Wharton Transport Corp. v. Bridges

Citation606 S.W.2d 521,24 A.L.R.4th 1295
PartiesWHARTON TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Dr. James T. BRIDGES, Appellee.
Decision Date07 July 1980
CourtSupreme Court of Tennessee

Joseph A. Heffington, III, Holt, Batchelor, Spicer & Ryan, Memphis, for appellant.

John J. Thomason, Jerry E. Mitchell, Gail M. Simonton, Thomason, Crawford & Hendrix, Memphis, for appellee.

OPINION

FONES, Judge.

This appeal involves a suit for indemnity brought by appellant, Wharton Transportation Corporation against appellee Dr. James T. Bridges. Appellant asserts that appellee negligently conducted a physical examination of Martin Lawson, a prospective employee of appellant; that appellee negligently certified Lawson as physically fit to drive a truck in interstate commerce according to the requirements of the Motor Carrier Safety Regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Department of Transportation; that appellant hired Lawson as a truck driver relying upon appellee's certification; that while driving a truck for appellant, Lawson was involved in a collision proximately caused by Lawson's physical disabilities that appellee failed to discover; and that as a result of the collision appellant was required to pay $426,314.25 to settle lawsuits brought by the injured third parties.

The trial judge directed a verdict for appellee at the close of all the proof holding that appellant failed to establish that a negligent examination by appellee was the proximate cause of the accident from which the settlement expenses arose and that appellee could not be liable for the settlement expenses because such liability imposed a duty upon appellee that ran to an indefinite class of persons, for an indefinite amount and for an indefinite time. The Court of Appeals affirmed the directed verdict holding that the only proof of proximate cause established that appellant's loss was caused by Lawson's inattentive driving and that there was no proof causally linking appellant's loss to the alleged negligent examination.

We granted this appeal to determine the propriety of rendering a directed verdict in this case.

I. The Employment of Lawson

Martin Lawson submitted to appellant Wharton an application for employment as a truck driver on May 22, 1972. That same day appellant sent Lawson to the Bridges Clinic, operated by appellee, for a pre-employment physical examination to determine if Lawson was fit to drive a truck. Passing this physical examination is a prerequisite for drivers employed by common carriers regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Department of Transportation. Lawson was accompanied to the Bridges Clinic by another Wharton employee, and when they returned, Lawson had in his possession a detailed certificate, signed on behalf of and with the approval of Dr. Bridges, stating that all physical characteristics including vision, reflexes, and extremities were normal and that Lawson was qualified to drive a motor vehicle in accordance with the Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. 49 C.F.R. 391.41-391.49.

Having passed the physical examination, Lawson was given a written examination by appellant and a test drive. In addition he drove on two student trips on which he was accompanied by another Wharton employee. His performance was deemed satisfactory, and on May 25 he was assigned to drive his first solo trip to Black Fork, Ohio. On his return to Memphis at approximately 4:15 a. m. on May 27, Lawson pulled off the highway, for a reason unclear from the proof, and collided with a station wagon parked off the two westbound traffic lanes, in or beyond the emergency lane of the westbound side of I-40. The automobile was occupied by Sgt. Paul Rains and his four children who had pulled off the highway to sleep. The collision resulted in severe injuries to three children, the death of one child, and minor injuries to Sgt. Rains. Lawson was unhurt. Wharton's expenses in settling the claims of the Rains family are the basis for this suit.

II. Lawson's Physical Condition

While in the process of settling the Rains family's claims, Wharton learned that Lawson, far from being physically fit prior to his employment, had been rated one hundred percent physically disabled and had severe vision defects. Doctor Robert Ackerman, one of Lawson's treating physicians, testified that Lawson suffered from the following permanent disabilities at the time he applied to work for Wharton:

1. Eyes: Lawson had chorioretinitis in both eyes, a condition which left him with a ninety-five percent loss of vision in his left eye and blurred vision in his right. The condition was permanent and could not be improved with corrective lenses. The overall effect of this condition left Lawson with a loss of sight ahead and to the lower right of his field of vision and with a significant impairment of depth perception.

2. Legs: Following surgery in 1958, Lawson contracted severe osteoarthritis in his left knee which compounded a ten percent loss of flexion and a propensity for the joint to lock, giving him a twenty percent disability to the body as a whole; he also had a functional debility in his right leg and ankle which caused a thirty percent disability to the body as a whole.

3. Spinal Column: Lawson was suffering from a chronic degenerative disc disease which affected his neck and lower back, causing a forty percent permanent disability to the body as a whole. Both pain and problems with manueverability of the neck and head resulted from this disease.

4. Lawson was suffering from chronic fatigue, depression, and emotional exhaustion stemming from his multiple physical ailments.

