Whipple v. CIR
Decision Date | 11 May 1962 |
Docket Number | No. 18963.,18963. |
Citation | 301 F.2d 108 |
Parties | A. J. WHIPPLE and Mildred Whipple, Petitioners, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Charles Dillingham, Ben H. Schleider, Jr., Houston, Tex., for petitioners.
William A. Friedlander, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Louis F. Oberdorfer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lee A. Jackson, Atty., Dept. of Justice, R. P. Hertzog, Acting Chief Counsel, John M. Morawski, Sp. Atty., I. R. S., Robert M. Anderson, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for respondent.
Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, and HUTCHESON and RIVES, Circuit Judges.
The taxpayer-petitioners here complain of the decision of the Tax Court which held that the taxpayers' advances to the corporation, in which the husband held a majority interest, represented, within the meaning of Section 23(k) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 23(k) a non-business rather than a business bad debt, when these advances became worthless upon the insolvency of the corporation. So far as is significant here a non-business bad debt is defined in the statute as one "other than a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business." The debt which the petitioner claims he should be allowed to deduct as a business bad debt represents the balance of unpaid advances which Whipple had made to Mission Orange Bottling Company, a soft drink bottling company, in which he owned approximately 80% of the stock and of which, at the time of the debt becoming worthless, he had assumed the active management because of its unsuccessful operation thus far. The final advance of $48,000 was made by taxpayer to Mission Orange coincidentally with its transfer to him of its entire physical assets on December 15, 1953. This left his unrecovered claim against Mission Orange at $56,975.10. It is conceded that this amount became worthless during the month of December, 1953.
The Tax Court, based on ample evidence, found that during the period of four years commencing in 1949, petitioner was instrumental in incorporating fifteen corporations; fourteen of these were engaged in construction, building or real estate business; petitioner owned an interest in five additional construction or real estate corporations, and at one time or another was a member of ten partnerships involved in similar activities; during this period of time the petitioner spent the major part of his time and energies in the construction or real estate business, or the related building supply business; on April 25, 1951, petitioner obtained a franchise from the Mission Dry Corporation entitling him to produce, bottle, distribute and sell Mission Beverages in certain counties in Texas; during the same month he purchased the bottling machinery and equipment then owned by one D. C. Casey, who was operating the Mission Orange Company in Lubbock, Texas; he conducted this business as a sole proprietorship until approximately July 1, 1951, at which time he organized debtor corporation, Mission Orange Bottling Company, and transferred the bottling machinery and equipment to it; the bottling business was apparently not successful, for during the years 1952 and 1953, he made advances to it so that including the amount which the corporation owed him as the result of his sale of the bottling assets, it was indebted to him in the sum of $79,489.06, on December 1, 1953. On December 15th petitioner advanced Mission Orange $48,000 to pay general creditors, and on the same date he received a transfer from Mission Orange of bottling machinery, equipment and an automobile, which had the value of $70,414.66. This left a net amount due by Mission Orange to him of $56,975.10, which the Tax Court found became worthless during the month of December, 1953.
The Tax Court, in its opinion, stated:
"If we were required to find a definite time of worthlessness we should be inclined to say December 15, 1953, at which time petitioner received the bottling machinery from Mission Orange in partial satisfaction of that corporation\'s obligation."
Thus it appears that at the time when the sum of $48,000 of the indebtedness in issue was advanced to Mission Orange petitioner had no hope of its being recovered.
Petitioner recognizes the usual rule that where the controlling stockholder of a corporation is unable to obtain repayment of moneys he advances to his corporation to bolster up its operating possibilities this is generally considered a non-business bad debt. This follows because in such a case the loan or advance made by the taxpayer to the corporation is no part of any business which he is engaged in individually. It is an advance or loan made by him to enable his wholly owned corporation to make a profit. The petitioner here, however, contends that his extensive activity in the formation of the numerous corporations and the extensive activity he himself performed in attempting to save the Mission Orange Company in its operation, made these particular advances loans in some separate trade or business carried on by the taxpayer.
The Tax Court made the following findings of fact:
In its opinion the Tax Court also determined that taxpayer was not personally in the business of bottling and selling soft drinks at the time he made the advances that resulted in the debt here in issue.
In the case of Giblin v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 227 F.2d 692, this Court said:
The Giblin case is one in which this Court found that under the peculiar circumstances which were there present a taxpayer could treat a loss, resulting from the failure of his wholly or partially owned corporations to repay advances, as a business bad debt. In articulating the circumstances which justified a finding of the existence of a business bad debt, we said:
We further stated:
"Petitioner\'s right to deduct the amount of the cancelled debt depends not upon his showing, as the Tax Court seemed to think, that he was in the business of lending money, but rather that he was regularly engaged in the business of `dealing in enterprises,\' during the course of which he operated either as a proprietor, as a stockholder, as a partner or as a lender or in a combination of these capacities, contributing to each enterprise his own initiative and energy, and such financial backing as it required."
We think that the Tax Court was amply warranted in finding that there was no evidence in this record, other than the simple fact that taxpayer had used his talents as a building contractor to organize a large number of companies to conduct such building operations, that he was interested in any way in doing any more than enabling these separate corporations to achieve a successful and lucrative operation as corporations. Taxpayer's claim, it seems clear to us, falls within the class of those in which the taxpayer fails to recognize the distinction between carrying on one's business through a corporate form, which of course, requires some organizing and financing, and the business of dealing in corporations, which may likewise require some financing arrangements. As stated by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Holtz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 256 F.2d 865, at page 870:
This opinion then cited the case of Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410, where at page 415, 53 S.Ct. 207, at page 208, 77 L.Ed. 397, the Supreme Court said:
The case of Ferguson v. Commissioner, 4 Cir., 253 F.2d 403, is equally persuasive of the correctness of the Tax Court's decision here. In that case it was said, "It is now well settled that debts such as these are not deductible as business bad debts unless the taxpayer is so extensively engaged in the business of promoting or financing business ventures as to elevate that activity to the status of a separate business." 253 F.2d 403, 406.
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Whipple v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
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