Whitaker v. Jones

Decision Date08 June 1943
Docket NumberNo. 29936.,29936.
Citation26 S.E.2d 545
PartiesWHITAKER. v. JONES, McDOUGALD, SMITH, PEW CO.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

26 S.E.2d 545

WHITAKER.
v.
JONES, McDOUGALD, SMITH, PEW CO.

No. 29936.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

June 8, 1943.


[26 S.E.2d 545]

Rehearing Denied July 22, 1943.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. There can be no recovery on account of the negligence of the defendant which was not the proximate cause of the injury. If the cause was remote, and furnished only the condition or occasion of the injury, it was not the proximate cause thereof.

2. "The standard by which to test the question of negligence vel non is undoubtedly the common experience of mankind; its existence implying the want of that care and diligence which ordinarily prudent men would use under the circumstances of the particular case" Norris v. Macon Terminal Co, 58 Ga. App. 313, 317, 198 S.E. 272. But this rule in the instant case does not require the defendant to anticipate or foresee and to provide against that which, according to the common experience of mankind, under the circumstances alleged, is unusual and not likely to happen, or, in other words, that which is only remotely and slightly probable.

3. If, in the case here, the injuries complained of did not flow naturally and directly from the wrongful act or omission attributed to the defendant, or could not reasonably have been expected to result therefrom, or would not have resulted therefrom but for the interposition of some independent, unforseen cause, the defendant's such antecedent wrongful act

[26 S.E.2d 546]

or omission would not be the proximate cause of the injury complained of.

4. Under the allegations of the petition the acts of negligence were either a remote cause or no cause, and the court did not err in sustaining the general demurrer.

Error from City Court of Richmond County; Gordon W. Chambers, Judge.

Action by C. L. Whitaker against Jones, McDougald, Smith, Pew Company for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff when struck by an automobile on premises under the control of defendant as general contractor under a contract with the Federal Government for construction of an Army Camp. A general demurrer to the petition was sustained and judgment entered for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.

Affirmed.

The petition averred that the defendant was in control of and operated a project, constructing and erecting for the United States Government what is now known as Camp Gordon, in a certain cantonment area. The project was the changing of several thousand acres of wooded lands, fields, streams, and valleys in Richmond County and adjacent counties into a modern military camp and post. The defendant employed between seven and nine thousand employees at said project, and it was being done for the United States Government under an order for quick construction of said camp, and on account of the size of said work and the demand for quick construction, it was charged that the defendant knew that it would have to employ continuously several thousand workmen who were personally unknown to it, and from various walks of life, and there would be several thousand vehicles and automobiles carrying persons and goods across this area of ground, and that thousands of people would be in and upon this area of construction; that the defendant in the progress of the construction of said project graded and laid out various streets and avenues over an area of approximately 5, 000 acres, which said streets were used by vehicles and by persons entering or leaving said project. The streets ran north and south and the avenues ran east and west and they were at all times under the complete control, supervision, and management of the defendant, as well as were the vehicles and persons who were allowed on said pro ject, as the defendant permitted only those persons and vehicles to whom it had granted permission to enter said cantonment area, and that the defendant allowed no one and no vehicle upon said project area without its express permission, and with the said person and the said vehicle to be under the defendant's supervision and control, and before any vehicle or person could enter said area the driver of such vehicle or such person was approved by the defendant; that the defendant conducted and supervised all travel of automobiles and persons upon said area, and that the defendant further knew, by reason of the fact that said area was ten miles from Augusta, and ten miles from Harlem, Georgia, and five miles from Grovetown, Georgia--which, were the closest residential areas--that its employees and such other persons entering said project would necessarily have to use automobiles in entering said project and in doing business on said cantonment area, and that said employees and such other persons coming to said area would come in the morning and from time to time during the day and would depart in the afternoon, at "knocking off time, " and that thousands of vehicles so...

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