Wheeler v. Wheeler

• Court: Oregon Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: LORD, J.
• Citation: Wheeler v. Wheeler, 18 Or. 261, 24 P. 900 (Or. 1889)
• Decision Date: 23 December 1889
• Parties: WHEELER v. WHEELER.

24 P. 900

18 Or. 261

WHEELER v. WHEELER.

Supreme Court of Oregon

December 23, 1889

Appeal from circuit court, Multnomah county.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

The contract of marriage, unlike ordinary contracts, the state is specially interested in preserving unbroken, and the contracting parties cannot annul it, nor the court, except for the causes specified in the statute, and only then upon satisfactory evidence that such cause or causes exist.

Where the party asking for a divorce is liable to a charge which is a cause for divorce, it will prevent him from obtaining such divorce, although the wife may have misconducted herself.

Williams & Wood and F.V. Drake, for appellant.

James Gleason, for respondent.

LORD J.

The facts are these: On March 8, 1889, the appellant, Ella Wheeler, filed her complaint against the respondent, C.H Wheeler, based on a late act of the legislature, to compel her husband, the respondent, to contribute to her support. The respondent appeared and answered, and at the same time filed a complaint for a divorce from the appellant, his wife but in his answer, among other things, set forth the fact that he had commenced a suit for divorce against his wife and prayed a suspension of proceedings until the determination of his suit for divorce. In the proceedings for divorce, the respondent answered denying all the material allegations, and alleging his neglect to provide a support for her, etc., and praying that his complaint might be dismissed. After all issues had been joined in the divorce suit, the evidence was taken, and the case argued by counsel, and the court found that the appellant had been guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment towards the respondent by the use of opprobrious epithets, false accusations of marital infidelity, and exasperating conduct etc., and, as a conclusion of law, found that the respondent was entitled to a divorce, which was decreed, and also entered a decree dismissing the petition for support, from both of which decrees these appeals are taken.

As the cases stand, the suit for divorce must be first disposed of and when that is done the petition for support can be easily determined upon the facts as disclosed by this record. The ground of the complaint is cruel and inhuman treatment, and indignities, rendering life burdensome. The particular acts which make up the gravamen of these charges consist in accusing the defendant of adultery, calling him opprobrious names, and the habit contracted by the defendant in drinking whisky and using morphine, all of which, it is alleged, greatly annoyed the respondent, and made his life burdensome. Passing the criticism suggested as to the complaint, and entering directly upon the merits with as little detail as possible, our first duty is to inquire whether the respondent has proven or sustained the allegations of his complaint. And in pursuing this inquiry it is our duty to remember that the contract of marriage, unlike other contracts, the state is specially interested in preserving unbroken, and that the contracting parties cannot annul it, nor the court, except for the causes specified in the statute, and only then when satisfactory evidence that such cause or causes exist. "Divorces," said STRONG, J., "ought never to be decreed without clear and satisfactory evidence of the wrong which the law treats as justifying cause for a divorce." Edmond's Appeal, 57 Pa.St. 234. The evidence discloses that the respondent is a physician, and was married to the defendant in December of the year 1881. The first charge he makes is that appellant accused him of adultery with one of his patients in a little over a year after their marriage, but it is evident from his own testimony, if it shall be considered that such an accusation was made, that he did not treat it seriously, nor did it cause him any mental concern, sufficient, at least, to disturb his happiness, and render his life burdensome. Whatever may have succeeded that period, his own evidence bears testimony, which covers this charge, that their married life was tranquil and happy, free from bickerings and quarrels, or any causes or accusations to irritate or disturb its peaceful tenor. The appellant flatly contradicts it, and under the rules of law, which must guide us, the allegation is not proven. The next count against the appellant is that without cause or provocation, she applied, in a loud and violent manner, opprobrious epithets to the respondent, in the presence of other persons greatly to his mortification and annoyance. It appears, at the time when this scene occurred, that it was the occasion commonly known as the "Villard Demonstration," in honor of the completion to Portland of the Northern Pacific Railroad, and suffice it to say that it was an important event which the citizens sought to make memorable by various public demonstrations during the day, and illuminations during the evening. Necessarily on such an occasion, the spectacular displays were numerous and attractive, the streets thronged with sight-seekers, on foot and in carriages, to witness the various displays designed for amusement and entertainment, and altogether the celebration was not only conspicuous for general rejoicing and congratulations but, it furnished an opportunity for many pleasant social interchanges among friends and acquaintances. Without detail, on the last evening of the celebration the respondent took his wife down town in her buggy, drove around the streets a short time, and then took her home, and as he was driving back, at the instance of a friend, took his wife in the buggy and again drove around for a while, and then back to the livery stable, where, as he says, his wife met him, all ablaze with indignation, and applied to him violent and abusive names. The appellant's version of this affair is that she was anxious to see the sights and enjoy the celebration, and that her husband only drove around, while she was with him, about a half of an hour, early in the evening, between 8 and 9 o'clock, and then took her home, and, contrary to her wishes, and despite her protests, required her to return to her rooms, promising to return himself immediately. Instead of doing this he was spending the remainder of the evening in the way described by himself, and when he returned to the livery stable she confesses to have been indignant, and to have reproached him for his conduct. He claims that his object in driving back after he left her was to attend to a business engagement, and that the incident of taking another lady riding was merely accidental. Be that so, still his conduct was not free from fault, and did much to provoke the outburst from his wife. It was an occasion when it was natural that she should wish to enjoy the scenes and sights as others were doing; and why should she be deprived of this pleasure? She remonstrated, but of no avail, and when she found that another lady had supplied her place, concede there was nothing improper, it was in the nature of the circumstances that she should be resentful and indignant. Better, no doubt, it would have been to have restrained her temper and her tongue; but better, too, it would have been if he had on such an occasion granted his wife's reasonable request, especially when no circumstance is disclosed by the evidence to justify its refusal. A review of all the circumstances in connection with this unhappy affair, which seems to be the point in their lives when their paths began to diverge, and the charges alleged in respect to the same lady in the succeeding paragraph of the complaint, exhibit only contradictory and conflicting statements in many particulars, mutual faults and recrimination, and in both an absence of a spirit of forbearance and conciliation. There is, however, one of the specifications in which it is alleged that the appellant accused the respondent of adultery with one Mrs. C., which is admitted. As to this woman, the testimony of both agree that...