Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health

• Decision Date: 08 April 2009
• Docket Number: No. 34426.,34426.
• Citation: 207 P.3d 988,147 Idaho 257
• Parties: Dennis N. WHEELER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

207 P.3d 988

147 Idaho 257

Dennis N. WHEELER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, Respondent.

No. 34426.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, November 2008 Term.

April 8, 2009.

Vernon K. Smith, Jr., Boise, argued for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise for respondent. M. Scott Keim, Deputy Attorney General argued for respondent.

BURDICK, Justice.

I. NATURE OF THE CASE

This case requires the Court to interpret the Family Law License Suspensions Act (FLLSA), Idaho Code §§ 7-1401 to -1417, as well as the administrative rules governing license suspension proceedings commenced by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (Department). Dennis N. Wheeler appeals from the district court's decision affirming a final order issued by the Department suspending Wheeler's driver's license for failure to pay court ordered child support. We affirm.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 25, 2005, Wheeler received notice that the Department, pursuant to its authority under the FLLSA, intended to suspend Wheeler's driver's license for his failure to pay court ordered child support. According to the Department's records, Wheeler owed $22,629.01 in child support obligations for three children under three separate orders, all of which were entered before the FLLSA became went into effect. Wheeler hired private counsel and requested a hearing to contest his license suspension.

The administrative hearing was held on December 14, 2005. During the hearing, the Department presented the financial records from Wheeler's three support cases showing he owed a combined cumulative balance of $20,904.32. Although Wheeler was afforded the opportunity to challenge the Department's findings and/or present evidence to establish "good cause" for why his license should not be suspended, Wheeler chose to do neither. Instead, Wheeler requested the opportunity to submit briefing regarding legal challenges to the FLLSA itself and his request was granted.

Wheeler filed a motion to vacate and dismiss the license suspension proceedings, in which he argued a driver's license was an exempt "property interest" under the FLLSA; the Department's interpretation of "good cause" was unduly restrictive; a judicial proceeding, rather than an administrative hearing, was the proper forum for the enforcement of child support orders under the FLLSA; the FLLSA was applied ex post facto; and the Department had improperly instituted license suspension proceedings against him. In addition, Wheeler raised various constitutional challenges to the FLLSA. The hearing officer determined the Department had established that Wheeler owed the unpaid child support and that Wheeler had failed to present any evidence of "good cause" for why his license should not be suspended. The hearing officer also determined that pursuant to IDAPA 16.05.03.131, he neither had the authority to invalidate the Department's rule regarding the definition of "good cause," nor the authority to invalidate any aspect of the FLLSA on constitutional or any other grounds. As such, the hearing officer issued a preliminary order granting the Department's request to suspend Wheeler's driver's license.

Wheeler appealed to the Director of the Department. The Department agreed with the hearing officer that it was beyond the bounds of an administrative proceeding to rule on the Department's authority to suspend Wheeler's driver's license under the FLLSA. As such, the Department affirmed the hearing officer's decision and issued a final order suspending Wheeler's driver's license. Wheeler then sought judicial review and the district court affirmed the Department's order in all respects. Wheeler now appeals the district court's decision.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Department is treated as an agency for the purposes of judicial review. "This Court reviews the district court directly when it acts as an intermediate appellate court." Galli v. Idaho County, 146 Idaho 155, 158, 191 P.3d 233, 236 (2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008)). In reviewing the district court, we examine the Department's findings to determine if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. See id. "The [C]ourt will not substitute its judgment for that of the [Department] on questions of fact." Id.; I.C. § 67-5279(1). The district court must affirm the Department's action, "unless the court determines that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: "(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." I.C. § 67-5279(3). Regardless of whether the Department's action meets the standard set forth in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3), the district court must affirm the Department's action "unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." I.C. § 67-5279(4). It is the burden of the party contesting the Department's decision to show how the Department erred in a manner specified under I.C. § 67-5279, and to establish that a substantial right has been prejudiced. See Druffel v. State, Dept. of Transp., 136 Idaho 853, 855, 41 P.3d 739, 741 (2002).

IV. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Wheeler argues the Department did not have authority to commence license suspension proceedings against him under the FLLSA, and that the FLLSA was applied to all three of his child support orders ex post facto. Wheeler also raises various challenges to the FLLSA itself, and to the administrative rules governing license suspension proceedings commenced by the Department, arguing 1) a driver's license is an exempt "property interest" under the FLLSA; 2) the Department's interpretation of "good cause," as set forth in IDAPA 16.03.03.604, is unduly restrictive; 3) the hearing officer is not vested with the proper authority under IDAPA 16.05.03.131; 4) the FLLSA is void for vagueness; and 5) a judicial proceeding is the proper forum for the enforcement of child support orders under the FLLSA. We will first address the issues specific to the facts of Wheeler's case, and then address the general challenges Wheeler makes to the FLLSA and the Department's rules.

A. Issues specific to the facts of Wheeler's case

1. The Department substantially complied with the requirements under the FLLSA to commence license suspension proceedings against Wheeler.

First, Wheeler asserts the Department did not have authority under the FLLSA to institute license suspension proceedings against him. Wheeler argues that because the Department did not present evidence that it notified the Department of Transportation (DOT) of Wheeler's delinquency and that the DOT failed to take action within 30 days, the Department failed to prove that it met the statutory prerequisites to commence suspension proceedings under I.C. § 7-1404.

Idaho Code § 7-1404, which governs jurisdiction for license suspension proceedings, states in pertinent part:

Upon notification by the department [of health and welfare] of a child support delinquency, a licensing authority shall initiate proceedings to suspend a license in accordance with its statutory process, petition the court, or refer the matter to the department to initiate proceedings for suspension of the license in accordance with the requirements of this chapter. Upon referral, or if the licensing authority takes no action within thirty (30) days after notification of the delinquency by the department, the department is authorized to commence a license suspension proceeding under this chapter. The licensing authority shall notify the department of all action taken in response to the notification of the delinquency.

(Emphasis added). In sum, the Department must first notify the DOT of a licensee's child support delinquency, and then wait for the DOT to either not take action within 30 days or refer the case to the Department before the Department may commence license suspension proceedings under the FLLSA.

Here, the Department established that it substantially complied with these statutory prerequisites through the affidavit of Kristy White, a policy specialist for the Department. In her affidavit, Ms. White stated: "The Idaho Department of Transportation has referred all of the child support cases which qualify for license suspension to the Department for the initiation of license suspension proceedings." Ms. White's affidavit establishes that the Department met the statutory referral requirement, and thus contrary to Wheeler's assertion, it was unnecessary that the Department also prove the DOT failed to take action within 30 days. It can be reasonably inferred from her affidavit that the DOT waived the statutory prerequisite of notice when it provided a blanket referral of all cases to the Department. The notice requirement merely triggered the DOT's choice as to whether to commence license suspension proceedings itself or to refer the case back to the Department for handling of the suspension proceedings. With the blanket referral in place, it would be superfluous for us to require the Department to continue to notify the DOT of each child support delinquency case before commencing license suspension proceedings against a licensee. Because we find that the Department substantially complied with I.C. § 7-1404, we uphold the district court's decision to dismiss Wheeler's argument.¹

2. The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws does not preclude the application of the FLLSA to Wheeler's child support orders.

Wheeler also argues that because all three of his child support orders were entered before the FLLSA became effective on January 1, 1997,² the FLLSA was applied to his orders ex post facto. Ex post facto laws are prohibited by article I, section 9, clause 3 of the United States...