Wheeler Lumber Bridge Supply Co of Des Moines, Iowa v. United States
| Decision Date | 26 May 1930 |
| Docket Number | No. 15,15 |
| Citation | 50 S.Ct. 419,281 U.S. 572,74 L.Ed. 1047 |
| Parties | WHEELER LUMBER BRIDGE & SUPPLY CO. OF DES MOINES, IOWA, v. UNITED STATES |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Mr. Jesse I. Miller, of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.
The Attorney General, for the United States.
The Court of Claims has certified to us a question concerning which it desires instruction for the proper disposition of the aboveentitled cause now pending before it. Late in the last term we dismissed the certificate in the belief that the question propounded embraces the whole case, and so could not be answered consistently with the applicable statute or with the constitutional limitations on our jurisdiction. But before the term closed we vacated the order of dismissal (279 U. S. 826, 49 S. Ct. 515, 73 L. Ed. 978) and held the matter for further consideration.
The facts shown in the certificate are as follows: In the years 1918, 1919, 1920, and 1921, the plaintiff, a corporate dealer in bridge materials, engaged to sell and deliver to each of several counties in the States of Iowa and Nebraska a quantity of lumber, which in each instance was needed and used by the purchasing county in the construction or repair of bridges along public highways within the county. The plaintiff was to ship the lumber from places outside the State to designated points within the purchasing county and there deliver the same to the county f. o. b. at stated prices. The plaintiff fulfilled its engagement as made. The shipping was done by railroad under bills of lading calling for delivery by the carrier to the plaintiff, or on its order, at destination. The plaintiff forwarded the bills of lading to the county clerk; and when the shipments reached their destination the county clerk, acting for the county and conforming to the plaintiff's intention, presented the bills of lading to the carrier, paid the transportation charges, accepted the lumber, deducted the transportation charges from the stipulated f. o. b. price, and remitted the balance to the plaintiff.
The federal revenue laws in force at the time imposed on the transportation of freight by rail or water a tax of 3 per cent. of the amount paid for that service; required that the tax be paid 'by the person paying for the service'; and authorized the carrier to collect the tax on behalf of the government; but declared that transportation service rendered to a State should be exempt from the tax. Revenue Act 1917, c. 63, §§ 500, 501, 502, 503, 40 Stat. 300, 314, 315; Revenue Act 1918, c. 18, §§ 500(a) and (h), 501(a), 502, 40 Stat. 1057, 1101, 1102, 1103. In the administrative regulations issued under those laws the exemption of transportation service to a State was construed as including such service to her 'political subdivisions, such as counties, cities, towns, and other municipalities.'
No tax on the transportation service was demanded or paid when the transportation charges were paid. But thereafter the Collector of Internal Revenue assessed such a tax against the plaintiff and the plaintiff paid it under protest. Application was then made by the plaintiff to have the amount refunded; but the application was denied by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The suit in the Court of Claims was brought by the plaintiff against the United States to recover the amount collected on the tax; that exaction being assailed on two grounds: One that the transportation service was rendered to the purchasing counties, and therefore was exempt from the tax, and the other that, as the counties paid the carrier its transportation charges, the liability, if any, for the tax did not attach to the plaintiff.
The certificate further shows that the court referred the case to a commissioner who, in accord with the reference, reported special findings of fact; and that both parties conceded the correctness and accuracy of the report. In making the certificate the court accepted and summarized the facts reported by its commissioner.
The question certified, somewhat shortened in words but not altered in substance, is—
Where a vendor, who has engaged to sell and deliver lumber needed for public bridges to a county at a designated point in the county f. o. b. at a stated price, ships the lumber by rail to that point preparatory to there effecting the required delivery and forwards the bills of lading to the county, and the latter, conformably to the vendor's intention, surrenders the bills of lading to the carrier, pays its transportation charges, receives the lumber from it, deducts from the f. o. b. price at destination the transportation charges paid to the carrier, and remits the balance to the vendor-is the transportation of the lumber to the place of delivery a service rendered to the county (State) within the meaning of the exempting provisions of section 502 of the Revenue Act of 1917 and section 500(h) of the Revenue Act of 1918, and within the principle recognized and applied in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218, 48 S. Ct. 451, 72 L. Ed. 857, 56 A. L. R. 583?
The statute providing for certification of questions by the Court of Claims is section 3(a) of the Act of February 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 939 (28 USCA § 288(a), which reads:
'That in any case in the Court of Claims, including those begun under section 180 of the Judicial Code, that court at any time may certify to the Supreme Court any definite and distinct questions of law concerning which instructions are desired for the proper disposition of the cause; and thereupon the Supreme Court may give appropriate instructions on the questions certified and transmit the same to the Court of Claims for its guidance in the further progress of the cause.'
This is a new provision. Similar provisions have permitted particular federal courts to certify questions to this Court, but this provision is the first giving such authority to the Court of Claims.
There are two reasons why a certification by that court which embraces the whole case cannot be entertained by this Court. One is that to accept such a certification and proceed to a determination thereon, in advance of a decision by that Court, would be an exercise of original jurisdiction by this Court contrary to the constitutional provision which prescribes that its jurisdiction shall be appellate in all cases other than those affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and...
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...have been distinguished and must be deemed to be limited to their particular facts. Thus, in Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 572, 579, 50 S.Ct. 419, 421, 74 L.Ed. 1047, the federal tax on transportation as applied to lumber which the vendor had engaged to sell ......
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