Wheatcraft v. Wheatcraft
Decision Date | 31 March 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 41A04-0406-CV-344.,41A04-0406-CV-344. |
Citation | 825 N.E.2d 23 |
Parties | Geri WHEATCRAFT, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Charles WHEATCRAFT, Appellee-Respondent. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
David M. Seiter, Strodtman & Seiter, Cumberland, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Kelli J. Young, The Nice Law Firm, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
Geri Wheatcraft ("Wife") appeals from three of the trial court's orders in this dissolution proceeding. Wife presents the following issues for our review:
We affirm.
Husband and Wife were married in 1979, and they separated in 2002.1 Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on June 18, 2002. On November 21, 2002, the trial court ordered that the parties attend mediation "as soon as discovery allowed." Appellant's App. at 33. Wife submitted interrogatories to Husband in September 2002, but Husband had not responded to those discovery requests by the time of the parties' mediation on October 29, 2003. In the interrogatories, Wife sought information regarding the identity and value of Husband's assets, including the value of any right, title, or interest in any business entity.
Husband co-owns a painting company ("the company") with his brother, and Wife worked for the company for approximately fifteen years until the parties' separation. The company's assets include a Dodge Viper, which both Husband and his brother drive, trucks, a pole barn, and an office located on the grounds of the parties' marital residence. Husband's net annual income from the company is approximately $100,000.
During the parties' mediation on October 29, 2002, Husband presented Wife with a list of the parties' assets and their corresponding valuations ("list of assets"). Husband had hired an appraiser to valuate his interest in the company, which was listed as $43,021.68. Husband did not have a written report from the appraiser, but stated that the amount shown was based on the appraisal. The list of assets showed that the parties' net marital assets totaled $454,391.98.
The parties' mediation lasted approximately five and one-half hours. During that time, Wife contested Husband's valuations for her jewelry and other items of personal property. As a result, Husband agreed to reduce the valuations for those items. But Wife did not request an opportunity to conduct an independent valuation of the company, nor did she contest the valuation of the company indicated on the list of assets. Wife questioned why the Dodge Viper was not listed as an asset, and Husband explained that it was included in the valuation of the company. At the conclusion of the mediation, the parties signed a settlement agreement which provides in relevant part:
Pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, Husband's attorney prepared the final settlement agreement, waiver of final hearing, and other documents requiring Wife's signature to present to the dissolution court along with the proposed dissolution decree. Husband sent those documents to Wife's attorney, but he did not receive any response. Then, in December 2003, Wife hired a new attorney, David Gillman, who informed Husband's attorney that Wife would not sign the documents because she "did not feel comfortable with the settlement reached at mediation." Id. at 35.
Accordingly, Husband filed a petition to enforce the mediated agreement. The dissolution court entered an order enforcing the mediated agreement and executed a final dissolution decree on January 23, 2004. Wife timely filed a motion to set aside the dissolution decree under Trial Rule 60(B) and a "motion to reconsider" the order enforcing the mediated settlement agreement. In her brief in support of those motions, Wife alleged that Husband had committed fraud in inducing her to sign the settlement agreement and that she had signed the agreement under duress. Wife also moved the court to stay the execution of the settlement agreement and requested that she be able to conduct discovery under Trial Rule 60(D).
On April 16, 2004, at the conclusion of a hearing on Wife's 60(D) motion, the dissolution court took the matter under advisement. Specifically, the court advised the parties that it would rule on that motion following the hearing on Wife's 60(B) motion to set aside the decree. In her Trial Rule 60(D) motion, Wife sought leave to conduct additional discovery to determine the value of the company. Because Wife's 60(B) motion turned on her allegation that Husband had misrepresented the value of the company, the court advised the parties that for purposes of the 60(B) hearing, it would assume that the company had a valuation "one hundred times more" than that represented by Husband. Transcript of April 16 hearing at 28.
At the hearing on Wife's 60(B) motion, Wife asserted that she was coerced into signing the settlement agreement at the parties' mediation. In support of that contention, Wife testified in relevant part as follows:
Transcript of May 17, 2004 hearing at 28-29, 39-40. In addition, regarding the valuation of the company, Wife testified in relevant part as follows:
Following the hearing, the dissolution court denied Wife's 60(B) and 60(D) motions and awarded Husband's petition for attorney's fees. In its order, the court found and concluded in relevant part:
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