Whatley v. Lee

• Decision Date: 04 November 2015
• Docket Number: CASE NO.: 3:14-cv-21-TSL-JCG
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi
• Parties: WALLACE W. WHATLEY PETITIONER v. ERNEST LEE RESPONDENT

WALLACE W. WHATLEY PETITIONER v. ERNEST LEE RESPONDENT

CASE NO.: 3:14-cv-21-TSL-JCG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI NORTHERN DIVISION

November 4, 2015

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

BEFORE THE COURT is the Application of Wallace W. Whatley for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254, filed January 1, 2014. On February 14, 2014, Earnest Lee, the Superintendent of the Mississippi State Penitentiary (incorrectly named by Plaintiff as "Ernest" Lee), filed a Response. Having considered the Petition, Response, pleadings, records on file, the arguments of the parties, and relevant legal authority, the undersigned recommends that the Petition be dismissed.

I. Facts and Procedural History

In November 2008, Wallace W. Whatley was indicted as a habitual offender in Rankin County, Mississippi, on a three-count indictment "for sale of Dilaudid, a schedule II controlled substance, possession of more than forty dosage units of Dilaudid, and possession of a firearm by a felon." Whatley v. State, 123 So. 3d 461, 464 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). In December 2010, Whatley pled guilty only to one count of the indictment: the "sale of Dilaudid as a subsequent drug offender . . . but not as a habitual offender." Id., at 465. The trial court entered an order of nolle prosequi as to the other two counts. Id. Whatley was sentenced to a term of sixty years, "with release after serving twenty of the sixty years, followed by five years of post-release supervision," and "ordered to pay a fine of $5,000 and various court costs and fees." Id. Whatley was represented by four different attorneys.

In September 2009, Whatley fired his first lawyer, Richard Rehfeldt, and hired Cynthia Stewart to represent him. He also entered the first of two plea petitions. In it, he pleaded guilty to all three counts of the indictment. Whatley listed his "physical and mental health" as "uncertain" and stated that he was not under the influence of any drugs "except methadone." This plea petition was signed on September 28, 2009 (the date of the plea hearing), and a judgment of conviction for the three counts was signed as well, and entered on October 7, 2009. However, at the plea hearing, at some point Whatley ran out of the courtroom and did not return. A bench warrant was issued for Whatley's arrest when he failed to appear at his sentencing hearing, set for January 2010. Whatley later explained that he fled the courtroom because before the hearing he had received a letter from his methadone clinic stating that if he was imprisoned, and thereby suddenly taken off his methadone treatments, he could have a stroke. Whatley "stayed gone" for one and one-half months, and turned himself in after "detoxing."

In October 2010, Whatley changed lawyers yet again, substituting Stewart with Percy Stanfield and Beverly Poole. In December 2010, another plea hearing was held where Whatley entered a second plea of guilty . . . [the] sale of Dilaudid as a subsequent drug offender . . . , but not as a habitual offender.

Id. (footnotes omitted).

In August 2011, Whatley filed a motion for post-conviction relief "alleging his indictment was improper; his plea, involuntary; his sentence, illegal; the judge biased; and his counsel, ineffective." Id. After the trial court dismissed his motion, Whatley appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court which referred the appeal to the Mississippi Court of Appeals. On appeal, Whatley "rais[ed] three issues: he was entitled to a competency hearing before his plea hearing; his guilty plea was involuntary; and his counsel was ineffective." Id., at 466. The court of appeals also addressed "the validity of [Whatley's] indictment and sentence." Id. Ultimately, the court of appeals denied Whatley any post-conviction relief on January 22, 2013. Id., at 471. And the supreme court denied certiorari on October 10, 2013. Whatley v. State, 123 So. 3d 450 (Miss. 2013) (unpublished table decision).

On January 10, 2014, Whatley filed this petition for habeas corpus raising four issues: (1) that the trial court erred by not holding a competency hearing prior to the entry of the guilty plea, (2) that his indictment was improper, and (3) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from all four of his attorneys, and (4) that the guilty plea was entered into unintelligently. Mem. Supp. 1-2, ECF No. 2. On February 14, 2014, Respondent Lee answered the Petition. Resp., ECF No. 6. On March 21, 2014, Whatley responded in opposition to Lee's Response. Resp. Opp., ECF No. 9.

II. Standard of Review

The Court applies the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") in reviewing the Petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Under the AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in state custody

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Section 2254(d)(1) "places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). "Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported . . . the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fair-minded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of" the Supreme Court. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). In Williams, the Court held that:

Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

529 U.S. at 412-13; see also Chambers v. Johnson, 218 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2000). A federal court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry asks "whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Williams, 529 U.S. at 409; Chambers, 218 F.3d at 363. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; accord Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). Section 2254(d)(1) imposes a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings," Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n.7, and "demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt," Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam). A federal court may not "substitut[e] its own judgment for that of the state court, in contravention of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)." Id.; Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10 (2002) (per curiam) (holding that habeas relief is not proper where state court decision was only "merely erroneous").

"The starting point for cases subject to § 2254(d)(1) is to identify the 'clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States' that governs the habeas petitioner's claims." Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1449 (2013) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 412). Courts may look to federal case law from district and circuit courts as "helpful amplifications of Supreme Court precedent[,]" but these holdings cannot serve as a basis for habeas relief "on an issue that the Supreme Court has not addressed." Reed v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 465, 487-88 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Matteo v. SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 890 (3d Cir. 1999) and discussing other relevant circuit decisions). Furthermore, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), factual determinations by a state court are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

III. Discussion

A. Competency Hearing

The competency standard for a defendant to enter a guilty plea is the same as the standard required to determine the competency of the defendant to stand trial. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 (1993); Smith v. State, 831 So. 2d 590, 593 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). The Supreme Court has developed the following two-prong test to adequately protect this important right: a defendant is competent to stand trial in federal cases if (1) the defendant has the "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and (2) the defendant "has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."¹ Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). In a federal habeas proceeding stemming from a state court conviction, the burden is on the petitioner to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was incompetent in fact at the time of the plea. Thompson v. Blackburn, 776 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.1985). "The burden imposed upon a habeas petitioner to demonstrate incompetency in fact at the time of trial is extremely heavy . . . ." Johnson v. Estelle, 704 F.2d 232, 238 (5th Cir. 1983).

The court of appeals found that

there were no "reasonable grounds" for the trial court to order a

...