Whisenhunt v. Westrock, Tex. L.P.

Decision Date16 September 2022
Docket NumberCivil Action 1:20-CV-296
PartiesDERRAL WAYNE WHISENHUNT, Plaintiff, v. WESTROCK, TEXAS, L.P., D/B/A Westrock, and STEPHEN K. MORGAN, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MARCIA TA. CRONE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the court is Defendant WestRock, Texas, L.P. (Westrock), and Stephen K. Morgan's (Morgan) (collectively Defendants) Motion for Summary Judgment (#29) as to Plaintiff Derral Wayne Whisenhunt's (Whisenhunt) claims. Whisenhunt filed a response in opposition to the motion (#30). Having considered Defendants' motion, the submissions of the parties, the record, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that the motion should be granted.

I. Background

At the time of the event giving rise to these proceedings Whisenhunt worked as a truck driver for Vegas Logging, delivering logs to WestRock's facility, a paper mill in Evadale, Texas (“Evadale paper mill”), as part of his employment. According to his deposition testimony, Whisenhunt had delivered logs to the Evadale paper mill for about nineteen years, entering the mill approximately four days per week, often on multiple occasions. According to the evidence, when delivering logs at the Evadale paper mill, truck drivers are expected to assist with unloading the logs from their trucks. After the truck driver parks his vehicle in the proper location, near the “stacker”-a large vehicle which is used to unload stacks of logs-he exits his vehicle and removes the chains from the load of logs. Then, the truck driver stands in front of his truck where he can maintain eye contact with the stacker operator, and helps guide the stacker into position. On February 13, 2019, Whisenhunt arrived at the Everdale paper mill to deliver a truckload of logs. After driving his truck through the wood yard to the unloading area, parking, and exiting his vehicle, Whisenhunt acted as a “spotter” for Brian Cravy (“Cravy”), the stacker operator. After guiding Cravy into position to pick up the logs with the stacker equipment, Whisenhunt walked backwards and tripped over a stray log that was already in the yard. Cravy had not yet picked up the logs on Whisenhunt's truck when he witnessed Whisenhunt fall. Whisenhunt seeks recovery for alleged physical, mental, and economic damages resulting from the incident.

Whisenhunt filed suit against the Defendants[1] in the 1st Judicial District Court of Jasper County, Texas. WestRock effected a “snap removal” of the case on July 8, 2022.[2]

II. Analysis
A. Summary Judgment Standard

A party may move for summary judgment without regard to whether the movant is a claimant or a defending party. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Palestine, 41 F.4th 696, 703 (5th Cir. 2022); Parrish v. Premier Directional Drilling, L.P., 917 F.3d 369, 380 (5th Cir. 2019); Apache Corp. v. W&T Offshore, Inc., 626 F.3d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 2010). Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Union Pac. R.R. Co., 41 F.4th at 703; United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union v. Anderson, 9 F.4th 328, 331 (5th Cir. 2021); Smith v. Harris County, 956 F.3d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 2020); Parrish, 917 F.3d at 378; Hefren v. McDermott, Inc., 820 F.3d 767, 771 (5th Cir. 2016). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); MDK Sociedad De Responsabilidad Limitada v. Proplant Inc., 25 F.4th 360, 368 (5th Cir. 2022); Goldring v. United States, 15 F.4th 639, 644 (5th Cir. 2021); Playa Vista Conroe v. Ins. Co. of the W., 989 F.3d 411, 417 (5th Cir. 2021); Jones v. United States, 936 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 2019). To warrant judgment in its favor, the movant “must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense.” Lyons v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Dewan v. M-I, L.L.C., 858 F.3d 331, 334 (5th Cir. 2017)); accord Access Mediquip L.L.C. v. UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co., 662 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1194 (2013). At the summary judgment stage, the defendant “bears the burden of proving each element of each affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” Petro Harvester Operating Co., L.L.C. v. Keith, 954 F.3d 686, 697 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23); cf. In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) Prod. Liab. Litig., 994 F.3d 704, 710, (5th Cir. 2021).

