Whatley v. State
| Decision Date | 21 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A04–1110–PC–548.,49A04–1110–PC–548. |
| Citation | 969 N.E.2d 634 |
| Parties | Walker WHATLEY, Appellant–Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Respondent. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court; The Honorable Steven R. Eichholtz, Judge; Cause No. 49G20–0803–PC–64067.
Walker Whatley, Pendleton, IN, pro se.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Angela N. Sanchez, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Appellee.
Walker Whatley was convicted of possession of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a youth program center, a Class A felony, and sentenced to thirty-five years in prison. The Indiana Supreme Court upheld his conviction and sentence in a June 8, 2010 opinion. Whatley filed a petition for post-conviction relief and an amended petition, which, following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied. Whatley, pro se, now appeals that denial and raises several issues which we consolidate, restate, and reorder as three: 1) whether the post-conviction court erred in finding no impropriety in the evidence which was presented at trial and evidence which Whatley alleges was not disclosed regarding the seized cocaine; 2) whether the post-conviction court erred in finding no error with the evidence presented at trial regarding the measurement of the distance between Whatley's home and the youth program center; and 3) whether Whatley was charged for and convicted of the proper offense. We conclude the State did not fail to disclose the material Whatley now takes issue with, and that the other issues could have been addressed on direct appeal, and as a result are precluded from our review. Therefore, we affirm.
The background facts and the majority of the procedural history of this case have been discussed by our supreme court:
The facts most favorable to the conviction indicate that in March, 2008, Whatley was arrested at his home on a warrant issued in an unrelated case. During a search incident to arrest, the arresting officer discovered a bag containing 3.2459 grams of cocaine in Whatley's pocket. In relevant part, the State charged Whatley with possession of cocaine as a Class A felony. Possession of cocaine is ordinarily a Class C felony, but possession of three grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a youth program center elevates the offense to a Class A felony. Whatley's home, where the arrest occurred, was located approximately 795 feet from Robinson Community Church (“RCC”). Whether RCC qualifies as a “youth program center” for the purpose of triggering the elevation to a Class A felony is the central issue of this appeal.
The jury found that the enhancement was supported by the evidence and the court sentenced Whatley to a term of 35 years. Whatley appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed his conviction on the grounds that RCC did not qualify as a “youth program center.” The Court of Appeals found that RCC's hosting of various programs for children did not change its status as a church; thus, removing it from the ambit of the statute's intended coverage for purposes of the sentence enhancement. The Court of Appeals remanded the case with instructions to enter the conviction as a Class C felony and sentence Whatley accordingly.
The State sought, and we granted, transfer.
Whatley v. State, 928 N.E.2d 202, 203–04 (Ind.2010) (citations and footnote omitted).
The supreme court concluded that, based on the evidence presented, a jury could properly find that RCC was a “youth program center,” and affirmed Whatley's conviction and sentence. Id. at 207.
Following the supreme court's decision, Whatley filed, pro se, a petition for post-conviction relief, raising several issues, and amended this petition to add another claim of error. Following a hearing thereon, the post-conviction court denied his petition. Whatley now appeals. Additional facts will be supplied as appropriate.
Post-conviction procedures provide a narrow remedy for collateral challenges to convictions based on grounds enumerated in the post-conviction rules. Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1187 (Ind.2001), cert. denied,535 U.S. 1019 (2002). To the extent an argument within the petition is the same claim made and rejected in prior proceedings, that argument is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Wallace v. State, 820 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Ind.2005). When an argument is raised for the first time but could have been raised earlier either on direct appeal or in an earlier petition for post-conviction relief, the claim is procedurally defaulted for not having been presented timely. Id.
Whatley appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief, which is a negative judgment. See Wrinkles, 749 N.E.2d at 1187. As a result, he must convince this court that the evidence “as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.” Id. at 1187–88. “This Court will disturb a post-conviction court's decision as being contrary to law only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, and the post-conviction court has reached the opposite conclusion.” Id. at 1188 (quotation and citation omitted).
First, Whatley repeatedly and adamantly insists the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence prior to trial. As discussed below, we believe his specific arguments to be somewhat different than that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, and as a result, we define and address his arguments broadly, as challenges to the propriety of both the evidence which was submitted at trial and evidence which he alleges was not disclosed.
Nevertheless, we lay out the principles which would guide our review of an alleged failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). “To prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must establish: (1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) that the evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) that the evidence was material to an issue at trial.” Minnick v. State, 698 N.E.2d 745, 755 (Ind .1998) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87),cert. denied,528 U.S. 1006 (1999). Evidence is material under Brady United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). However, the State will not be found to have suppressed material evidence if it was available to a defendant through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Conner v. State, 711 N.E.2d 1238, 1246 (Ind.1999), cert. denied,531 U.S. 829 (2000). “Favorable evidence” includes both exculpatory evidence and impeachment evidence. See Prewitt v. State, 819 N.E.2d 393, 401 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied.
Now to Whatley's arguments. The evidence which Whatley contends was improperly not disclosed is any evidence which might suggest the cocaine entered into evidence at his trial was in fact cocaine from a previous conviction of his and unrelated to the present offense. This is an argument which he raised at trial to challenge the weight of the evidence presented. In the present appeal he argues that the evidence which the State presented at trial was false and deceptive, and therefore the State improperly failed to disclose exculpatory evidence—in Whatley's view, “the truth”—as required by Brady.
Specifically, Whatley contends the officer who seized the cocaine lied at trial. In support of this contention, he reasons that the officer's testimony conflicts with his probable cause affidavit and points out that the State initially charged Whatley with possessing less than three grams of cocaine, but amended his charge and he was tried and convicted of possessing greater than three grams. He also contends the forensic chemist lied at trial in testifying that the substance recovered consisted of greater than three grams of cocaine. Similarly, he takes issue with the supposed lack of evidence of a chain of custody of the substance seized between the seizure and chemical testing.
Whatley already made some of these arguments at trial, either by cross-examining the witnesses pointedly or by objecting to their testimony. These testimonies were allowed into evidence by the trial court, and any challenge to their admission or veracity was an issue first for the trial court and jury, respectively, and second, as to the admission into evidence, for this court on direct appeal. None of this evidence may be directly challenged in seeking post-conviction relief.1See Wallace, 820 N.E.2d at 1264.
Further, and returning to our statement that Whatley's arguments do not quite fall under Brady, these challenges to the State's evidence presented at trial do not refer to Brady material (improperly undisclosed exculpatory evidence) because Whatley himself points to little evidence that was not disclosed. (The little evidence he does point to, we discuss separately below.) To the extent he might argue that “truth” was not disclosed, our simple but complete response to the somewhat circuitous argument is, as stated above, attacks on the relative truth and reliability of the evidence presented: 1) should have been and largely were raised at trial, 2) were properly submitted to the jury for it to weigh, 3) could have been issues on direct appeal, and 4) are improper when seeking post-conviction relief.
Whatley also makes a corollary argument. He argues...
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Whatley v. Zatecky
...III"). The trial court's denial of Whatley's petition forpost-conviction relief was affirmed in Whatley v. State, 969 N.E.2d 634 (Ind.Ct.App. June 21, 2012) ("Whatley IV"). Whatley's petition for transfer was denied on October 11, 2012. The circumstances surrounding Whatley's offense and pr......