Wheeler v. Ward
| Decision Date | 23 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:19-CV-00059-GNS-CHL |
| Parties | BONNIE WHEELER PLAINTIFF v. JOHN WARD; DAVID LEE; and MARVIN RHINEHART DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (DN 24) and Motion to Strike (DN 47) and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Scheduling Order and File Amended Complaint (DN 29) and Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint to Add Newly Discovered Claims (DN 44). These motions are ripe for adjudication. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, while all other motions are DENIED.
Plaintiff Bonnie Wheeler ("Wheeler") was hired by the Hardin County Sheriff's Office ("HCSO") in 1997 as a paid deputy and remained employed as such until the time of her termination. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 9, DN 17).1 On or about May 23, 2018, Wheeler was hand-delivered a letter from Lee stating that it had "come to the attention of [the HCSO] that [Wheeler]may have violated the general employment policies of" the HCSO, specifically, policies 1.060-.061 and 2.092-.092. .
Policy 1.060-.061 prohibits employees "from making any public statements in any form concerning any pending criminal investigation without the prior permission of competent authority (except for a Defendant's name, age, residence, charge, identity of investigation agency)." (Compl. Ex. A, at 2). In addition, Policy 2.090-.092 requires all employees "to treat official business of the HCSO as confidential." (Compl. Ex. A, at 2). Wheeler allegedly made statements regarding a criminal investigation of another deputy that violated both of these policies. (Compl. Ex. A, at 2).
For these alleged violations, Wheeler was suspended without pay and was instructed to attend a meeting with Lee on May 25, 2018, and to keep the matter confidential. (Compl. Ex. A, at 2). On the morning of May 25, Wheeler met with Lee, Rhinehart, and County Attorney Jenny Oldham ("Oldham"), who questioned Wheeler regarding the veracity of the allegations outlined in the letter. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 17). Wheeler denied making any statements regarding open investigations or any statements to the public about Deputy Clennon Smith ("Smith"), his hiring, or a lack of disciplinary action taken against Smith. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 21). The meeting lasted approximately eight minutes and was characterized as an "Administrative Interview." (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18-19). No witness testimony was taken, nor were any witness statements shown or adverse witnesses identified; however, an audio recording of the meeting was made. .
On May 30, 2018, Wheeler was terminated from employment with the HCSO for a violation of the policies referenced in the suspension letter. (Compl. Ex. C, at 2, DN 1-1). On June 15, Wheeler sent a letter to Ward and Lee "requesting a copy of all documentation regardingthe suspension that resulted in [her] termination . . . [including] all written complaints and documentation as well as audio and/or transcripts of the Administrative Interview . . . ." (Compl. Ex. D, at 2, DN 1-1). Rhinehart responded to Wheeler's letter, attaching several items. (Compl. Ex. E, at 2-7, DN 1-1). Included were three letters, one of them having ostensibly been notarized by Ward and another by Teal Richardson ("Richardson"), apparently a deputy sheriff at the HCSO. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 29; Compl. Ex. E, at 3-5; Pl.'s Mot. Leave File Am. Compl. ¶ 1, DN 44). The letters were written by different individuals, each claiming to have encountered Wheeler while she was out campaigning with Willie Oden ("Oden"), who had run against Ward for election as Hardin County Sheriff. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 29; Compl. Ex. E, at 3-5; Pl.'s Mot. Leave File Am. Compl. ¶ 1). The letters stated that Wheeler had discussed Smith, his actions, and the purported lack of disciplinary action taken against Smith. (Compl. Ex. E, at 3-5).
Wheeler brought the current action against Ward, Lee, and Rhinehart in their official capacities. (Compl. 1, DN 1). Wheeler subsequently filed an Amended Complaint asserting: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Ward in his official capacity for wrongful discharge pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) official capacity claims against Ward, Lee, and Rhinehart for violation of the Kentucky Police Officers' Bill of Rights, Kentucky Revised Statutes ("KRS") 15.520; and (3) official capacity claims against Ward, Lee, and Rhinehart for violation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35-53)
Ward, Lee, and Rhinehart have since moved for summary judgment regarding immunity defenses on the Section 1983 claim against Ward and the Kentucky state law claims against Ward, Lee, and Rhinehart. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 1). Wheeler has moved for leave to amend the scheduling order and to file two amended complaints, one seeking to assert individual capacity claims against Ward and Lee and one seeking to assert claims against Richardson in her individualand official capacities.2 (Pl.'s Mot. Leave File Am. Scheduling Order 1, DN 29; Pl.'s Mot. Leave File Am. Compl. 3, DN 44). Defendants have also moved to strike Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint purporting to assert the aforementioned claims against Richardson. (Def.'s Mot. Strike 1, DN 47; Proposed Third Am. Compl., DN 46-2). Having been fully briefed, the motions are ripe for decision.
This Court possesses federal question jurisdiction over Wheeler's federal law claims and supplemental jurisdiction over Wheeler's state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367(a).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact that would preclude entry of judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of stating the basis for the motion and identifying the evidence demonstrating an absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). If the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party must then produce specific evidence proving the existence of a genuine dispute of fact for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
While the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable for the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party must do more than merely show the existence of some "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,586 (1986) (citation omitted). Rather, the nonmoving party must present facts proving that a genuine factual dispute exists by "citing to particular parts of the materials in the record" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position will be insufficient" to overcome summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
The first claim at issue is Wheeler's Section 1983 action against Ward in his official capacity as Hardin County Sheriff. Ward, in his official capacity, believes he is immune from this claim. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 11-13). While state law governs whether Defendants are immune from state law claims, federal law determines whether Defendants are immune from federal law claims. Funke v. Coogle, No. 3:11-CV-310-H, 2013 WL 209602, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 17, 2013) (citations omitted); see also Jefferson Cty. Fiscal Court v. Peerce, 132 S.W.3d 824, 836 (Ky. 2004) ().
"Official-capacity suits . . . 'generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'" Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Wheeler's Section 1983 claim against Ward in his official capacity as Sheriff is therefore really an action against Hardin County. See Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir. 2005) ; Johnson v. Fink, No. 1:99-CV-35-R, 1999 WL 33603131, at *3-4 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 17,1999) (). For purposes of Section 1983, Hardin County is considered a municipality. See Johnson, 398 F.3d at 877 ().
A municipality must be responsible for the violation of a Section 1983 claimant's constitutional rights before that municipality can be held liable to the claimant. Graham ex rel. Estate of Graham v. Cty. of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 382-83 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). "[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. "[A] municipality is liable under § 1983 only if the challenged conduct occurs pursuant to a municipality's 'official policy,' such that the municipality's promulgation or adoption of the policy can be said to have 'cause[d]' one of its employees to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights." D'Ambrosio...
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