Wheeler v. Pioneer Developmental Services, Inc.
| Citation | 349 F.Supp.2d 158 |
| Decision Date | 08 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.02-30159-MAP.,CIV.A.02-30159-MAP. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
| Parties | Sandra WHEELER, Plaintiff, v. PIONEER DEVELOPMENTAL SERVICES, INC. and "Jane Doe", Plan Administrator of Pioneer Developmental Services, Inc. Benefit Plans, Defendant. |
James F. Donnelly, Lyon, Ferriter & Fitzpatrick, Holyoke, for Pioneer Developmental Services, Inc., Jane Doe, Defendants.
Hugh D. Heisler, Heisler, Feldman & McCormick, PC, Springfield, for Sandra Wheeler, Plaintiff.
Robert S. Murphy, Jr., Bacon & Wilson, P.C., Springfield, for Pioneer Developmental Services, Inc., Jane Doe, Defendants.
Patti A. Prunhuber, Western Mass. Legal Services, Northampton, for Sandra Wheeler, Plaintiff.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docket Nos. 22 and 26)
Plaintiff Sandra Wheeler ("Wheeler") has brought this action against her former employer Pioneer Development Services, Inc. ("Pioneer") claiming that Pioneer wrongfully discharged her from her position. Specifically, Wheeler's complaint charges violations of the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), ERISA violations, breach of both contractual and fiduciary duties, conversion, and violation of Massachusetts state law.
Following discovery, Wheeler has moved for partial summary judgment on Count I, arguing that on the undisputed facts, no reasonable jury could fail to find a violation of the FMLA. Pioneer has opposed Wheeler's motion and responded with a motion for partial summary judgment of its own as to Wheeler's FMLA claim.
As will be seen, the critical point of disagreement between the parties is whether Wheeler gave proper notice to Pioneer of her need for FMLA leave, and whether her medical condition qualified for medical leave under the statute. As the discussion will show, the undisputed facts permit no other conclusion but that the plaintiff suffered a violation of her rights under the FMLA. Although courts seldom allow plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment, the facts of this case establish a violation of the FMLA as a matter of law and make a trial on the liability aspect of this claim unnecessary.
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A "genuine" issue is one that reasonably could be resolved in favor of either party, and a material fact is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "drawing all reasonable inferences in the party's favor." Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1161, 120 S.Ct. 1174, 145 L.Ed.2d 1082 (2000).
Once the moving party has asserted that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden is on the opposing party to point to specific facts demonstrating that there is, indeed, a trial worthy issue. National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir.1995), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1103, 115 S.Ct. 2247, 132 L.Ed.2d 255 (1995). Not every genuine factual conflict, of course, necessitates a trial. "It is only when a disputed fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the governing law if found favorably to the nonmovant that the materiality hurdle is cleared." Parrilla-Burgos v. Hernandez-Rivera, 108 F.3d 445, 448 (1st Cir.1997) (citations omitted).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, the relevant background to the motions may be summarized a follows.
Pioneer, defendant in this case, provides social and training services to developmentally disabled adults. Wheeler, the plaintiff, worked for Pioneer as a case manager and/or direct case worker from March 16, 1998 until her discharge on December 26, 2001.
The events leading up to plaintiff's discharge unfolded in the following manner. On December 7, 2001, having promised to take one of Pioneer's clients home from the office, Wheeler failed to follow through, leaving the supervisor with a disabled client. Wheeler explained to her supervisor, however, that she had to leave to pick up her children. On December 10, 2001, Wheeler chose not to follow her supervisor's suggestion that she encourage one of Pioneer's clients to perform some work around the office to make some money. As a result, both Wheeler and the client remained idle for the next hour. At that point, Pioneer considered Wheeler's behavior to constitute willful insubordination and later issued a reprimand in the form of a so-called "Disciplinary Action Letter" on December 13, 2001. Although office protocol required Wheeler to sign the Disciplinary Letter, she apparently refused. Wheeler was placed on thirty-day probationary status based on this reprimand.
