Whatley v. State, No. 49A02-0809-CR-808.

• Docket Nº: No. 49A02-0809-CR-808.
• Citation: 906 N.E.2d 259
• Case Date: May 21, 2009
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

906 N.E.2d 259 Walker WHATLEY, Appellant-Defendant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. No. 49A02-0809-CR-808. Court of Appeals of Indiana. May 21, 2009.

Bruce E. Andis, Lebanon, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Indianapolis, IN, Angela N. Sanchez, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

SULLIVAN, Senior Judge.

A jury convicted Walter Whatley ("Whatley") of Possession of Cocaine as a Class A felony under Ind.Code 35-48-4-6(b)(3)(B)(iv). More precisely, Whatley was convicted of possession of cocaine in a quantity in excess of three grams within one-thousand feet of a "youth program center."¹

Whatley does not contest the fact that he was in possession of cocaine in excess of

906 N.E.2d 260

three grams. He also does not contest that he possessed the cocaine within one thousand feet of the Robinson Community Church as charged.² Rather, he asserts that the criminal statute and the statute defining a "youth program center" are unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.³ Insofar as here applied, I.C. 35-41-1-29 defines a youth program center as "a building or structure that on a regular basis provides recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other programs or services for persons less than eighteen (18) years of age."

Citing Manigault v. State, 881 N.E.2d 679 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), Whatley contends that "a bright line rule" is constitutionally required and that there is no such bright line in the case before us. In Manigault, the court held that the statute "clearly and unambiguously puts any person on notice that cocaine possession `within one-thousand feet [of a] family housing complex' [is proscribed]." Id. at 684. In Manigault, the defendant's possession took place on the property of the Knight's Inn Motel.

The definitional statute, IC 35-41-1-10.5, sets forth that a family housing unit is a building or series of buildings that contains at least twelve dwelling units and where children are domiciled or likely to be domiciled. The statute specifically includes a facility "operated as a hotel or motel."⁴ Manigault made no challenge to the inclusion of a hotel or motel within the definition of a family housing complex as part of his unconstitutional statutory vagueness argument. In this regard, it is important to note that Whatley concedes that there is no "identification" problem with regard to the other locations set forth in the criminal statute, including "schools, parks, and family housing complexes." (Appellant's Brief at 7).

However, Whatley asserts that because a church bears no identifier to signify it as a "youth program center," the statute provides no basis for individuals to know they are within the proscribed distance. This appears to focus primarily upon the "bright line rule" argument as drawn from Manigault and from Polk v. State, 683 N.E.2d 567 (Ind.1997), trans. denied. To be sure, both Manigualt and Polk do appear to require such a rule so as to communicate to offenders "what conduct is proscribed." Polk, 683 N.E.2d at 572.

As Whatley concedes, the family housing complex involved in Manigault presented no definitional constitutional problem. Furthermore, Whatley's constitutional challenge to Indiana's definition of a "youth program center" gains no support from Manigault or Polk. As noted, Manigault involved a family housing complex, i.e., a motel.

Most importantly, Polk leads to a contrary conclusion than that proffered by Whatley. He is of the view that the Indiana statutory scheme relative to youth program centers is fatally flawed because no bright line rule is present that would put a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that the person is within 1000 feet of an "unmarked youth program center." (Appellant's Brief at 7). Polk tells us that

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such knowledge or notice is not required for constitutionality. Our Supreme Court there held:

Nothing forces drug offenders to drive within the drug-free zone created by the legislature. To the contrary, they pass there at their own peril and in jeopardy of their own penal interests. Walker⁵ settled that drug offenders do not have to know that their activities are taking place near a school....

(Emphasis supplied). If therefore, the Robinson Community Church is a "youth program center,"⁶ Whatley's conviction as a Class A felony must stand.

At trial Reverend Robert E. Harvey, senior pastor of the Robinson Community church for nine years, testified that the youth programs conducted at the church consisted of:

(1) "Amani (sic) church services" several Sundays out of the month, targeted for young people age 5-11, to "teach them the purpose of worship and why we worship the way we do";

(2) "Boys to Men" and "Girls to Women" programs which are mentoring programs "so that the kids have positive role models";

(3) A Girl Scout troop made up of girls who are members of the church and a few from the community, meeting twice a month;

(4) "Wednesday Bible Circle" for teens, youth and children broken into age appropriate classes "so that they might learn the Bible and the principles therein";

(5) "Family Fun Night" every Friday from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. where parents and children meet together at church to "get them to find positive ways to interact one with another. Give children opportunities to see how other kids react and interact with their...