Wheeler v. District Court In and For Adams County
Decision Date | 25 February 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 25382,25382 |
Citation | 184 Colo. 193,519 P.2d 327 |
Parties | Darreld W. WHEELER, a/k/a Darreld W. Anderson, a/k/a Andy Wheeler, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF ADAMS, State of Colorado and FloydMarks, District Attorney for the Seventeenth Judicial District, State ofColorado, Respondents. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Jay L. Gueck, Denver, for petitioner.
Floyd Marks, Dist. Atty., Commerce City, Harlan R. Bockman, Asst. Dist. Atty., Commerce City, Stanley B. Bender, Special Pros., Northglenn, Edward B. Towey, Special Pros., Denver, for respondents.
This is the third time this case has been before us in an interlocutory manner. Wheeler v. District Court, Colo., 497 P.2d 695 (1972) and Wheeler v. District Court, Colo., 504 P.2d 1094 (1973). The second case has no materiality here and will not be mentioned further.
The petitioner, Wheeler, was indicted by the Adams County grand jury in September of 1971 and charged with four counts of prostitution related offenses in violation of C.R.S. 1963, 40--9--11. Two of the counts charged the petitioner with operating and managing a building and with soliciting two females for purposes of prostitution. Two counts charged the petitioner with conspiracy to commit the same offenses.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictments on the ground that he had been granted transactional immunity in connection with his testimony before a grand jury in Denver. This motion was denied and he came here for the first time. We ruled that he had made a Prima facie showing in support of his motion to dismiss, casting upon the district attorney the burden of going forward. We remanded the matter for further proceedings, retaining jurisdiction to review the rulings of the respondent district court at any stage of the proceedings.
In July of 1971 the district attorney in Denver desired that the petitioner testify before the grand jury then meeting in Denver. The petitioner was in Las Vegas, Nevada. Two investigators of the district attorney's office went to Las Vegas and conferred with the petitioner. The investigators requested that petitioner return to Denver to testify and assured him that if he did so, he would be granted immunity against prosecution of any offenses about which he testified. The petitioner agreed to so testify and returned to Denver at the expense of the district attorney's office. Upon petitioner's return to Denver two deputy district attorneys reiterated the same assurances to the petitioner.
The petitioner appeared before the grand jury and refused to testify on the grounds he might incriminate himself. On August 3, 1971, he was then taken to Judge James C. Flanigan, a Denver District Judge, before whom the grand jury and the district attorney petitioned for immunity. The judge ordered him to testify and granted immunity 'whereby such witness may not be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture on account of his compulsory testimony except prosecution for perjury or contempt committed while giving testimony or producing evidence.' Petitioner then testified before the grand jury. Neither the respondent court nor this court have been informed of the content of his testimony.
There was filed in the Adams County proceedings an affidavit by Judge Flanigan in which he made the following statements:
'That pursuant to petition by the Denver District Attorney, I granted transactional immunity to Darreld (Andy) Wheeler on August 3, 1971 and that such immunity was granted pursuant to and in accordance with 1963 C.R.S., 154--1--18, as amended.
'That such immunity, as explained to the said Darreld (Andy) Wheeler and as granted to him by this Court's Order, extended to immunity from prosecution by Federal, State or Local officials for crimes encompassed within the transactions to which he testified before the 1971 Statutory Grand Jury in and for the City and County of Denver, State of Colorado.'
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictments on account of his having been granted transactional immunity. After a hearing in February of 1973 the respondent court denied the motion, and it is this denial that is now at issue before this Court.
We quote quite at length from the court's findings:
'So then, turning their back to the investigation of this organized crime in Adams County which was then being conducted before the Adams County Grand Jury, they (the district attorney's investigators) proceeded to go to Las Vegas, Nevada, outside the jurisdiction of the State of Colorado, and inveigle, induce or persuade the return of Mr. Wheeler to testify in this alleged bribery and conspiracy . . ..
'So these two officers, who had been more or less employed by Adams County and the Adams County District Attorney to ferret out and to investigate this alleged prostitution in Adams County, went out to see this defendant whom they knew had been charged and that his conduct was being investigated, and they made a deal with him because they had no way of bringing him back. He didn't have to appear before the Denver Grand Jury because a subpoena couldn't be served upon him. The only way he could be brought back would be by way of a prosecution, indictment or an information charging him with a criminal offense under which he could be prosecuted. And as the witness Mulnix, a Denver police officer, has stated, 'We wanted Mr. Wheeler to come back and we promised him immunity for anything that he might be asked about or anything that might be said by him before the Grand Jury.' Whether it was he who stated that the defendant Wheeler, particularly, wanted the prosecution to be dismissed in Adams County against him or whether it was some other witness, it was brought out to the Court that one of the conditions upon which the defendant Wheeler was to be brought back to Denver to testify was that the prosecution in Adams County or the investigation was to cease and he was to be free from that. He wasn't interested in prosecuting Marks or anybody else: he was interested in getting the prosecution against him dismissed.
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'So Mr. Wheeler came back and they said, With that thinking, he came back and that is what they proceeded to do.
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