Whipple v. Johnston

• Decision Date: 28 April 2022
• Docket Number: A21-1478
• Parties: Michael R. Whipple, Appellant, v. Nancy Johnston, Executive Director of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Michael R. Whipple, Appellant, v. Nancy Johnston, Executive Director of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, Respondent.

No. A21-1478

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

April 28, 2022

Carlton County District Court File No. 09-CV-21-1140

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Bratvold Judge; and Klaphake, Judge. ^[*]

ORDER OPINION

Roger Klaphake, Judge

BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:

1. Pro se appellant Michael R. Whipple, who was indeterminately civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) as a sexually dangerous person (SDP) in 2009 after a 30-year history of sexual crimes against women and girls appeals the district court's summary denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

2. A writ of habeas corpus is a statutory civil remedy by which a petitioner may obtain relief from unlawful imprisonment or restraint. Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2020). A petitioner bears the burden of showing the illegality of his detention. Case v. Pung, 413 N.W.2d 261, 262 (Minn.App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 24, 1987). The petitioner must allege facts that support a prima facie case for discharge from illegal confinement. State ex rel. Fife v. Tahash, 111 N.W.2d 619, 620 (Minn. 1961).

3. A civilly committed person may challenge the legality of his confinement by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, Joelson v. O'Keefe, 594 N.W.2d 905, 908 (Minn.App. 1999), rev. denied (Minn. July 28, 1999), but not if an adequate alternative remedy exists at law, State ex rel. Young v. Schnell, 956 N.W.2d 652, 674 (Minn. 2021). Habeas proceedings may not be used to address issues previously raised, to substitute for appeal, or to collaterally attack a civil commitment. Joelson, 594 N.W.2d at 908. We review questions of law arising from a habeas corpus decision de novo. Id.

4. Whipple challenges the denial of his petition without a hearing and seeks release from his civil commitment. He argues that (1) he is improperly committed as an SDP because he no longer suffers from a mental disorder; (2) the Commitment Appeals Panel (CAP) forfeited jurisdiction over his petition; (3) the timing of the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act's (MCTA's) discharge procedures is unconstitutional; and (4) the MCTA is void for vagueness.

5. As a threshold issue, Whipple argues that the district court erred by denying his habeas petition without a hearing. But a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if the petition shows a factual dispute. Seifert v. Erickson, 420 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Minn.App. 1988), rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 1988). Because Whipple's petition raised only legal issues, the district court did not err by denying his request for an evidentiary hearing.

5. First, Whipple asserts that he should be discharged from civil commitment because he no longer suffers from a serious mental disorder. While it is true that a civilly committed person is entitled to immediate release "upon a showing that [he] is no longer dangerous or mentally impaired," Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368-69 (1997), the MCTA provides the "exclusive remedy" for Whipple to challenge his commitment on that basis, In re Civ. Commitment of Lonergan, 811 N.W.2d 635, 642 (Minn. 2012). See also Minn. Stat. §§ 253D.07, subd. 4 (stating that a committed person may be transferred or discharged "only as provided in this chapter"), .27-.28 (providing a process for a person committed as an SDP to challenge the commitment by petitioning the special review board (SRB) for discharge and then seeking judicial review of the SRB's recommendations) (2020). Because the MCTA provides an adequate, alternative remedy for Whipple to challenge his confinement, his claim based on his current mental status is not properly raised in a habeas proceeding.

8. Second, Whipple argues that CAP forfeited jurisdiction over his petition by failing to provide him a hearing on the merits of his commitment petition within the statutory deadlines. See Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 1(b) (stating that hearing before CAP must be held within 180 days of filing of petition). But the supreme court has long recognized the rule that "provisions defining the time and mode in which public officers shall discharge their duties . . . are generally deemed directory" and carry no jurisdictional significance. Heller v. Wolner, 269 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Minn. 1978). Because the legislature gave no clear indication in section 253D.28, subdivision 1 that it intended to divest CAP of subject-matter jurisdiction if the hearing was not held within the statute's deadline, CAP's failure to hold a timely hearing did not divest it of continued jurisdiction over Whipple's petition.

9. Next, Whipple argues that the SRB and CAP's failure to hold a hearing within the statutory deadlines violates his due-process rights and entitles him to release from confinement. But Whipple cites to no legal authority, and we are aware of none, indicating that CAP's failure to provide Whipple with a timely hearing entitles him to release from MSOP. Whipple may challenge CAP's purported failure to comply with the statutory deadlines in other legal proceedings. See Minn. Stat. § 586.01 (2020) (writ of mandamus). Further, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the MCTA-which contains the statutory discharge process and timing...