Whipple v. Hartzell

• Decision Date: 05 December 1898
• Citation: 25 Colo. 481,55 P. 186
• Parties: WHIPPLE, Secretary of State, v. HARTZELL.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

55 P. 186

25 Colo. 481

WHIPPLE, Secretary of State, v. HARTZELL.

Supreme Court of Colorado

December 5, 1898

Review from district court, Arapahoe county.

Action by Charles Hartzell against C. H. S. Whipple, secretary of state, to review his ruling in sustaining a protest against the filing of plaintiff's certificate of nomination. The ruling was reversed, and defendant petitions for a review. Reversed.

This case was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts, from which it appears that one Charles H. Brierly was in 1896 elected by the regular convention of the Silver Republican party chairman of the district central committee of the First congressional district of Colorado, and as such chairman, by authority of the district central committee, issued and published a call for a convention of the Silver Republican party of that district to meet at Coliseum Hall, in Denver at 10 a. m. September 13, 1898, to nominate a candidate for congress. In pursuance of this call, delegates from 10 out of the 13 counties which compose the district assembled at the time and place specified, organized a convention, nominated Hon. John F. Shafroth for representative to the Fifty-Sixth congress from the First congressional district of Colorado and adopted the name and emblem of the Silver Republican party, and on the same day filed in the office of the secretary of state a certificate of such nomination. To this certificate no protest was filed within the time prescribed by statute. Among the delegates constituting this convention were 105 from Araphahoe county, who were selected by the Silver Republican county convention presided over by Boothe M. Malone, and known as the 'Eddy Convention,' and 4 of the delegates elected from Jefferson county. About 10 o'clock in the forenoon of the same day, 16 delegates from Weld county, 10 from Jefferson county, and 105 from Arapahoe county, elected by the county convention presided over by John R. Smith, and known as the 'Fleming Convention,' met at Windsor Hall, in the city of Denver organized a convention, and appointed a committee to nominate a candidate for congress from the First congressional district. Afterwards, and on the 8th day of October, 1898, a majority of the committee so appointed nominated Charles Hartzell as such candidate, and adopted the name and emblem of the Silver Republican party, and filed a certificate of such nomination in the office of the secretary of state. A protest was filed against this certificate, which was sustained by the secretary of state. Upon application to the district court of Arapahoe county, this ruling was reversed and respondent awarded the right to use the name and emblem. The secretary of state brings the case here to obtain a review of this judgment.

Campbell C.J., dissenting.

Victor A. Elliott, Harry C. Davis, John F. Shafroth, and James H. Blood, for petitioner

Ward & Ward and John R. Smith, for respondent.

GODDARD, J. (after stating the facts).

From the foregoing statement it clearly appears that the convention held at Coliseum Hall was the regular and lawful convention of the Silver Republican party of the First congressional district, and that the assemblage at Windsor Hall was entirely without authority to represent that party. Yet the court below, while recognizing this, held that, because the delegates composing this convention were not in favor of the fusion policy adopted by what is known as the 'Broad Faction' of the Silver Republican party in the state convention (and to which this court, in the recent case of Whipple v. Broad, 25 Colo. 407, 55 P. 172, awarded the emblem now in controversy), its nominee was not entitled to be classed thereunder. Under the doctrine of that case the policy that the convention adopted was not a matter to be considered by the court below in determining the merits of this case. It was there held that the only question for its consideration in an inquiry of this kind is which of the rival conventions was in fact the regular and legally organized convention of the party, and when that fact is determined there is an end of the controversy; in other words, that a convention composed of a majority of the regularly and lawfully elected delegates under the call is a law unto itself, and may adopt whatever policy it deems best, and its action in this regard is purely a political question, and is not a subject of judicial inquiry or control. The contention of the respondent Board in that case is thus stated by the learned chief justice, who delivered the majority opinion: 'That the decision of a convention of the delegates of a political party with respect to party policy is final and...