Wheatcraft v. Wheatcraft

Decision Date31 March 2005
Docket NumberNo. 41A04-0406-CV-344.,41A04-0406-CV-344.
Citation825 N.E.2d 23
PartiesGeri WHEATCRAFT, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Charles WHEATCRAFT, Appellee-Respondent.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

David M. Seiter, Strodtman & Seiter, Cumberland, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Kelli J. Young, The Nice Law Firm, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.

OPINION

NAJAM, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Geri Wheatcraft ("Wife") appeals from three of the trial court's orders in this dissolution proceeding. Wife presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Wife's motion to set aside the dissolution decree under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B).
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Wife's motion for discovery under Indiana Trial Rule 60(D).
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Charles Wheatcraft's ("Husband's") petition for attorney's fees.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Husband and Wife were married in 1979, and they separated in 2002.1 Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on June 18, 2002. On November 21, 2002, the trial court ordered that the parties attend mediation "as soon as discovery allowed." Appellant's App. at 33. Wife submitted interrogatories to Husband in September 2002, but Husband had not responded to those discovery requests by the time of the parties' mediation on October 29, 2003. In the interrogatories, Wife sought information regarding the identity and value of Husband's assets, including the value of any right, title, or interest in any business entity.

Husband co-owns a painting company ("the company") with his brother, and Wife worked for the company for approximately fifteen years until the parties' separation. The company's assets include a Dodge Viper, which both Husband and his brother drive, trucks, a pole barn, and an office located on the grounds of the parties' marital residence. Husband's net annual income from the company is approximately $100,000.

During the parties' mediation on October 29, 2002, Husband presented Wife with a list of the parties' assets and their corresponding valuations ("list of assets"). Husband had hired an appraiser to valuate his interest in the company, which was listed as $43,021.68. Husband did not have a written report from the appraiser, but stated that the amount shown was based on the appraisal. The list of assets showed that the parties' net marital assets totaled $454,391.98.

The parties' mediation lasted approximately five and one-half hours. During that time, Wife contested Husband's valuations for her jewelry and other items of personal property. As a result, Husband agreed to reduce the valuations for those items. But Wife did not request an opportunity to conduct an independent valuation of the company, nor did she contest the valuation of the company indicated on the list of assets. Wife questioned why the Dodge Viper was not listed as an asset, and Husband explained that it was included in the valuation of the company. At the conclusion of the mediation, the parties signed a settlement agreement which provides in relevant part:

Come[ ] now the parties in person [and] by counsel and agree to the following:
1. That the Wife shall take the following property:
a. the personal property in her possession and the asterisked items on Exhibit B. Husband will []move these items into the garage [and] the daughter can be present when Wife arrives to pick up. . . .
b. the Bank One-One Group Investment — Husband IRA/mutual fund ($13,705 as of 10/29/03) and Lincoln Husband IRA ($3[,]270.82 as of 10/29/03) both of which shall be rolled over into an IRA account of Wife so it is a tax-free transfer.
c. Jackson National Life IRA/annuity John Hancock — IRA (cashed in 4/03) Wife's checking [and] savings — Bank One John Hancock variable life ins[urance] Wife's 2001 Ford 250 — Wife assumes debt [and] hold[s] Husband harmless[.]
d. Husband [to] pay Wife $155,000 cash within 7 days of Decree of Dissolution[.]
e. Husband shall pay Wife's COBRA health insurance premium of $467.77 for twelve months following Decree of Dissolution[.]
2. That the Husband shall take the following property:
a. All other property listed on exhibit[s] A [and] B not previously set off to Wife as stated above.
b. Any debt associated with the property Husband receives in Ex. A [and] hold Wife harmless.
c. Any personal property in Husband's possession not previously set off to Wife.
* * *
6. That Husband's attorney shall prepare the final Court pleadings to finalize the dissolution upon the terms [and] conditions of this agreement.

Appellant's App. at 37-39.

Pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, Husband's attorney prepared the final settlement agreement, waiver of final hearing, and other documents requiring Wife's signature to present to the dissolution court along with the proposed dissolution decree. Husband sent those documents to Wife's attorney, but he did not receive any response. Then, in December 2003, Wife hired a new attorney, David Gillman, who informed Husband's attorney that Wife would not sign the documents because she "did not feel comfortable with the settlement reached at mediation." Id. at 35.

