Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Donovan Wire & Iron Co.

• Decision Date: 09 July 1976
• Docket Number: Civ. No. C76-231.
• Citation: 416 F. Supp. 602
• Parties: WHEELING-PITTSBURGH STEEL CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. DONOVAN WIRE AND IRON COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

416 F. Supp. 602

WHEELING-PITTSBURGH STEEL CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. DONOVAN WIRE AND IRON COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. No. C76-231.

United States District Court, N. D. Ohio W. D.

July 9, 1976.

David W. Stucky, Toledo, Ohio, for plaintiff.

Theodore M. Rowen, Toledo, Ohio, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DON J. YOUNG, District Judge.

This cause came to be heard upon the motion of the defendant for a preliminary injunction. On July 1, 1976, the Court granted to defendant a temporary restraining order enjoining the plaintiff from prosecuting its claims against the defendant in any court other than this one. The plaintiff concedes that it has filed identical actions against the defendant in federal district courts in Pennsylvania and West Virginia as well as in this Court. Thus, the only issue before the Court on this motion is whether the plaintiff should be allowed to proceed with its Pennsylvania and West Virginia cases.

In cases where federal courts have enjoined a party from prosecuting a second action, the matter has been viewed as resting within the equitable discretion of the Court. Ashland Oil & Refining Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 421 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1970). At the hearing on the temporary restraining order, the Court held that for the purposes of these injunctive motions, the three cases involved would be treated as having been simultaneously filed even though the Pennsylvania case was actually filed one day earlier than the other two. Thus, the general rule that the court first acquiring jurisdiction of a controversy should enjoin subsequent proceedings therein in other jurisdictions does not apply. In any event, an injunction in favor of the first filed action is not a mandatory step in all instances because countervailing equitable considerations, where present, cannot be ignored. Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security National Bank, 525 F.2d 620 (D.C.Cir. 1975). In a different context, the Supreme Court in Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Co., 342 U.S. 180, at page 183, 72 S.Ct. 219, at page 221, 96 L.Ed. 200 (1952) stated:

Wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation, does not counsel rigid mechanical solution of such problems. The factors relevant to wise administration here are equitable in nature.

The same is true in the case at bar. The problem of whether to enjoin the plaintiff from pursuing another action involving the same issues and the same defendants cannot be solved by a blind application of a mechanical rule of thumb. Rather, the solution requires the balancing of equitable considerations genuinely relevant to the ends of justice. Small v. Wageman, 291 F.2d 734 (1st Cir. 1961).

Thus, the problem in this motion is reduced to determining on which side the equities most heavily weigh. In one sense, the situation is very similar to a forum non conveniens problem since the convenience of the parties is certainly one of the equities to be considered. In another...