Wheeler v. Philadelphia
| Decision Date | 15 February 1875 |
| Citation | 77 Pa. 338 |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
| Parties | Wheeler <I>et al. versus</I> Philadelphia <I>et al.</I> |
Before AGNEW, C. J., SHARSWOOD, WILLIAMS, MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON and WOODWARD, JJ.
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W. H. Rawle and E. S. Miller argued for the plaintiff.— The bill to restrain the sewer loan is one quia timet a recognised head of equity: Baird v. Rice, 13 P. F. Smith 489; Page v. Allen, 8 Id. 338; Wells v. Bain, 25 Id. 39. The Act of May 23d 1874 is unconstitutional: Walker v. Potter, 28 Ohio St. 85. The Supreme Court may inquire whether the legislature has exceeded its power: Cronise v. Cronise, 4 P. F. Smith 255; Jones v. Jones, 2 Jones 350: Gardner v. Collector, 6 Wallace 499; Fowler v. Pierce, 2 Cal. 165; Cooly on Constitution 135, 177; Page v. Allen, 8 P. F. Smith 354. The title of an act must not mislead, giving the details of some provisions and omitting others: Dorsy's Appeal, 22 P. F. Smith 192.
The Act of May 23d 1874 authorizes a loan of its credit to a corporation, association or institution: Western Saving Fund et al. v. The City, 7 Casey 175. The city having entered into the business of manufacturing gas, put itself into the position of a private citizen: U. S. Bank v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 907; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304; Speer v. School Directors, 14 Wright 150; Philadelphia v. Collector, 5 Wallace 727.
C. H. T. Collis, City Solicitor, G. W. Biddle and H. M. Phillips (with whom were E. S. Quinn and W. B. Mann) for defendants. —The trustees of the Gas Works are neither a corporation, association or institution within the meaning of the Constitution; they are but the agents of the city with specified powers: Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 52; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Philadelphia, 11 Wright 189.
Two bills have been filed by the complainants against the city of Philadelphia, in both of which they aver that they are citizens and tax-payers of said city. In one bill they seek to restrain the city authorities from borrowing upon the credit of the city the sum of $1,000,000, for the extension of the Philadelphia Gas Works; in the other bill they seek to enjoin said authorities from borrowing upon the credit of the city the further sum of $1,000,000, to be applied to the construction of main sewers. The Gas Loan was expressly authorized by ordinance of the City Councils; in the case of the Sewer Loan the ordinance has passed only the Common Council. The ordinances referred to, depend for their validity upon the Act of 23d May 1874, entitled, "An Act dividing the cities of this state into three classes," &c. For the exercise of certain corporate powers, and having respect to the numbers, character, powers and duties of certain officers thereof, the cities now in existence or hereafter to be created in this Commonwealth, are divided by the said act into three classes, as follows:
Those containing a population exceeding 300,000 shall constitute the first class.
Those containing a population less than 300,000, and exceeding 100,000, shall constitute the second class; and
Those containing a population less than 100,000, and exceeding 10,000, shall constitute the third class.
It was further provided by the 11th section of said act, that "The councils of any city of the first class, the debt of which now exceeds 7 per centum upon the assessed value of the taxable property therein, shall be and they are hereby authorized to increase the said debt 1 per centum upon such valuation," &c.
The complainants allege as the grounds of their application, that the Act of Assembly, above referred to, is unconstitutional and void, because: —
1. It creates an unconstitutional classification of the cities of the Commonwealth, and by indirection, legislates specially for the city of Philadelphia.
2. It authorizes the increase of the city debt without submission to the popular vote.
3. The act was so altered, during its passage through the House of Representatives, as to change its original purpose.
4. The object of the act is not clearly expressed in its title.
These four grounds of objection apply to both the bills.
