of the shifts at [their] station[s] on a rotating basis each month." (McDowell Aff. ¶ 23, ECF No. 21-1.)3
7. "Fire Captains are responsible for apportioning the work among the three shifts." (McDowell Aff. ¶ 15, ECF No. 21-1; see Weymouth Dep. 23:7-24, ECF No. 24-2.)4
8. According to Henrico County's "Class Specification" for Fire Captains, a Captain "directs the activities of an assigned station in accordance with rules and regulations and Division policy" and "coordinat[es] the functions of all three shifts." (Affidavit of Paula G. Reid ("Reid Aff."), ECF No. 21-2, Ex. 2-A, ECF No. 21-3.)
9. Plaintiffs have testified that, as Captains, they performed most of the job duties listed in the Class Specification. (Weymouth Dep. 42:13-16, ECF No. 21-9; Hughes Dep. 35:2-20, ECF No. 21-10; Dep. of James A. Redford ("Redford Dep.") 17:12-50:16, ECF No. 21-11; Dep. of Larry W. Spencer ("Spencer Dep.") 20:5-73:19, ECF No. 21-12 ().)
10. The chain of command for HFD is as follows: Firefighters report to Lieutenants; Lieutenants report to Captains; Captains report to either a Battalion Chief or a District Chief. (Hughes Dep. 14:23-15:10, ECF No. 21-10; see also Weymouth Dep. 16:10-22, ECF No. 21-9.)
11. The head of the HFD is the Fire Chief. The current Fire Chief is Anthony E. McDowell, who has served in that capacity since October 20, 2012. (McDowell Aff. ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 21-1; see also Hughes Dep. 40:7-8, ECF No. 23-1.)
12. There are certain tasks, known as "Daily Checks," that everyone at a given station must attend to on certain days of the week. Daily Checks include self-inspections of an individual's breathing apparatus and inspections of the fire engine and trucks. (Dep. of Andrew M. Baxter ("Baxter Dep.") 51:15-52:15,...
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