“A fact issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Hemphill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 805 F.3d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2007)), cert. denied, 578 U.S. 945 (2016); see MDK Sociedad De Responsabilidad Limitada, 25 F.4th at 368; Lexon Ins. Co., Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 7 F.4th 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2021); Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2020). “Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Tiblier v. Dlabal, 743 F.3d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)); accord Valencia v. Davis, 836 Fed.Appx. 292, 296 (5th Cir. 2020); see Dyer, 964 F.3d at 379; Parrish, 917 F.3d at 378. “An issue is genuine' if it is real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham.” Gerhart v. Barnes, 724 Fed.Appx. 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001)), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 1239 (2019); accord Hudspeth v. City of Shreveport, 270 Fed.Appx. 332, 334 (5th Cir. 2008); see Nall v. BNSF Ry. Co., 917 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2019). Thus, a genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Hefren, 820 F.3d at 771; accord MDK Sociedad De Responsabilidad Limitada, 25 F.4th at 368; Sanchez Oil & Gas Corp. v. Crescent Drilling & Prod., Inc., 7 F.4th 301, 309 (5th Cir. 2021); Dyer, 964 F.3d at 379; Tiblier, 743 F.3d at 1007. The moving party, however, “need not negate the elements of the nonmovants' case.” Pioneer Expl., L.L.C. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 767 F.3d 503, 511 (5th Cir. 2014); see Savoy v. Kroger Co., 848 Fed.Appx. 158, 160 (5th Cir. 2021); Stout v. Vincent, 717 Fed.Appx. 468, 470 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323).

Once a proper motion has been made, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must present affirmative evidence, setting forth specific facts, to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 n.3; see Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529 (2006) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)); MDK Sociedad De Responsabilidad Limitada, 25 F.4th at 368; Clark v. CertainTeed Salaried Pension Plan, 860 Fed.Appx. 337, 340-41 (5th Cir. 2021); Acadian Diagnostic Labs., L.L.C. v. Quality Toxicology, L.L.C., 965 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 2020); Smith, 956 F.3d at 316 (quoting James v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 743 F.3d 65, 68 (5th Cir. 2014)); Hassen v. Ruston La. Hosp. Co., L.L.C., 932 F.3d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 2019). The court “should review the record as a whole.” Black v. Pan Am. Labs., LLC, 646 F.3d 254, 273 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)); see Hacienda Records, L.P. v. Ramos, 718 Fed.Appx. 223, 234 (5th Cir. 2018); City of Alexandria v. Brown, 740 F.3d 339, 350 (5th Cir. 2014). All the evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the court will not weigh the evidence or evaluate its credibility. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150; Seigler v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C., 30 F.4th 472, 476 (5th Cir. 2022); Batyukova v. Doege, 994 F.3d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 2021); Lyons, 964 F.3d at 302; Nall, 917 F.3d at 340. The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, with all justifiable inferences drawn and all reasonable doubts resolved in his favor. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); Seigler, 30 F.4th at 476; Batyukova, 994 F.3d at 724; Lyons, 964 F.3d at 302; Hassen, 932 F.3d at 355.

Furthermore the court's obligation to draw reasonable inferences “does not extend so far as to allow a wholly ‘unreasonable inference' or one which amounts to ‘mere speculation and conjecture.' Mack v. Newton, 737 F.2d 1343, 1351 (5th Cir. 1984) ([A]n inference would be unreasonable if it would allow a jury to rest its verdict on mere speculation and conjecture.” (quoting Bridges v. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 553 F.2d 877, 879 (5th Cir. 1977))); accord McGill v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 830 Fed.Appx. 430, 432 (5th Cir. 2020); Batyukova, 994 F.3d at 724 (‘Conclusory allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation' will not survive summary judgment.” (quoting Orr v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016))); Stearns Airport Equip. Co., Inc. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 528 (5th Cir. 1999) (“If the [nonmoving party's] theory is . . . senseless, no reasonable jury could find in its favor, and summary judgment should be granted.” (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468-69 (1992)); Mills...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT