Wheeler v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.

• Decision Date: 12 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 14–7108.,14–7108.
• Citation: 812 F.3d 1109
• Parties: Patricia WHEELER, Appellant v. GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, Also Known as Medstar–Georgetown Medical Center, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

812 F.3d 1109

Patricia WHEELER, Appellant

v.GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, Also Known as Medstar–Georgetown Medical Center, Appellee.

No. 14–7108.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Nov. 19, 2015.

Decided Feb. 12, 2016.

Donna Williams Rucker argued the cause and filed the brief for Appellant.

Ziad Haddad argued the cause for Appellee. On the brief was David C. Tobin.

Before: HENDERSON, PILLARD and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Patricia Wheeler, who is African–American, charges that she was improperly terminated by her former employer Georgetown University Hospital (the Hospital), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Nurse Wheeler claims that her termination was the result of racial discrimination. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Hospital and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Patricia Wheeler was hired as a Clinical Nurse at the Hospital in March 2006, in a department of the Hospital known as "4 East." In March 2007, Nurse Angela Hollandsworth assumed the position of Clinical Manager for 4 East, and became Nurse Wheeler's immediate supervisor. As the Clinical Manager of 4 East, Nurse Hollandsworth had responsibilities for the hiring, supervision, and, when necessary, termination, of all of the Registered Nurses in her unit. The Clinical Director of the unit was Sue Howell.

On December 27, 2009, Nurse Wheeler was floated to the Hospital's Intensive Care Unit (ICU). She was assigned to care for three patients during a twelve-hour shift that began at 7:00 a.m. The following day, four nurses who had been working with Nurse Wheeler during that December 27 shift reported to Nurse Hollandsworth that Nurse Wheeler had made a number of mistakes, including (1) a report that Nurse Wheeler had left a patient's IV bag empty, that the IV was set up to deliver the wrong medications, and that the patient had not been given two prescribed doses of insulin

; (2) a report that Nurse Wheeler had failed to properly record patient vital signs for at least two of her patients, had failed to provide a temperature probe monitor to a patient, and had failed to properly set a blood pressure cuff on a patient; (3) a report that one of Nurse Wheeler's patients, who was unable to make intentional movements or reposition herself without assistance, was left slouched over in bed with her head rested uncomfortably against the side rail, resulting in the patient being soaked through to her gown and sheets in her own oral secretions, that Nurse Wheeler did not check in on the patient during the five hours the patient's family was in the room, and that later the patient was once again found slumped against the rail and also caked in dry stool; and (4) a report that another of Nurse Wheeler's patients had been discovered lying in dried stool, also with an empty antibiotic bag hooked up to the running heparin drip.

On December 30, 2009, following the reporting of these alleged incidents, Nurse Hollandsworth and Director Howell spoke with Nurse Wheeler via speaker phone to notify her that she was being suspended and to advise her that she was to report to the Hospital later that day in order to review the issues under investigation. During Nurse Wheeler's suspension, Nurse Hollandsworth conducted an investigation into the allegations. Nurse Hollandsworth interviewed each of the nurses who had reported on Nurse Wheeler's conduct, and confirmed in writing what each had told her they observed. Nurse Hollandsworth also requested that Nurse Wheeler provide a written explanation of the incidents, which Wheeler provided in two emails to Michelle Lawyer in the Hospital's Human Resources department on January 1 and 6, 2010. Ms. Lawyer forwarded Nurse Wheeler's emails to Nurse Hollandsworth and Director Howell on January 4 and 7, 2010, respectively.

On January 8, 2010, Nurse Wheeler met with Nurse Hollandsworth and Director Howell, and was notified at that time that the decision had been made to terminate her employment. According to the termination letter, Nurse Wheeler's termination was based on the findings of the investigation into the allegations of poor work performance during her December 27, 2009 shift, which concluded that her actions on that day "reflected a serious lack of clinical judgment and jeopardized the health and safety of [the Hospital's] patients." J.A. 109. The Hospital did not hire a nurse to replace Wheeler.

Nurse Wheeler filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on January 7, 2010. She then filed a formal Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC and the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights (OHR) on January 21, 2010. On or about September 22, 2010, the EEOC issued Nurse Wheeler a Notice of Right to Sue.

Nurse Wheeler filed a complaint with the District of Columbia Superior Court on July 26, 2010. The action was removed to the District Court for the District of Columbia on August 25, 2010. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the Hospital discriminated against Nurse Wheeler based on her race in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Hospital filed a motion to dismiss on August 31, 2010, seeking dismissal of all counts. The District Court granted the motion in part on June 6, 2011. See Wheeler v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. (Wheeler I ), 788 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C.2011). The Hospital moved for summary judgment on January 31, 2014. The District Court granted the Hospital's motion for summary judgment on June 27, 2014. Wheeler v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp. (Wheeler II ), 52 F.Supp.3d 40 (D.D.C.2014).

II.

We review the District Court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C.Cir.2006). Summary judgment is appropriately granted when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and drawing all reasonable inferences accordingly, no reasonable jury could reach a verdict in her favor. Carter v. George Washington Univ., 387 F.3d 872, 878 (D.C.Cir.2004). The evidence presented must show that (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895 ; FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In conducting our analysis, we review the record taken as a whole. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial."Id. (quotation marks omitted). We are not to make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895 ; see Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ("[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.").

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). Where the plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discrimination, racial discrimination claims under Title VII are subject to the familiar burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See, e.g., Chappell–Johnson v. Powell, 440 F.3d 484, 487 (D.C.Cir.2006). First, the plaintiff carries the burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Id. "To state a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must allege she is part of a protected class under Title VII, she suffered a cognizable adverse employment action, and the action gives rise to an inference of discrimination." Walker v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085, 1091 (D.C.Cir.2015). Once the prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Id. at 1092. If the employer does this, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff, who must be afforded a fair opportunity to show that the employer's stated reason for its actions was in fact pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id.

In reviewing a summary judgment motion where the defendant has proffered some legitimate reason for its adverse employment action, however, we skip ahead to the third step in the test. "[O]nce the employer asserts a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the question whether the employee actually made out a prima facie case is no longer relevant and thus disappears and drops out of the picture." Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C.Cir.2008) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). "[T]he district court need not—and should not —decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. " Id. at 494 (emphasis in original); see also Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 678 (D.C.Cir.2009) ("[A]sking whether [the plaintiff] satisfied his prima facie burden is an unnecessary and improper ‘sideshow.’ " (quoting Brady, 520 F.3d at 494 ))....