As to the bill to which the Trustees of the Philadelphia Gas Works are made defendants, there is another ground:
5. In authorizes the city to obtain money for, or loan its credit to, a corporation, association or institution.
It was alleged on behalf of the city that the plaintiffs had no standing in court to enable them to raise these questions, because: —
1. As to the Gas Loan, the burden can never fall on the city, and
2. As to the Sewer Loan, it has only passed one branch of councils, and may never pass the other, or it may be vetoed by the mayor.
It is unnecessary to consider these objections at length. It is too late to question the right of a tax-payer, where money is to be raised by taxation, or expended by the treasury, to proceed in equity to test the validity of the law under which the proposed assessment or expenditure is to be made. Moers v. The City of Reading, 9 Harris 188; Mott v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 6 Casey 9; Page v. Allen, 8 P. F. Smith 338; and other cases following the lead of Sharpless v. The City, 9 Harris 147, have put this question at rest.
The objection that as to the Gas Loan bill the burden of the proposed loan can never fall upon the city, if true in point of fact, would turn the complainants out of court. But the facts do not justify such an assertion. The proposed loan can only be issued upon the credit of the city, and the city's certificates of indebtedness must be given therefor. The property of the complainants would be responsible for every dollar of the loan. To hold that this responsibility would not, under any circumstances, be enforced, is to assume that the business of manufacturing gas is absolutely free from all the contingencies to which every other branch of business is liable, and that the Gas Trust itself is so far above all other trusts in its own integrity, and that of its numerous employees and agents, as to render defalcations, embezzlements, and mismanagement impossible.
The Sewer Loan bill may be regarded as a bill quia timet, a well-settled branch of equity jurisdiction, recognised by this court in Baird v. Rice, 13 P. F. Smith 489, in which the passage of an ordinance appropriating any moneys, or laying any special tax in aid of the construction of new public buildings at Broad and Market streets, in the city of Philadelphia, was sought to be restrained. Also, in Page v. Allen, 8 P. F. Smith 338, before cited, and in Wells v. Bain, 25 P. F. Smith 39.
Having thus conceded the right of the complainants to file these bills, it remains to consider how far they have made out a case which entitles them to the equitable relief prayed for.
It is alleged that the Act of 23d of May 1874, offends against article 3d of section 7th of the Constitution. The material parts of said section are: * * *
Without entering at large upon the discussion of what is here meant by a "local or special law," it is sufficient to say, that a statute which relates to persons or things as a class, is a general law, while a statute which relates to particular persons or things of a class is special, and comes within the constitutional prohibition.
The necessity for classification is recognised in the Constitution itself. In the article upon the judiciary, section 5th, it says: "Whenever a county shall contain 40,000 inhabitants, it shall constitute a separate judicial district." In section 12 of the same article: "In Philadelphia there shall be established for every 30,000 inhabitants, one court not of record, of police and civil causes." Again, in section 27 of the same article: "In every county wherein the population shall exceed 150,000 the General Assembly shall establish a separate Orphans' Court." We are aware that it does not follow that because classification is resorted to in the organic law, the legislature may exercise the same power. But the power existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; it had been exercised by the legislature from the foundation of the government; it was incident to legislation, and its exercise was necessary to the promotion of the public welfare. The true question is, not whether classification is authorized by the terms of the Constitution, but whether it is expressly prohibited. In no part of that instrument can, any such prohibition be found.
For the purpose of taxation, real estate may be classified. Thus, timber lands, arable lands, mineral lands, urban and rural, may be divided into distinct classes, and subjected to different rates. In like manner other subjects, trades, occupations, and professions, may be classified. And not only things but persons may be so divided. The genus homo is a subject within the meaning of the Constitution. Will it be contended that as to this there can be no classification? No laws affecting the personal and properly rights of minors as distinguished from adults? Or of males as distinguished from females? Or, in the case of the latter, no distinction between a feme covert and a single woman? What becomes of all our legislation in regard to the rights of married women if there can be no classification? and where is the power to provide any future safeguards for their separate estate? These illustrations might be multiplied indefinitely were it...
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