Wheeler v. Yellow Cab Co. of Orlando

• Decision Date: 21 July 1953
• Citation: Wheeler v. Yellow Cab Co. of Orlando, 66 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1953)
• Parties: WHEELER v. YELLOW CAB CO. OF ORLANDO.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 501

66 So.2d 501

WHEELER v.YELLOW CAB CO. OF ORLANDO.

Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division A.

July 21, 1953.

Sam E. Murrell, Sam E. Murrell, Jr., and Robert G. Murrell, Orlando, for appellant.

Sanders, McEwan & Berson, Orlando, for appellee.

HOLT, Associate Justice.

Appellant(plaintiff below) brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by her as a fare-paying passenger in one of the defendant's taxicabs.She was accompanied by other ladies, three of whom were sitting in the rear seat and one in the front seat.Appellant was a passenger in the rear seat.The accident occurred between 11:30 and 12:00 midnight, at the intersection of Garland and Livingston Streets in Orlando, Florida.The weather was clear.The other car involved in the accident was driven by one Albert Campbell, who was driving north on Garland Street(the taxi was going south on the same street) and that Campbell was making a left turn at Livingston Street and driving about 5 or 10 miles an hour.He gave a left-hand signal and started turning, struck his left arm straight out of the can window and testified that he saw the taxicab before it struck him when it was about 50 or 60 feet before the intersection.The taxicab struck the right front fender of his automobile, and the traffic light at the intersection was green both to him and to the taxi driver.Another witness testified that both Campbell and the taxi driver 'must have been both making the yellow light.'Other witnesses more or less testified as to the same thing except the plaintiff and those ladies who were with her who testified in her behalf, some of whom were claimants in their own right against the defendant for injuries sustained in the same accident.

Appellant's chief complaints against the taxi driver was that he was not paying attention; he was talking to the ladies about himself and the feud that he, the taxi driver, was having with his wife; he did not slow down, neither did he put on his brakes; that he was driving too fast; he had his head turned to the rear of the taxi and was not looking where he was going; he ran through an amber colored traffic light.

Plaintiff claimed damages for personal injuries suffered in the collision in the sum of $15,000.Defendant answered, the case was tried, submitted to a jury which rendered a verdict for the defendant.Judgment was rendered on the verdict for the defendant from which this appeal was taken.

Appellant asks reversal of the cause and a new trial (motion for which was denied by the lower court), for that (1) the jury did not bring in a proper verdict upon the evidence adduced, and (2)the court erred in granting certain charges and refusing certain instructions to the jury requested by appellant.

Disposing of the second question first, we have carefully examined the instructions in light of the law applicable thereto and find there is no merit in such contention.The charges and instructions given were proper and in accordance with law and we find there is no error in the same.Refusal of the trial judge to give those requested by appellant was not error.

The first question that the jury disregarded the manifest weight of the evidence which preponderated in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant must be answered adversely to appellant.It has long been the law of this state and so announced by this Court, on many occasions, that the verdict of a jury will not be disturbed unless it affirmatively appears that the action of the jury was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence or was motivated by prejudice, passion, mistake or any other improper cause.SeeMartin v. Stone, Fla., 51 So.2d 33, 35, in which we said: 'It is settled law that if there appears in the record substantial competent evidence in support of the verdict rendered, the same should stand and the trial court is without authority at law to substitute his conclusions based on the evidence for the views and conclusions of the jury impanelled and sworn to try the controverted issues of fact.It is true that a trial court may set a verdict aside and grant a new trial when it is shown that the jury was deceived as to the force and credibility of the evidence, or when the jury was influenced by considerations outside the record, but when no issue is involved but the sufficiency and the probative force of the evidence, the verdict should not be interfered with.It is error to grant a new trial when the verdict set aside is supported by the testimony appearing in the record and nothing can be accomplished except to have another jury review the cause.SeeSeaver v. Stratton, 133 Fla.183 So. 335.The record reflects sufficient competent evidence to support the verdict and there is no showing that it is clearly contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.It is true that disputes and conflicts appear in the evidence, but it has not been established that the jury was motivated by prejudice, passion, mistake or any other improper cause.'Also, Babcock v. Flowers, 144 Fla. 479, 198 So. 326;Golden v. Morris, Fla., 55 So.2d 714;Nelson v. McMillan, 151 Fla. 847, 10 So.2d 565.Also Geffrey v. Langston Construction Co., Fla., 58 So.2d 698, 699, in which we said: 'This Court is committed to the rule announced in Seaver v. Stratton, 133 Fla. 183, 183 So. 335;Edwards v. Miami Shores Village, Fla., 40 So.2d 360, and similar cases to the effect that the granting of a motion for new trial is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and will not be...