Wheaton v. Collins

Decision Date25 July 1912
Citation84 A. 271
PartiesWHEATON v. COLLINS.
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery

Suit by Edgar T. Wheaton against John Collins for specific performance of a contract to purchase land. Decree for complainant.

C. English, of Newark (McCarter & English, of Newark, on the brief), for complainant.

F. E. Bradner, of Newark, for defendant.

EMERY, V. C. This bill is filed by the vendor for the specific performance of an alleged agreement to purchase lands of the vendor located in Cranford township, Union county, and the defenses are (1) that there was no completed agreement of purchase made in writing, and the statute of frauds is pleaded; and (2) that the contract was abandoned. The complainant, to make out the written agreement, relies on letters signed by defendant, and also sets up possession taken by defendant under the agreement, in part performance of the contract. As to the written agreement, the case depends upon the construction and application of defendant's letters.

The property to be conveyed, and with reference to which the negotiations admitted in the answer took place, are sufficiently identified by the following letters, signed by defendant, viz.: Exhibit C 2, undated, but written in August, 1910, referring to "your [complainant's] 2 houses in Cranford," and inquiring size of ground; Exhibit C 6, dated August 20th, stating, "My son is moving in;" letter of September 22, 1910, referring to "lease of small house"; letter of January 17, 1911 (inclosing deed), and stating, "I send 1 more deed off little house 2000 lot 1000 large house 3000, large house and lot together in one deed, small house by itself," and further inquiring, "No. [number] of house this is for little house, the other was for lot and house where my son is;" the letter of January 17, 1911, in which defendant writes, "I want all I agreed for lot and 2 houses 0000," and the further postscript, "Bear in mind I want all." So far as relates to the property to be conveyed, there is from these letters alone, without reference to any extrinsic proof whatever, evidence of a contract to purchase complainant's lot and two houses in Cranford, with their ground; one of the houses being a large house occupied by defendant's son, and the other being a small house. A deed or will, conveying or devising such by description alone, would, I think, be sufficient; the description being applied by proof, which has been made in the case, that the complainant owned at Cranford only the one lot and these two houses.

That the further elements of a complete contract, the parties and the price and terms of payment, are made out by these and other letters, is clear. The letter of August 30, 1910, Exhibit C 4, says, "If I can sell or trade it [my property], I will buy yours." Letter of August 20th, "I can pay you your money." Letter of September 22, 1910, "We agreed to this—you were to give warrantee deed &c. and sign insurance and lease of small house—the property is yours until paid." Letter of September 26th, "I have your letter—that is our understanding. If you can wait I can have your money." Further reference on the matter of parties to the contract is unnecessary, as the admissions of the answer in relation to the negotiations above referred to include this point also. The terms also sufficiently appear by defendant's letters of January 17. 1911, "I agreed for lot and 2 houses $6000— was to have bill April 1, 1911, & if I paid all cash you would discount it at 5 p. c," and the subsequent letter of February 4, 1911, referring in terms to complainant's letter of August 19, 1900, as to discount of 5 per cent. for cash from prices fixed. The letter of September 22, 1910, further states as to terms that complainant was to...

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6 cases
  • County of Morris v. Fauver
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • March 9, 1998
    ...by the consent of both parties, 'and requires as clear evidence of the waiver as of the existence of the contract.' " Wheaton v. Collins, 84 A. 271, 273 (Ch.1912) (citation omitted). To effectuate an abandonment, mutual assent is always required. Gillette, supra, 21 N.J.Super. at 516, 91 A.......
  • Steere v. Palmer
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • September 12, 1949
    ...Ulen Construction Co., 94 F.2d 201; Hoggson v. First Natl. Bank, 231 F. 869; Metz Furniture Co. v. Thane Lumber Co., 298 F. 91; Wheaton v. Collins, 84 A. 271; Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U.S. 29, 24 L.Ed. 54. (8) Plaintiff had no adequate remedy at law. The services rendered were exceptional, su......
  • Sauder v. Dittmar
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • April 15, 1941
    ...and inconsistent with an intent to be further bound by the contract. City of Del Rio v. Ulen Contracting Corp., supra; Wheaton v. Collins, N.J.Ch., 84 A. 271; May v. Getty, 140 N.C. 310, 53 S.E. 75; Singleton v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 203 N.C. 462, 166 S.E. 305; Mood v. Methodist Episc......
  • City of Del Rio v. Ulen Contracting Corporation
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • February 8, 1938
    ...869, certiorari denied 241 U.S. 679, 36 S.Ct. 727, 60 L.Ed. 1233; Metz Furniture Co. v. Thane Lumber Co., 8 Cir., 298 F. 91; Wheaton v. Collins, N.J. Ch., 84 A. 271; 6 R.C.L. Tested by these rules, it is apparent that paragraph 3 of the answer shows no rescission by abandonment. It speaks o......
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