Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
Decision Date | 23 July 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 12–1806.,12–1806. |
Citation | 689 F.3d 680 |
Parties | Anthony WHEELER, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., et al., Defendants–Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Anthony Wheeler (submitted), Danville, IL, pro se.
Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and WOOD and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
In September 2011, Anthony Wheeler filed a complaint alleging that prison officials and the prison's medical provider, Wexford Health Sources, have refused to provide effective care for his golf-ball-size hemorrhoids, leaving him in excruciating pain. Documents submitted with the complaint show that Wheeler is not fantasizing. (The complaint presents other grievances too, but this is the only one we need consider on this appeal.)
District judges must screen prisoners' complaints before or “as soon as practicable after” docketing to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Yet even though this complaint alleges that defendants have ignored severe ongoing pain from a medical condition—allegations that state a claim for relief under the eighth amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)—the district judge to this day has not screened the complaint under § 1915A. Defendants have not been served; the litigation is stalled. Congress has the authority to require judges to expedite particular matters, see Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 120 S.Ct. 2246, 147 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000), and § 1915A(a) exercises that authority. Ten months exceeds any understanding of “as soon as practicable”. Delay is especially hard to understand when the complaint plausibly alleges a serious ongoing injury.
Contemporaneously with his complaint, Wheeler requested a preliminary injunction that would compel the defendants to arrange for the operation he thinks essential. He also asked the judge to recruit counsel to assist him. The district judge did not act on either motion. On January 5, 2012, Wheeler filed a second motion for injunctive relief; the court did not address that one either. Nor did the court rule on Wheeler's renewed request for counsel, or either of his motions for the appointment of a medical expert.
On January 24 Wheeler filed his third motion for injunctive relief. In a brief order on March 28 the judge declined to afford relief. The court stated (emphasis in original): Wheeler has appealed, as 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) allows.
The district court's three grounds for denying Wheeler's motions are inadequate, individually and collectively. The judge was right to say that equitable relief depends on irreparable harm, even when constitutional rights are at stake. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88–92, 94 S.Ct. 937, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974). To the extent the judge may have believed that pain never constitutes irreparable injury, however, he was mistaken. See Harris v. Board of Supervisors, 366 F.3d 754, 766 (9th Cir.2004). To the extent that the judge believed that his delay in screening the complaint justifies denying relief (the apparent import of the italicized clause in the first sentence, and the whole of the second sentence), he was very far wrong. A judge's failure to act earlier is a reason to act now, not a reason to deny an otherwise meritorious motion. Just as prison administrators must deal promptly with their charges' serious medical problems, so federal judges must not leave litigants to bear pain indefinitely. As for the third reason: Wheeler did not ask the judge to “take over administration of a prison”; he asked the judge to order the prison to honor his constitutional right to care for a serious medical condition. A prisoner's view of optimal medical treatment can be a weak ground for superseding the views of competent physicians, but prisoners are not invariably wrong. Judges regularly must decide whether physicians have ignored a serious medical problem (or, in tort litigation, whether physicians have committed malpractice).
Until evidence has been submitted, it is not possible to know whether Wheeler really is suffering irreparable harm and otherwise has a good claim for relief. ...
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