Whetstone v. Mayor
| Decision Date | 13 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Case No. ELH-18-738 |
| Parties | D'WAN WHETSTONE Plaintiff v. MAYOR & CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE CITY, et al. Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
In this civil rights suit, plaintiff D'Wan Whetstone has sued the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (the "City"); Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, a former Mayor of the City; Catherine Pugh, the current Mayor of the City; the Baltimore City Police Department ("BPD"); Anthony Batts, former BPD Commissioner; Darryl De Sousa, former BPD Commissioner1; and BPD Police Officers Thadius McMillian and Alan Chanoine, Detective Steven Fraser, and Lieutenant Thomas Mistysyn (collectively, the "Police Officers"). ECF 1. The individual defendants have been sued in both their individual and official capacities.
The suit is rooted in events that occurred on March 12, 2015, when Whetstone was in the driver's seat of a motor vehicle that was double parked on a City street. ECF 1, ¶ 19. Whetstone alleges that Chanoine unlawfully stopped her vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. Further, she alleges that after McMillian, Fraser, and Mistysyn arrived at the scene, the Police Officers used excessive force to remove her from her vehicle. Id. ¶ 23.
The Complaint contains five counts. Count One contains two "Monell" claims against the City and the BPD, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In particular, in Claim I Whetstone alleges unconstitutional policies, customs, and/or patterns and practices of the City and the BPD. In Claim II, plaintiff alleges that the City and the BPD engaged in unconstitutional discipline, training, and supervision of members of the BPD. See ECF 1, ¶¶ 25-43. Count Two presents a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for supervisory liability against Rawlings-Blake, Pugh, Batts, and De Sousa. Id. ¶¶ 44-50. Count Three asserts a § 1983 claim against the Police Officers, claiming the use of excessive force, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. ¶¶ 51-56. In Count Four, Whetstone asserts § 1983 claims against the Police Officers for malicious prosecution and conspiracy to maliciously prosecute, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 57-64. Count Five contains a § 1983 claim against the Police Officers for "false arrest/imprisonment." Id. ¶¶ 65-72. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 19.
Four motions to dismiss are now pending. First, the City, Pugh, and Rawlings-Blake have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (ECF 5), supported by a memorandum of law. ECF 5-1 (collectively, the "City's Motion"). The BPD, De Sousa, and Batts have also moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) (ECF 8), supported by a memorandum. ECF 8-1 (collectively, the "BPD's Motion"). And, the Police Officers submitted two nearly identical motions to dismiss, under Rule 12(b)(5) and Rule 12(b)(6). They argue insufficient service of process and failure to state a claim. The first motion was submitted by Mistysyn alone. ECF 15. The second motion was submitted jointly by all four Police Officers. ECF 22. Each motion is supported by a memorandum of law (ECF 15-1; ECF 22-1) (collectively,the "Police Officers' Motions") and an exhibit containing Chanoine's Statement of Probable Cause. ECF 15-2; ECF 22-2. Plaintiff opposes the motions (ECF 6; ECF 9; ECF 23), and the defendants have replied. ECF 7; ECF 10; ECF 24. Because the Police Officers' Motions are nearly identical, the opposition (ECF 23) and the reply (ECF 24) address both motions.
No hearing is necessary to resolve the motions. See Local Rule 105(6). For the reasons that follow, I shall grant the City's Motion and the BPD's Motion. And, I shall grant in part and deny in part the Police Officers' Motions. Specifically, I shall dismiss Counts Four and Five as well as all official capacity claims against the Police Officers. But, I shall deny the Police Officers' Motions as to Count Three.
On March 12, 2015, Police Officer Chanoine was on patrol in the area of the 1100 block of Darley Avenue in Baltimore City when he saw a double-parked automobile. ECF 1, ¶ 19. Plaintiff recounts that, according to Chanoine, she was sitting in the driver's seat of the vehicle, talking to an unidentified pedestrian. Id. ¶ 20. While Whetstone was talking, "'other vehicles waited behind" her vehicle and "'had to drive around [Ms. Whetstone] nearly hitting the sidewalk.'" Id. (alteration in Complaint).2
Accordingly, Chanoine conducted a traffic stop. Id. ¶ 20. The Officer told plaintiff "'that she had been pulled over for obstruct[ing] the flow of traffic.'" Id. ¶ 21. Whetstone gave Chanoine her motor vehicle registration, which displayed her name. Id. ¶ 22. Chanoine ran the automobile's tags and "'the owner of the motor vehicle came back suspended.'" Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff alleges thateven though Chanoine received the vehicle registration with her name, he claims that she provided a fictitious name. Id. ¶ 22.
Chanoine "placed his hand" on plaintiff and told her that she was under arrest. Id. ¶ 23. The Complaint does not state whether Chanoine informed plaintiff of the crime for which she was arrested. ECF 1. Plaintiff "demanded that a supervisor be called to the scene." Id. Mistysyn, McMillian, and Fraser arrived at the scene shortly thereafter. Id. ¶ 23.
According to the Statement of Probable Cause (ECF 22-2), signed by Chanoine, Mistysyn and Chanoine repeatedly asked plaintiff to exit the vehicle, but she refused. ECF 1 at 4-5. But, plaintiff alleges that she did not "physically resist" this removal. Id. ¶ 23 (emphasis added). Plaintiff claims that the police officers forcibly removed her from her vehicle, "with such extreme force that her limbs were severely bruised and her face was caused to slam into the roadway." Id.
Thereafter, Whestone was "taken to Johns Hopkins for treatment of her severe injuries." Id. ¶ 24. She was issued the following traffic citations: "(1) Failure to Display License on Demand; (2) Driving Vehicle while License Suspended; (3) Vehicle Driver giving False and Fictious Name to Uniformed Police; (4) Causing Standing Vehicle to Obstruct Free Vehicle Passage of Roadway; and (5) Driving on Suspended License." Id. Whetstone was also charged with "(1) Disorderly Conduct; (2) Resisting and/or Interfering with Arrest; and (3) Failure to [Obey] a Reasonable Lawful Order." Id. Subsequently, "[a]ll charges received a nolle prosequi." Id.
Plaintiff filed suit on March 12, 2018. ECF 1. McMillian was served on August 12, 2018. ECF 17. According to the returns of service (ECF 18), Mistysyn was served on September 9, 2018, but he asserts that he was served on September 19, 2019. ECF 22-1 at 7 n.3. Chanoine was served on September 28, 2018. ECF 16. On October 18, 2018, counsel for Fraser accepted serviceon Fraser's behalf by agreement and without prejudice to the defendant's right to challenge the sufficiency of the service. ECF 22-1 at 2, n.1.
A defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with "fair notice" of the claims and the "grounds" for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
To survive a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (citation omitted) ("Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions' . . . ."); see also Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Weil, 2019 WL 1105179, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 11, 2019); Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). To be sure, a plaintiff need not include "detailed factual allegations" in order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, federal pleading rules "do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legaltheory supporting the claim asserted." Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 346, 346 (2014) (per curiam). But, mere "'naked assertions' of wrongdoing" are generally insufficient to state a claim for relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
In other words, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). If a complaint provides no more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," it is insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "[A]n unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation" does not state a plausible claim of relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rather, to satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest" a cognizable cause of action, "even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely." Tw...
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