Wheeler began to feel sick around December 10, 2001. Following the onset of her symptoms, Wheeler asked her supervisor, an individual named Michaud, for permission to leave, but Michaud refused to allow it.
The following day, Wheeler consulted her physician, Dr. Peter Siersma ("Siersma"). Siersma had been Wheeler's personal doctor since 1992. During the office visit, Siersma observed Wheeler coughing and experiencing hot and cold sweats and an upper respiratory infection. These observations led the doctor to conclude that Wheeler suffered from a condition characterized as a "viral infection in a smoker" or "viral infection with attendant symptoms." Although he did not mention it in Wheeler's medical records, at deposition Siersma testified that it would have been "counterproductive for [Wheeler] to work at her job until she was feeling better or was clinically better or was seen and documented to be better." (Docket No. 24 at 2).
Medical records merely indicate that on December 11 Siersma prescribed "symptomatic care" to Wheeler, though he later testified that he advised Wheeler to stay home from work, get plenty of rest and treat her symptoms with fluids and over-the-counter medications. Siersma also testified that he felt concerned that Wheeler needed rest in order to completely recover from her illness, but he again failed to record that information in Wheeler's medical records.
Wheeler continued to request medical leave. She explained that she had not been feeling well on several occasions in December. When Wheeler's supervisors Michaud and another party named Taylor ("Taylor") denied all of Wheeler's requests on December 13, 2001, Wheeler telephoned Siersma's office and asked for a note confirming her need for a leave of absence. In response to Wheeler's request, Siersma wrote a note on the same date, which simply indicated that Wheeler needed "LOA × 4."1 The doctor testified at his deposition that at that time, he believed that damage done to Wheeler's bronchi and pulmonary parenchyma would take three to four weeks to resolve, and so he wrote Wheeler a note for the maximum amount of time that he thought Wheeler needed to recover from her viral illness.
Wheeler picked up the note from Siersma's office and handed it to Taylor the next day, December 14, 2001. Pioneer apparently considered the Siersma note to constitute a request for medical leave under the Pioneer employee manual. Although Wheeler said that she felt "sick and tired" as she handed in the note, Taylor understood that Wheeler requested a medical leave, upon the advice of her physician, for a period of four weeks. (Docket No. 28 at 3). Upon receiving the note, Taylor indicated that she would need more information to determine if Wheeler truly qualified for leave. Having delivered the note to Taylor, Wheeler left work, went home, and remained completely incapacitated from December 14, 2001 through December 19, 2001.
On December 19, 2001, Wheeler received a letter from Pioneer dated December 17, 2001. The letter requested that Wheeler submit additional information from her doctor no later than December 20, 2001, the next day, and instructed her to sign a release to allow Pioneer to contact Wheeler's physician directly. Wheeler took the letter to Siersma's office the same day, let Siersma's receptionist make a copy, and signed the requested medical release form. The receptionist assured Wheeler that the doctor would submit all the necessary information to Pioneer.
On the same day, a person from Siersma's office telephoned Pioneer and explained that because Siersma had a busy schedule, he could not comply with Pioneer's deadline of December 20th. The person assured Pioneer, however, that Siersma would fax the requested information to Pioneer by December 24, 2001, the day before the Christmas holiday. The following day, December 20, 2001, Siersma reviewed the job description for Wheeler that Pioneer had provided and dictated additional information that Pioneer had requested. Siersma stated in his letter that, having reviewed Wheeler's job description, he concluded that it was counter-productive for Wheeler to continue with her duties, since the time demands of Wheeler's job would impede her recovery.
Siersma uses a transcriptionist to type his dictation. Except in cases of emergency, the transcriptionist typically requires two to three days to return Siersma's dictation for his signature. Siersma did not consider administrative requests like Pioneer's an emergency, and, partly as a result of the Christmas holiday, Siersma did not receive the letter back for signature until December 26, 2001. When Pioneer did not receive medical certification on December 20, 2001, it did not instruct anybody to contact Wheeler and...
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