Whitaker v. Miller

• Decision Date: 30 September 1876
• Citation: 83 Ill. 381,1876 WL 10353
• Parties: RACHEL E. WHITAKERv.STEPHEN S. MILLER et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

83 Ill. 381

1876 WL 10353 (Ill.)

RACHEL E. WHITAKER

v.STEPHEN S. MILLER et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1876.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Livingston county; the Hon. NATHANIEL J. PILLSBURY, Judge, presiding.

This was a bill in chancery, by Rachel E. Whitaker against Stephen S. Miller, John F. Battles, Edgar A. Congdon, Myron L. Pearce, George W. Newcomb and Azariah Eddy, to set aside a certain deed of complainant purporting to convey the west one-half of the south-west quarter of section 26, township 26 north, range 8 east of the third principal meridian, in Livingston county, Illinois, as a cloud upon complainant's title.

The facts attending the execution of this deed are stated in the opinion of the court. The bill further shows that the deed from complainant to Battles was dated Oct. 31, 1872, and recorded on Nov. 13, 1872; that Battles, by deed dated Dec. 2, 1872, for the expressed consideration of $3800, conveyed said land to Miller, and that Congdon, Pearce, Newcomb and Eddy have, or claim to have, some title or interest in the land, by conveyances from Miller.

The cause was heard on bill, answers, replication, and testimony of witnesses taken. On the hearing, the court dismissed the bill.

Mr. J. W. CHICKERING, and Messrs. MORRIS, DEWOLF & SINGLETON, for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. C. M. HARDY, and Mr. WILLIAM J. HERRICK, for the defendants in error.

Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court:

The contention in this case has reference, principally, to the lands situated in Livingston county. What contracts complainant and Miller may have had in regard to Iowa lands and Chicago suburban lots, is a matter of no consequence, as the case comes before us, further than they show the manner of dealing between the parties. Under the evidence, it can not be seriously disputed, the deed to Battles for the land in Livingston county was executed in blank, and his name subsequently inserted as grantee, without the knowledge or consent of the grantor. The proof is also clear it was executed under the belief the property described in it was Chicago suburban lots. The original deed is with the record, and from an inspection, it plainly appears the name of the grantee was written in it at a different time from the body of the deed. It was incumbent on Miller and those claiming under him to explain this palpable alteration in the deed. This they have not done.

It is conceded, Battles never had any interest in the lands. According to Miller's own testimony, the deed to him was for his benefit. The grantee named was simply a trustee for Miller.

Complainant is positive, she never acknowledged but four deeds in her transactions with Miller--one to the Iowa land, in blank, by his directions and procurement; one to her father, for Chicago lots; one to her father, for the lands in Livingston county; and one other, as she supposed, for two Chicago suburban lots. She declares most positively, she never heard of Battles, and never made any deed to him for any property. To the same effect is the testimony of her father, who was really the beneficial owner of all the property. Their testimony, in this regard, is not overcome by anything in the testimony of Miller. It seems to us his conduct in the several transactions is mysterious and inexplicable. Adopting his own version of the transaction, the name of Battles was inserted in the deed as grantee, without any reason whatever. Battles had not bought the land, and had no interest in it. It was at the suggestion of Miller the deed for the Iowa land was executed in blank, and was afterwards filled up, perhaps with the name of his wife. The deed for the two lots to be exchanged for furniture for complainant was also executed in blank, by his procurement, and under his advice. Actual conveyances of real property are not usually made in that way. Unless some fraud or advantage was meditated, we are at a loss to understand why so many deeds were executed in blank. The facts proven are calculated to make the impression it was a plan adopted to overreach complainant, who was a young woman without experience in business matters, and who evidently relied with great confidence on Miller's integrity as a business man.

It is evident the signature to the deed is the genuine signature of complainant, and it was, no doubt, acknowledged; but her theory is, it was executed in blank by the procurement of Miller, under the belief, induced by his assurances, the property embraced in it were two Chicago lots, which she wished to exchange for furniture, when in fact it contained the lands involved in this litigation, and subsequently the name of Battles was inserted as grantee, without her knowledge or consent. Her explanation is, that Miller represented to her the trade for the furniture could not be effected unless it was attended to at once, and urged to immediate action. She acknowledged the deed without reading the description of the property, relying on the good faith and assurances of Miller, but did observe it was in blank and contained the name of no grantee. This theory of the case, in our opinion, is better sustained by the evidence than any other. All that militates against it is the...