Whewell v. Ives
| Decision Date | 29 November 1967 |
| Citation | 155 Conn. 602,236 A.2d 92 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Joseph B. WHEWELL et al. v. Howard S. IVES, Highway Commissioner. |
Francis J. Pavetti, New London, with whom were Louis C. Wool, New London, and, on the brief, Ralph P. Pupont, New London, for appellants (plaintiffs).
S. Victor Feingold, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Harold M. Mulvey, Atty. Gen., and Jack Rubin and Milton H. Richman, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee (defendant).
Before ALCORN, HOUSE, COTTER, RYAN and COVELLO, JJ.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court from the assessment of damages by the defendant in the sum of $15,200 for the taking of their property described to be necessary for the construction of the highway known as interstate route 95, Groton-Stonington Road. General Statutes § 13a-76. The matter was referred to a state referee for reassessment of damages. The referee heard witnesses, viewed the property and filed a report in which he found the total damages to be $55,400. The referee denied a motion of the plaintiffs for leave to introduce additional testimony and also denied their motion to correct the report. The court overruled the plaintiffs' exceptions to the report, accepted it, and found the sum of $55,400 to be the fair amount of damages.
The referee found the following facts: The property taken by the defendant is a segment of a right of way or pentway, socalled. This was the sole means of access to 169.25 acres of rear land owned by the plaintiffs in North Stonington and on which were situated their residence and the outbuildings used in a dairy farm business conducted by them. The house, built in 1850, had only a lavatory and no bath and was outmoded in other respects, such as having the milk room attached to it. The pentway ran a distance of several hundred feet from the public highway to the plaintiffs' land. The taking left the plaintiffs' 169.25 acres landlocked. The referee found that the land had a value at the time of the taking of $250 per acre and a value after the taking of $25 per acre, and he therefore allowed $225 an acre as damages. The valuation of the buildings as found by the referee is not in issue.
On this appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the damages which were awarded in the judgment are inadequate in that the referee was in error in not allowing a greater valuation for a portion of the land on which it is claimed there were deposits of sand and gravel that the referee was in error in characterizing the sale of a contiguous parcel of land as a comparable sale without evidence of similarity and likeness to the land in question, and that the referee failed to consider, as evidence, awards made in three other condemnation cases which the plaintiffs claim involved comparable properties.
The first two claims of the plaintiffs have to do with the valuation of the portion of the property on which it is claimed there existed deposits of sand and gravel. Specifically, the plaintiffs' position is that fifty acres of the total acreage should have been found by the referee to have had a value at the time of the taking of $750 an acre, as appraised by one of their witnesses. They base this claim on the assumption that that portion, as testified to by their witness, was worth that amount per acre, which would make a total valuation of $37,500 on that portion alone and thereby add $25,000 to the total amount awarded by the referee. In support of this assertion, they claim that the referee recognized this valuation, and so found, but diminished or reduced the value because of limited access to the plaintiffs' land. They further claim that the referee could not reduce the value, having so found, because there was no 'direct evidence' to support his finding of a limitation of access, and that there was direct evidence to the contrary. 1
Four expert appraisers testified, and their appraisal reports were admitted as full exhibits, giving valuations as of the time of the taking of $25,000, $26,000, $102,400 and $110,000 respectively. Three of them testified that the highest and best use of the property was that of a dairy farm. One of the three, upon being questioned by the referee, stated that 'if it was accessible' he would say its use as a 'sand and gravel pit would be the highest and best use.' The fourth appraiser testified that the highest and best use of the land was that of a potential residential use, ten or twelve years in the future. Since the property did not front on a highway, access to the property was an important consideration especially where it was stated by one appraiser for the plaintiffs that its highest value depended on the development of the interior land for residential purposes or that a portion of it could be used on a commercial basis for mining sand and gravel. The right of way or pentway was about sixteen feet in width and had been used by the plaintiffs in the conduct of their dairy farm business. There was testimony that a buyer 'would have a tough time getting a road in there' and that the property was rather far from the road, which would make it costly to put in a fifty-foot road to the property. Although there was evidence that there was gravel in the southeast corner of the land at the brook area, no gravel had been sold at any time.
The referee was not compelled, as the plaintiffs claimed, to accept the appraisal of one of the plaintiffs' experts that a fifty-acre portion, which he described as 'cleared land (including gravel area),' had to be valued at $750 an acre because of the sand and gravel deposits. The opinions offered varied considerably as to the character of the land. The total area was described in various ways and...
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Robert Lawrence Associates, Inc. v. Del Vecchio
...given to it and may accept or reject the testimony of a witness offered by one party or the other in whole or in part. Whewell v. Ives, 155 Conn. 602, 607, 236 A.2d 92. It is also significant that the defendants at one point in their assignment of error state: "Uncontroverted evidence at tr......
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State v. Cofone
...The short answer is that the credibility of expert witnesses is a matter to be determined by the trier of fact. Whewall v. Ives, 155 Conn. 602, 607, 236 A.2d 92. The state introduced the testimony of three fellow workers of the defendant and the expert testimony of the superintendents of tw......
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Juvenile Appeal (Docket No. 9268), In re, Docket No. 9268
...is a matter to be determined by the trier of fact." State v. Cofone, 164 Conn. 162, 165, 319 A.2d 381 (1972), citing Whewell v. Ives, 155 Conn. 602, 607, 236 A.2d 92 (1967). In its consideration of the testimony of an expert witness, the trial court might weigh, as it sees fit, the expert's......
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Toffolon v. Town of Avon
...by the parties. Gentile v. Ives, 159 Conn. 443, 270 A.2d 680, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1008, 91 S.Ct. 566, 27 L.Ed.2d 621; Whewell v. Ives, 155 Conn. 602, 236 A.2d 92. Further, "(n)othing in our law is more elementary than that the trier is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and ......