Wheeler v. Saul

Decision Date15 June 2020
Docket NumberCivil No. 1:19-CV-1340
PartiesALBERT EDWARD WHEELER, III, Plaintiff v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction

In Albert Wheeler's case we most assuredly do not write upon a blank slate. Quite the contrary, this is Wheeler's second Social Security Appeal in a case that has spanned the past seven years. In March of 2018, this court remanded Wheeler's case for further consideration by the Commissioner, finding that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) had provided an insufficient explanation for the decision to give greater weight to the opinion of a non-examining, non-treating state agency expert than the opinion expressed by Wheeler's treating physician. Wheeler v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-CV-01916, 2018 WL 1528763, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:16-CV-1916, 2018 WL 1518572 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2018). At the time of this decision, there were only two medical opinions on record in these administrative proceedings, the treating source opinion of Dr. Falvello and a non-examining state agency doctor's opinion provided by Dr. Gryczko. Id.

Following this remand, additional medical evidence and opinions were obtained. There are now four medical opinions of record in this appeal. Three of these medical opinions conclude that Wheeler retains the residual functional capacity to perform either light or sedentary work. Considering this additional evidence, along with treatment notes from two physicians, and several independent reports concerning Wheeler's activities of daily living, the ALJ found that Wheeler could perform a limited range of sedentary work, and denied his disability claim.

This appeal then ensued. In considering this, Wheeler's second appeal, we are mindful that we are required to apply a deferential standard of review to the well-articulated findings of the ALJ. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently underscored for us the limited scope of our review when considering Social Security appeals, noting that:

The phrase "substantial evidence" is a "term of art" used throughout administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. —, —, 135 S. Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains "sufficien[t] evidence" to support the agency's factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis deleted). And whatever the meaning of "substantial" in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this Court has said, is "more than a mere scintilla." Ibid.; see, e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marksomitted). It means—and means only—"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S. Ct. 206. SeeDickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S. Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999) (comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-erroneous standard).

Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).

In the instant case, three medical sources have now opined that Wheeler could perform a limited range of work. These three opinions are based upon test results, as well as clinical and anecdotal reports which contain sufficient evidence to support the agency's factual determinations. Therefore, mindful of the fact that substantial evidence "means only—'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,'" Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154, we find that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's findings in this case. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the decision of the Commissioner denying this claim.

II. Statement of Facts and of the Case

Albert Wheeler initially applied for disability benefits nearly seven years ago. On August 10, 2013, Wheeler applied for disability benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging an onset date of disability beginning July 26, 2013. (Tr. 16). According to Wheeler he had become totally disabled due to degenerative disc disease and joint disease in his knees. (Tr. 18). Wheeler was born in 1969 and was 43 years old at the time of the alleged onset of his disability, making him ayounger worker under the Commissioner's regulations. (Tr. 25). He had a high school education and prior employment as a forklift operator and shipping clerk. (Id.)

In April of 2015, following an administrative hearing (Tr. 31-64), the ALJ entered a decision denying Wheeler's disability claim. (Tr. 13-30). In this decision the ALJ found that, notwithstanding his impairments, Wheeler retained the residual functional capacity to perform a range of sedentary work. (Tr. 20). In reaching this decision, the ALJ considered the only two medical opinions that were in the administrative record—a July 21, 2014 check block form completed by a treating source, Dr. Falvello (Tr. 302-07) and a September 23, 2013 non-examining, non-treating state agency expert opinion rendered by Dr. Gryczko. (Tr. 88-92). These two medical evaluations presented very different assessments of Wheeler's capabilities. For his part, Dr. Falvello opined that Wheeler was totally disabled. In contrast, Dr. Gryczko stated that he believed Wheeler could perform light work. The ALJ's 2015 decision afforded greater weight to the state agency expert opinion than the treating source opinion of Dr. Falvello, reasoning that the state agency opinion was more congruent with the clinical and anecdotal evidence regarding Wheeler's impairments, condition, limitations, treatment and activities of daily living. (Tr. 23-25). Wheeler appealed this agency ruling and in March of 2018, this court remanded this case for further consideration by the Commissioner, finding that the ALJ hadprovided an insufficient explanation for the decision to give greater weight to the opinion of a non-examining, non-treating state agency expert than the opinion expressed by Wheeler's treating physician. Wheeler v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-CV-01916, 2018 WL 1528763, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:16-CV-1916, 2018 WL 1518572 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2018).

Additional administrative proceedings then ensued. In the course of these proceedings, the ALJ received further testimony and information regarding Wheeler's medical conditions, impairments, and activities of daily living. The ALJ was also provided extensive and updated clinical and treatment records for Wheeler. (Tr. 777-1419). This extensive documentation presented a mixed picture regarding the degree to which Wheeler's impairments were wholly disabling. For example, at the time he applied for disability benefits, Wheeler was employed and was working 12-hour shifts at a plant. (Tr. 166). Wheeler's wife, in turn, completed a function report in support of this disability application, which stated that Wheeler had significant difficulties with self-care, but acknowledged that he was able to get his teenage son off to school, work the third shift, prepare meals, including meals with several courses, help with his son's homework, play with him, take care of his dogs, do light cleaning, fold laundry, wash dishes, do small household repairs, do some yardwork, go outside daily, go shopping in stores, build model cars, modify actionfigures for his son, play video games, go out on dates with his spouse, and go on weekly outings to his family's homes. (Tr. 167-73). Similarly, during his first administrative hearing in this case, Wheeler described his impairments but testified that he helped to take care of his teenage son, cooked for him, helped him with his laundry and homework, shopped in stores, did some light cleaning, washed dishes, did some small household repairs and some yard work, cared for his two dogs, played video games, could comfortably lift 10 pounds, built models as a hobby and occasionally helped his son during football season by tossing the football with him. (Tr. 43, 51-54).

Clinical records also presented an equivocal portrait regarding the severity of Wheeler's symptoms. At times Wheeler reported pain and tenderness in back and knees. (Tr. 312, 325, 342, 343, 347, 1113). However, these reports were episodic. Thus, by February 2017, Wheeler indicated that he experienced 50-70% pain relief with the injections and stated that his average daily pain was 2-3/10. (Tr. 1309). Likewise in April 2017, Wheeler denied significant lumbar pain. (Tr. 1302). In October 2017, Wheeler stated that his pain was a 1/10, and with prolonged walking and standing a 5/10. (Tr. 1277). According to Wheeler, he was walking one mile daily with his weight loss program. (Tr. 1277). Six months later, in early March 2018, Wheeler described his average daily pain as a 1-2/10. (Tr. 1274). Further, on occasion when Wheeler reported pain and discomfort, it was associated withphysical labor far beyond the requirements of sedentary work. For example, In August 2018, Wheeler told Dr. Falvello that he had increased shoulder pain from working on his car. (Tr. 1384).

Aside from Wheeler's well-documented, but somewhat equivocal, reports of his symptoms, these clinical records also provided a mixed picture of the degree to which his back and knee symptoms were disabling. From 2013 through 2018, care-givers often noted that Wheeler maintained a full or significant range of motion, normal strength and reflexes, and showed negative straight leg raising test results. (Tr. 343, 347, 352, 355, 1113). Further, with the exception of an arthroscopic procedure on his knee, the course of treatment prescribed for Wheeler during this time span was relatively conservative,...

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