Doctor Ackerman testified that as of 1967, five years before this medical examination, Lawson was one hundred percent permanently physically disabled and unemployable. None of these physical disabilities were listed on the physical examination sheet containing Dr. Bridges' signature, which Lawson submitted to Wharton. Doctor Bridges admitted that in exercising a reasonable degree of medical care and skill ordinarily possessed by physicians in Memphis performing a similar examination the physical disabilities of Martin Lawson would have been discovered. Doctor Bridges also admitted that Lawson's vision defects alone would have disqualified him from driving a truck in interstate commerce under the ICC regulations. Thus, the record reflects evidence from which the jury could conclude that appellee negligently conducted the physical examination. Two issues remain: first, whether material evidence exists from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the negligent examination was a proximate cause of the accident from which appellant incurred the settlement expenses; and second, does appellant have an implied right of indemnity arising out of Dr. Bridges' breach of the contractual duty to accurately disclose Lawson's physical condition.

III. Proximate Cause

The trial judge directed a verdict for appellee in this case on the issue of proximate cause and held that the accident was caused by Lawson's inattentive driving and that appellant failed to offer any proof that the inattentive driving was in any way related to Lawson's vision defects. The trial judge relied on the following testimony of Sgt. Rains in which he relates a hearsay statement of Lawson concerning the accident:

"A ... Mr. Lawson and I-After the children were taken out of the vehicle, of course-Mr. Lawson and I walked a little ways past the car up the little incline there and, of course, we got us a cigarette, and we were smoking, and Mr. Lawson said, you know, 'I'm sorry the accident happened. I'm very sorry.' He said he was having problems with his vehicle. He had had some mechanical problems with it down the road and prior some place else, and he was pulling off to the side of the road to see if he could take care of it, and he said as he was pulling off the road, he said he looked down and when he looked back up, there I was, and it was too late to get away from me.

Q I thought you said Mr. Lawson told you he looked down and when he looked up again, there you were, and he couldn't stop.

A That's right. That's what he said. He said when he started pulling off the side of the road he looked down-and he didn't say for what reason-but he looked back up, and there I was, and it was too late to get away from me.

Q When he said he looked down, do you understand he was looking down into the cab?

A No, sir.

Q What do you take that to mean?

A He didn't explain it.

Q But he didn't see your car until he looked back up?

A Yes, sir."

The Court of Appeals relied upon the same testimony in affirming the directed verdict.

"The next question is: Is there any proof that the inattentive driving was caused by the faulty eyesight? It seems to us to make little difference how many eyes you have; if what you have is looking down toward the floor board instead of the road ahead. There is simply no showing of a causal connection between the negligence charged as a proximate cause and the damages suffered by Wharton."

In Tennessee the requirements for sustaining a directed verdict are clear "On review of the grant of a directed verdict on motion of a defendant, it is not the office of an appellate court to weigh the evidence. Rather, it must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the plaintiff, indulging in all reasonable inferences in his favor, and disregarding any evidence to the contrary. The trial judge's action may be sustained only if there is no material evidence in the record that would support a verdict for the plaintiff, under any of the theories that he has advanced." Cecil v. Hardin, 575 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn.1978).

From our review of the record we are of the opinion that the trial court and Court of Appeals have incorrectly relied upon this statement by Lawson in directing a verdict for appellee. In our opinion the question of proximate cause should have been submitted to the jury.

The...

To continue reading

Request your trial
53 cases
  • Grogan v. Uggla
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • November 21, 2017
    ...of Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever had duty to warn patient's wife of her risk of contracting same disease); Wharton Transp. Corp. v. Bridges , 606 S.W.2d 521, 527-28 (Tenn. 1980) (holding that physician who performed mandatory pre-employment physical exam of prospective truck driver owed duty......
  • Calwell v. Hassan
    • United States
    • Kansas Court of Appeals
    • December 15, 1995
    ...v. Dept. of Corrections, 124 Or.App. 166, 861 P.2d 1026 (1993), rev. denied 319 Or. 150, 877 P.2d 86 (1994); Wharton Transport Corp. v. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn.1980); Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364 (Tex.App.1983); Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. System, 65 Wash.2d 461, 398 P.2d 14 After re......
  • Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. and Medical Center
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • July 13, 1987
    ...Davis v. Mangelsdorf (Ariz.App.1983), 138 Ariz. 207, 673 P.2d 951; Gooden v. Tips (Tex.App.1983), 651 S.W.2d 364; Wharton Transport Corp. v. Bridges (Tenn.1980), 606 S.W.2d 521; Watkins v. United States (5th Cir.1979), 589 F.2d 214; Freese v. Lemmon (Iowa 1973), 210 N.W.2d 576; Kaiser v. Su......
  • Amos v Vanderbuilt University
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • March 31, 2000
    ...injuries caused by the physician's negligence." Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865,at 870 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Wharton Transport Corp. v. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d 521, 526(Tenn. 1980)). However, that third party must be an identifiable plaintiff, and the imposition of liability must not expose t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT