Whatley v. Hamm

• Docket Number: CIV. ACT. 1:19-cv-938-TFM-N
• Decision Date: 07 August 2023
• Parties: DONALD DWAYNE WHATLEY, Petitioner, v. JOHN Q. HAMM,[1] Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

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DONALD DWAYNE WHATLEY, Petitioner, v. JOHN Q. HAMM,^[1] Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections Respondent.

CIV. ACT. No. 1:19-cv-938-TFM-N

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division

August 7, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TERRY F. MOORER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Donald Dwayne Whatley's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment (Doc. 23 filed 9/28/22). Pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Petitioner seeks reconsideration of this Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. 21) denying his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 9). The State filed its response in opposition of the motion. See Doc. 29. Upon thorough review of the motion, the response, and the relevant law, the motion (Doc. 23) is DENIED for the reasons discussed below.

I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Whatley filed his original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on November 7, 2019, and later amended that petition on February 18, 2020. Doc. 1; Doc. 9. He raised several grounds for relief, including (as relevant here) that he suffered constitutional violations in the Alabama state courts arising from (1) how his jury was selected and instructed, (2) how certain evidence was admitted and evaluated at his trial, and (3) how his trial counsel represented him.

On August 31, 2022, this Court entered a 196-page Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. 21) and Judgment (Doc. 22) denying Whatley's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in its entirety. The Court also denied Whatley's request for an evidentiary hearing and declined to issue a Certificate of Appealability.

Whatley filed the instant Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment (Doc 23) on September 28, 2022. After receiving an enlargement of time from this Court (Doc. 28), the State filed its response (Doc. 29) on December 5, 2022. Whatley's motion and the State's response are now before the Court for a ruling.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Whatley's motion for reconsideration is up against two weighty legal standards. First, Whatley still faces the original task of showing he is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the habeas statute under which he first sought relief. To do this Whatley needs to show that this Court was wrong to dismiss his habeas petition and that, in fact, the state court's ruling on his federal claims was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Evans v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). As explained in this Court's detailed Opinion and Order, Whatley did not meet this burden, so his habeas petition was denied.

Now Whatley faces an added hurdle - the very limited scope of relief offered by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). “‘The only grounds for granting [a Rule 59] motion are newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.'” Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999)) (alteration in original). “‘[A] Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be used] to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.'” Id. at 1343 (quoting Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005)) (alteration in original). Where a Rule 59(e) motion does nothing more than express disagreement with the district court's treatment of certain facts or conclusions of law, it should be denied. See Linet, 408 F.3d at 763; see also Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Intern., Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1344 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding the district court did not err in denying a Rule 59(e) motion where the movant “did nothing but ask the district court to reexamine an unfavorable ruling”).

III. ANALYSIS

In the Court's view, most of Whatley's motion is outside the scope of Rule 59(e) because it largely rehashes arguments made in his previous filings. The introductory section, headings, and even major parts of the legal argument are duplicative of his habeas petition, making it difficult to tell exactly what Whatley wants this Court to reexamine.^[2] Putting that aside, even where Whatley does raise novel issues, those issues do not come from new evidence, nor do they constitute “manifest errors of law or fact”, as required by Rule 59(e). For these reasons, Whatley's motion is due to be denied

As noted, the significant repetition between the habeas petition and the Rule 59(e) motion makes it hard to differentiate Whatley's alleged points of error from the arguments he already made. In this Court's best understanding, Whatley's motion seeks review of the following aspects of the Opinion and Order:

1. Whether Whatley was entitled to relief on his Batson claim.

2. Whether Whatley was entitled to relief on his penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

3. Whether Whatley was entitled to relief on his claim that evidence of future dangerousness was improperly admitted during the penalty phase of his trial.

4. Whether Whatley was entitled to relief on his claim that the prosecutor improperly argued to the sentencing judge that the victim's family wanted Whatley to be sentenced to death.

5. Whether Whatley was entitled to relief on his claim that the jury was improperly told that Whatley's case would be reviewed on appeal.

6. Whether Whatley was entitled to relief on his claim that the trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses.

7. Whether Whatley was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his habeas claims.

8. Whether this Court should have issued a Certificate of Appealability on any of Whatley's habeas claims.

After a thorough review of each of these issues, this Court finds Whatley is not entitled to relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Whatley does not suggest there is any newly discovered evidence this Court should consider, nor has he demonstrated any manifest error of law or fact that supports changing this Court's ruling. See Samara v. Taylor, 38 F.4th 141, 149 (11th Cir. 2022) (acknowledging that the only grounds for Rule 59(e) relief are newly discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact).

A. Whatley has not shown any manifest error of law or fact that warrants modifying this Court's denial of his Batson-related claims.

Whatley argued in his habeas petition that the jury selection process at his trial was done in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and he reiterates much of that argument here. Compare Doc. 9, ¶¶ 2, 25-115 with Doc. 23, pp. 1, 4-25. Whatley now also says this Court erred in finding no violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) because he still staunchly contends that the Alabama courts' adjudication of his Batson claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Doc. 23, pp. 5-9. Whatley also maintains the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals (“ACCA”), and now this Court in turn, unreasonably considered the facts in his case in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Doc. 23, pp. 5, 9-26. As explained below, Whatley's arguments are unpersuasive.

i. The Alabama courts' rejection of Whatley's Batson claims was not an incorrect or unreasonable application of Batson and its progeny.

Whatley's Rule 59(e) motion recommences his attack on the legal standard the ACCA applied to his Batson claims. Just like he did in his habeas petition, Whatley argues again that “the ACCA explicitly refused to consider the totality of the circumstances, focusing instead on whether it could identify a single race neutral justification for each struck juror.” Compare Doc. 9, ¶¶ 2730 with Doc. 23, p. 5. He cites to Batson, Snyder, and Miller-El II, all of which he relied upon in his habeas petition.^[3] Doc. 23, pp. 5-9. This Court already thoroughly considered these arguments and decided against Whatley. Doc. 21, pp. 20-27. To the extent Whatley's motion simply echoes what was raised in his habeas petition, it is not within the scope of Rule 59(e). Compare Doc. 23, pp. 5-6 with Doc. 9, ¶¶ 27-28.

Perhaps to avoid Rule 59(e)'s prohibition on relitigating old issues, Whatley suggests this Court misunderstood his Batson argument:

This Court misapprehended Mr. Whatley's contention that the ACCA failed to “consider all relevant circumstances,” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, when it suggested that petitioner's arguments are based only on “the fact that the state court did not mention or explicitly discuss these circumstances in its opinion.” (Doc. 21, at 23.) ... [Petitioner's argument here is based not on what the ACCA did not say but rather on what it did say. The ACCA explicitly stated that it was not considering anything other than a single justification proffered by the prosecution. Whatley, 146 So.3d at 454.

Doc. 23, pp. 5-6. Regardless of how it is articulated though, Whatley's argument is really just a restatement of his original contention-that the ACCA violated Batson and its progeny by making the following statement in its ruling:

As long as any one reason given by the prosecutor for the strike of a potential juror is sufficiently race-neutral, a determination concerning any other reason given need not be made.

Doc. 23, p. 6 (quoting Whatley v. State, 146 So.3d 437, 454 (Ala.Crim.App.2010)). To Whatley, this single statement amounts to the ACCA having “explicitly refused to consider the totality of the circumstances” in violation of Batson and its progeny. Doc. 23, p. 5.

This Court disagreed and explained why in its Opinion and Order. Doc. 21, pp. 20-27. Whatley now accuses this Court of “imagin[ing] additional reasoning that ‘could...