Accordingly, Husband filed a petition to enforce the mediated agreement. The dissolution court entered an order enforcing the mediated agreement and executed a final dissolution decree on January 23, 2004. Wife timely filed a motion to set aside the dissolution decree under Trial Rule 60(B) and a "motion to reconsider" the order enforcing the mediated settlement agreement. In her brief in support of those motions, Wife alleged that Husband had committed fraud in inducing her to sign the settlement agreement and that she had signed the agreement under duress. Wife also moved the court to stay the execution of the settlement agreement and requested that she be able to conduct discovery under Trial Rule 60(D).

On April 16, 2004, at the conclusion of a hearing on Wife's 60(D) motion, the dissolution court took the matter under advisement. Specifically, the court advised the parties that it would rule on that motion following the hearing on Wife's 60(B) motion to set aside the decree. In her Trial Rule 60(D) motion, Wife sought leave to conduct additional discovery to determine the value of the company. Because Wife's 60(B) motion turned on her allegation that Husband had misrepresented the value of the company, the court advised the parties that for purposes of the 60(B) hearing, it would assume that the company had a valuation "one hundred times more" than that represented by Husband. Transcript of April 16 hearing at 28.

At the hearing on Wife's 60(B) motion, Wife asserted that she was coerced into signing the settlement agreement at the parties' mediation. In support of that contention, Wife testified in relevant part as follows:

Q: Did you feel at that point that you had to sign something before the day was over?
A: I mean I knew it wasn't going anywhere. I just knew that no one was going to budge.
* * * Q: Well, were you in fear that he might hurt you if you didn't sign?
A: Yes.
* * *
Q: And when you indicated that you were beaten down, I think your words were intimidated and coerced, was that by Mr. Greg Nolan, the mediator?
A: It was by the thoughts of what [Husband] has done to me my whole life and Mr. Nolan just relayed what [Husband] was wanting.
Q: Let me stop you there. And when he . . . and what did he say that he wanted? He wanted to have this finished today.
A: He wanted this to be (INAUDIBLE).
Q: And you took that as a threat?
A: Um, yes I did.

Transcript of May 17, 2004 hearing at 28-29, 39-40. In addition, regarding the valuation of the company, Wife testified in relevant part as follows:

Q: Did [your attorney] gather any values of any of the marital assets?
A: Not that I know of. The discovery was never done. I don't really know.
Q: Did he ever tell you ... did he ever prepare anything or tell you what he thought the marital estate was valued at?
A: No.
* * *
Q: Did you ever ask your attorney to value the business?
A: Yes.
Q: Did he do that?
A: No.
Q: Did you ever ask your attorney to gather documentation about the assets of the marriage?
A: Yes.
Q: Did he do that?
A: No.
* * *
Q: Did you ask the mediator or your attorney to look at documentation confirming any of [the valuations of the assets during the mediation]?
A: I didn't know I was allowed to ask for more than what was presented that day.
Q: Did you talk to your attorney about things you were confused about in the mediation?
A: Yes.
Q: Did he offer you any guidance?
A: Not really, he didn't have anything of his own to (INAUDIBLE).
Q: He didn't bring anything with him that he had ...
A: No.

Id. at 45-46, 50-51.

Following the hearing, the dissolution court denied Wife's 60(B) and 60(D) motions and awarded Husband's petition for attorney's fees. In its order, the court found and concluded in relevant part:

1. Regarding Petitioner's Motion for Discovery of the Value of Wheatcraft Painting: the Petitioner argues that her Trial Rule 60(B)(3) Motion filed on January 27, 2004 requires the Court to allow discovery, specifically, mandates that her Motion for Order Allowing Parties to Obtain Discovery and for Evaluation of Wheatcraft Painting filed on February 27, 2004 be granted. On April 16, 2004, this Court held a hearing regarding this discovery issue and found that the same should be denied "prior to hearing" on Petitioner's Trial Rule 60 Motion. At the conclusion of said hearing, the Court found there was insufficient evidence to grant the Motion and left open the possibility that after the hearing on Petitioner's Trial Rule 60 Motion that the Court may reconsider and grant said request before ruling on the Trial Rule 60 Motion. While the language of Trial Rule 60(D) "may be read as requiring the trial court to allow discovery for the purposes of a motion for relief from judgment, it
...

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