Whinery v. Roberson
| Decision Date | 17 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A05-0311-CV-599.,49A05-0311-CV-599. |
| Parties | Blythe A. WHINERY, Edward M. Guljas, Glenn Lange and Stuart Shipman, Individually and as Representatives Of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. Sue ROBERSON, et al, Appellee-Defendant. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Robert M. Kelso, Eric D. Johnson, Kightlinger & Gray, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, David L. Steiner, Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Blythe Whinery, on behalf of herself and a class of similarly situated plaintiffs, ("the Employees") filed a complaint against Sue Roberson (hereinafter "the State"), in her official capacity as Director of the State Personnel Department ("the SPD"), in Marion Superior Court. The trial court entered judgment against the Employees' complaint by way of summary judgment, and the Employees appeal, presenting the following restated issues for review:
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
P.L. 70-1996 states:
Pursuant to P.L. 70-1996, the SPD forwarded a survey request to the Central States Compensation Association ("CSCA") on June 6, 1996.1 The SPD's requested survey designated salaries for selected Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") job classifications. On July 1, 1996, the requested CSCA survey was published, with six of the nine states listed in P.L. 70-1996 participating. To complete its research, the SPD faxed a similar survey to Ohio, Kentucky, and Michigan, which are not members of the CSCA.
In March of 1997, the SPD published its compiled research results in a document entitled "Professional Classification Salary Survey and Analysis for the Indiana [DNR]" ("the 1997 Survey"). The 1997 Survey concluded Indiana salaries were artificially lower than the nine comparative states listed in P.L. 70-1996, but also concluded that wages within ninety percent of the market average were competitive, and recommended no action be taken. Appellants' App. pp. 260-62.
After the publication of the 1997 Survey, the legislative sponsor of P.L. 70-1996 and other members of the General Assembly made it known that they were not pleased with the 1997 Survey's recommendations. Consequently, the SPD departed from the 1997 Survey's recommendation that no action be taken.
The SPD ran the average salary of DNR employees in the nine states listed in P.L. 70-1996 ("the nine-state average") and Indiana DNR salary data through a series of calculations to create a figure (referred to as the "target factor") for each job classification that, when multiplied by the employee in question's salary, would raise the employee's salary to ninety percent of the nine-state average.2 Before applying the target factor to Indiana DNR salaries, the SPD "trended" the nine-state average to account for wage inflation occurring between its survey and P.L. 70-1996's final implementation. The Department of Labor determined the average salary increase between 1997 and 1998 was two point seven percent. Accordingly, the SPD trended the nine-state average by 1.027.3 After trending the nine-state average, the SPD multiplied it by 0.90 to effectuate its ninety-percent of the market average policy. The resulting figure is referred to as the "ninety-percent survey results."
The SPD then compared the ninety-percent survey results to the salaries of Indiana DNR employees. The SPD first multiplied the salary of each Indiana job classification by 1.04 to account for a four-percent raise given to all state employees in 1997. This figure was then multiplied by 1.09 to account for the SPD's intent to raise the skill-level designation for each Indiana job classification and provide for a corresponding nine-percent salary increase. The 1997 Indiana salaries multiplied by 1.04 and 1.09 is referred to as the "1997 Indiana average." After compiling the ninety-percent survey results and the 1997 Indiana average, the SPD determined the percentage difference between each figure to arrive at the target factor.4
The SPD determined P.L. 70-1996's reference to "professional employees" only required salary increases for DNR employees with positions unique to the DNR and employees classified as professional, administrative, and technological ("PAT"), and supervisory and managerial ("SAM/PAT") and executive, scientific, and medical ("ESM") job classifications were not given salary increases. Though it is undisputed that the positions of director of state parks, director of land acquisition, entomologists, pedologists, and museum specialists are considered professional, the SPD concluded these positions are not unique to the DNR and excluded them from P.L. 70-1996's salary increases.5 P.L. 70-1996's salary increases were also limited to those employed by the DNR on or before June 17, 1998.
On June 17, 1998, the SPD completed its implementation of P.L. 70-1996 by multiplying the designated DNR employees' initial salary by the target factor and adding the 1997 Indiana average percentage increases.6
On June 26, 1998, the Employees filed a complaint against the State, alleging the SPD failed to comply with P.L. 70-1996. The Employees were certified as a class on November 8, 1999. On April 30, 2003, the State filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Employees moved to convert the State's motion to a motion for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the States' motion on June 2, 2003. On November 5, 2003, the trial court granted the State's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissed the Employees' complaint, and issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Employees now appeal.
Summary judgment should be granted only if the evidence authorized by Trial Rule 56(C) shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C) (2004). When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, this court views the facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Kennedy v. Guess Inc., 806 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ind.2004).
Though the trial court's decision is "clothed with a presumption of validity," a reviewing court faces the same issues that were before the trial court and analyzes them the same way. Id. (quoting Wright v. Carter, 622 N.E.2d 170, 171 (Ind.1993)). While the non-movant bears the burden of demonstrating the grant of summary judgment was erroneous, we carefully assess the trial court's decision to ensure the non-movant is not wrongly denied his or her day in court. Id.
Initially, the Employees contend pages 22-23, 26-28, 62-64, and 89-92 of the Deposition of Eric Scroggins ("Scroggins") and pages 6-7, 9-12, 28-29, and 36-40 of the Deposition of Jeff Hendrickson were not cited to the trial court by the State and this failure precludes this evidence's consideration on appeal. Reply Br. of Appellant at 7.
When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, this court may consider only those portions of the pleadings, depositions, or any other matter "specifically" designated to the trial court. Thomas v. N. Cent. Roofing, 795 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (Ind.Ct.App.2003).
Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) does not mandate the manner in which a party is to specifically designate material. Provided that the trial court is apprised of the specific material upon which the parties rely in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the material may be considered.... To comply with the designation requirement, a party may designate an affidavit either by providing specific page numbers and paragraph citations, or by specifically referring to the substantive assertions relied upon. However, the designation of pleadings, discovery material and affidavits in their entirety fails to meet the specificity requirement of T.R. 56.
Van Eaton v. Fink, 697 N.E.2d 490, 494-95 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (internal citations omitted). The purpose of the specific designation requirement is to decrease the evidentiary material trial courts are required to sift through when ruling on motions for summary judgment. Abbott v. Bates, 670 N.E.2d 916, 922 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. Because the State was required to designate the above-cited deposition testimony to the trial court in order to rely upon it on appeal and failed to do so, this court may not consider the corresponding information cited in the...
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