Wheeler v. Berryhill

Decision Date17 May 2018
Docket NumberNo. C17-4038-LTS,C17-4038-LTS
PartiesMELODY E. WHEELER, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before me on a Report & Recommendation (R&R) by the Honorable C.J. Williams, Chief United States Magistrate Judge. Doc. No. 17. Judge Williams recommends that I affirm the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner) denying plaintiff Melody Wheeler's application for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. (Act).

Wheeler filed timely objections (Doc. No. 18) to the R&R on January 25, 2018. The procedural history and relevant facts are set forth in the R&R and are repeated herein only to the extent necessary.

II. APPLICABLE STANDARDS
A. Judicial Review of the Commissioner's Decision

The Commissioner's decision must be affirmed "if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . ."). "Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 645 (8th Cir. 2003). The Eighth Circuit explains the standard as "something less than the weight of the evidence and [that] allows for the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions, thus it embodies a zone of choice within which the [Commissioner] may decide to grant or deny benefits without being subject to reversal on appeal." Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994).

To determine whether the Commissioner's decision meets this standard, the court considers "all of the evidence that was before the ALJ, but it [does] not re-weigh the evidence." Vester v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2005). The court considers both evidence which supports the Commissioner's decision and evidence that detracts from it. Kluesner v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 2010). The court "must search the record for evidence contradicting the [Commissioner's] decision and give that evidence appropriate weight when determining whether the overall evidence in support is substantial." Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Cline v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1991)).

To evaluate the evidence in an appeal of a denial of benefits, the court must apply a balancing test to assess any contradictory evidence. Sobania v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 879 F.2d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1989). The court, however, does not "reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ," Baldwin, 349 F.3d at 555 (citing Bates v. Chater, 54 F.3d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 1995)), or "review the factual record de novo." Roe v. Chater, 92 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Naber v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 186, 188 (8th Cir. 1994)). Instead, if, after reviewing the evidence, the court "find[s] it possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the Commissioner's findings, [the court] must affirm the [Commissioner's] denial of benefits." Kluesner, 607 F.3d at 536 (quoting Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 2008)). This is true even if the court "might have weighed the evidence differently."Culbertson, 30 F.3d at 939 (quoting Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1992)). The court may not reverse the Commissioner's decision "merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision." Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984); see also Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[A]n administrative decision is not subject to reversal simply because some evidence may support the opposite conclusion.").

B. Review of Report and Recommendation

A district judge must review a magistrate judge's R&R under the following standards:

Within fourteen days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Thus, when a party objects to any portion of an R&R, the district judge must undertake a de novo review of that portion.

Any portions of an R&R to which no objections have been made must be reviewed under at least a "clearly erroneous" standard. See, e.g., Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that when no objections are filed "[the district court judge] would only have to review the findings of the magistrate judge for clear error"). As the Supreme Court has explained, "[a] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). However, a district judge may elect to review an R&R under a more-exacting standard even if no objections are filed:

Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any issue need only ask. Moreover, while the statute does not require the judge to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard.

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Thus, a district court may review de novo any issue in a magistrate judge's report and recommendation at any time. Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has "emphasized the necessity . . . of retention by the district court of substantial control over the ultimate disposition of matters referred to a magistrate." Belk v. Purkett, 15 F.3D 803, 815 (8th Cir. 1994). As this court has previously stated, "[e]ven if the reviewing court must construe objections liberally to require de novo review, it is clear to this court that there is a distinction between making an objection and making no objection at all . . . ." Lynch v. Astrue, 687 F. Supp. 2d 841 (2010) (citing Coop. Fin. Assoc. v. Garst, 917 F. Supp. 1356, 1373 (N.D. Iowa 1996)). This court will provide de novo review of all issues that might be addressed by any objection, but will review for clear error matters to which no objection at all has been made. Id.

III. THE R&R

Wheeler alleged disability beginning April 26, 2013, due to radiculitis, which she claimed caused her to lose feeling in her legs. AR 54. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined Wheeler had impairments due to "pain complaints from childbirth and obesity" (AR 93) but ultimately found Wheeler not disabled. AR 108. Wheeler filed a complaint in this court on June 1, 2017, and Judge Williams filed his R&R on January 11, 2018.

In contending that the ALJ's determination was erroneous, Wheeler makes three arguments: (1) the ALJ's residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment was notsupported by substantial medical evidence from a treating or examining source, (2) the ALJ improperly discounted claimant's subjective allegations without identifying inconsistencies in the record as a whole and (3) the court should order remand to consider new evidence of a chronic inflammatory demyelinating polyneuritis (CIDP) diagnosis. With regard to the first argument, Judge Williams found that the RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Doc. No. 17 at 8, 11. He noted that the RFC need not be supported by a specific medical opinion if it is supported by other medical evidence demonstrating the claimant's ability to function in the workplace. Id. at 9-11. Judge Williams found:

In this case, the ALJ examined in significant detail the medical evidence pertaining to claimant's alleged disability. In short, in the spring of 2013, claimant gave birth to a child and during the procedure received an epidural anesthetic. (AR 98). Following the birth, claimant complained of losing feeling in her legs. (AR 97). EMG and CT scans at the time and over the course of the following two years were all normal. (AR 98-103). Dr. Franco, a neurologist, opined that her condition may have been due to a chemical irritation from the epidural anesthetic, or from the procedure, or it may have been a "functional disorder," meaning a mental disorder. (AR 98, 101). Whatever the cause, Dr. Franco predicted a gradual but complete recovery. (AR 98). The medical records as summarized by the ALJ show such a recovery. Over the course of the following three years, claimant gained back full strength in her legs and full range of motion. (AR 98-103). She apparently continues to have decreased sensation in her legs, but she has never complained of any pain. (Id.). Significantly, no treating or examining source has ever endorsed any type of work-related limitations. The ALJ gave great weight to all of the treating and examining sources. (AR 105). The ALJ also gave "greater weight" to the State agency medical consultants who concluded that claimant's limitations were not severe. (Id.).

Id. at 10. Because the existing medical evidence provided an adequate basis for the ALJ to determine the merits of the claim, Judge Williams held that the ALJ did not commit error by not ordering a...

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