Wheeler v. Sims, 90-1714
| Decision Date | 08 January 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-1714,90-1714 |
| Citation | 951 F.2d 796 |
| Parties | 35 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 72 Lorenzo WHEELER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Officer SIMS, Captain Staley and S. Jordan, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Jerold S. Solovy, Bradford P. Lyerla, Patricia A. Bronte (argued), Jenner & Block, Chicago, Ill., and Michael J. Tague, Flynn, Palmer, Tague & Lietz, Champaign, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.
Tanya Solov (argued), Office of the Atty. Gen., Civ. Appeals Div., Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Before COFFEY and MANION, Circuit Judges, and WILL, Senior District Judge. *
On June 7, 1984, Lorenzo Wheeler, a Pontiac Corrections Center inmate, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court construed the complaint as alleging: 1) that the defendants Staley and Jordan violated Wheeler's due process rights in refusing to consider the written statement he presented at the Adjustment Committee hearing; and 2) that the defendants Sims and Dean violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment when they allegedly beat him, resulting in his allegedly being permanently paralyzed from the waist down. Wheeler appeals the trial court's dismissal of his due process count for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and the entry of judgment (in accordance with the jury verdict) rejecting Wheeler's claim that Sims and Dean violated his Eighth Amendment rights. We affirm.
On April 16, 1984, correctional officers conveyed Wheeler to the Illinois Research Hospital in Chicago, Illinois for medical evaluation and treatment of injuries of an unspecified nature allegedly incurred while confined in the Pontiac Corrections Center. While in the hospital's waiting room, Wheeler and the correctional officers became embroiled in an argument over whether Wheeler could smoke and drink a cup of coffee in the waiting room area. At that time, Wheeler allegedly jumped from his chair and left the waiting area. When the officer ordered Wheeler to return to his chair, Wheeler refused and instead demanded that they depart from the hospital. The officers complied and returned Wheeler to Pontiac without his receiving medical attention.
Upon returning to the Pontiac Corrections Center, Wheeler entered the office of Assistant Warden Odie Washington without authorization to complain about his alleged mis-treatment at the hospital. Correctional Officer Sims followed Wheeler into the office, and Correctional Officer Dean, observing Wheeler's unauthorized presence in Washington's office, also entered the office. Sims and Dean stated that when the assistant warden informed Wheeler that he would not discuss the matter with him at that time, they took charge of Wheeler, who was handcuffed and shackled with leg irons, by the elbows and directed him out of the office. Wheeler alleges that during the process of removing him from Washington's office, Sims and Dean beat him severely, permanently paralyzing his lower extremities. He asserts that he has been unable to stand or walk since that day, April 16, 1984. Wheeler alleges that the purported beating was witnessed by inmate Jesse Merrette, who testified on Wheeler's behalf at trial.
The correction officers who were with Wheeler at the hospital filed an incident report regarding Wheeler's unauthorized actions in the hospital waiting room area and served the plaintiff-appellant with a copy of the report, which was the basis for the disciplinary hearing. The report notified Wheeler of his right to present a defense to the Adjustment Committee, stating:
"Please be advised that you have the right to appear before the Adjustment Committee and contest this rule violation charge by presenting a written or oral statement or explanation of your actions."
Wheeler prepared a written statement explaining his version of the events in the Chicago hospital and offered to present it to the Adjustment Committee at his hearing on April 21, 1984. But despite repeated requests from the committee to give an oral statement, Wheeler refused to comply. Nonetheless, the Adjustment Committee, consisting of defendants Staley and Jordan, refused to accept Wheeler's written statement explaining that he failed to submit it prior to the hearing in accordance with the state administrative regulations. The record fails to reveal any requirement that the written statement be submitted before the hearing.
The trial judge dismissed the due process claim January 29, 1990, holding that while Wheeler had a due process right to address the committee to present his defense, he did not possess a liberty interest in presenting a written rather than an oral statement. The court reasoned that the administrative regulation granting a right to present a written or oral statement fails to contain "explicitly mandatory language" mandating that a prisoner be permitted to make the choice of whether to present a written or oral statement prior to the imposition of disciplinary action. He concluded that the Due Process Clause merely entitles an inmate to the opportunity to present a defense, an opportunity the Adjustment Committee provided Wheeler when they asked for his oral statement.
The Eighth Amendment excessive force claim was tried before a jury February 12-14, 1990. At trial, the court admitted the defendant's Exhibit 11, which contained a number of reports concerning the defendant's activities during the time period in question from the plaintiff's master file documenting Wheeler's physical activity, including the dates he was observed moving his legs as well as the specific days when he was observed arising from his wheelchair and walking. Wheeler objected to the admission of Exhibit 11 on the ground that the documents contained hearsay statements made in preparation of litigation. The trial judge overruled the objection, admitting the exhibit under the business record exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6).
Wheeler presents two issues for review: 1) Whether the Adjustment Committee's refusal to consider his written statement at the disciplinary hearing violated the plaintiff's due process rights; and 2) Whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting Exhibit 11 in evidence.
The district court stated that "[r]eading [Ill.Admin.Reg.] 804(II)(H)(3) with 804(II)(H)(7), an inmate has an unmistakable right to appear before the committee, address the committee, and contest the charges." Order at 5 (Jan. 29, 1990). We are of the opinion that since the district court found that inmates are entitled to procedural safeguards under Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, § 1003-8-7 (1978) and Ill.Admin.Reg. 804(II) (1981), the court found that the statute and administrative regulation created a liberty interest, for there can be no right to due process without a constitutionally protected interest at stake. Thus, it is surprising that Wheeler argues both in his opening brief and his reply brief that he has "a well-defined liberty interest at stake in the disciplinary proceedings against him." After the district judge found that Wheeler possessed a protected liberty interest, the only due process question at issue is whether the Due Process Clause itself 1 entitles an inmate to present a written statement rather than an oral statement setting forth his version of the facts at a disciplinary hearing. 2
The appellant in his brief wrote as follows allegedly relying on Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-66, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-79, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) and Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476, 103 S.Ct. 864, 874, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983): "Due process requires that an inmate accused of disciplinary violations be given the ... right to present his own version of events in written form." (Emphasis added). The plaintiff-appellant has misinterpreted Wolff and Hewitt, for neither of these cases held that the Due Process Clause mandates that a prisoner be allowed to present a written statement of "his own version of events" when he has been provided the opportunity to appear in person and testify orally, but has refused to do so. In Hewitt the Supreme Court stated that:
Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472, 103 S.Ct. at 872. The language stating that prison officials were required to consider "whatever statement [the prisoner] wished to submit" refers to the content of the statement rather than its manner of presentation, and thus falls far short of directing that the authorities must consider the statement in whatever form the prisoner wished to submit it. The Court merely observed that the prisoner must be given an opportunity to present his statement of the facts, but did not mandate that the statement be in either oral or written form. The Court stated:
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