Whitaker v. Stamping
| Decision Date | 05 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:13-cv-14210 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
| Parties | SEAN WHITAKER, Plaintiff, v. HATCH STAMPING, Defendant. |
HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss [#8] filed by the Defendant, Hatch Stamping ("Defendant"). The matter is fully briefed and the Court finds that oral argument will not aid in the resolution of this matter. Accordingly, the Court will resolve the present motion on the briefs submitted. See E.D.Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2) (). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
In his Complaint, the plaintiff, Sean Whitaker ("Plaintiff"), alleges the following: He has worked for Defendant since November 9, 2009 as a Die Setter, which involves heavy physical labor. In August 2010, Plaintiff suffered a lateral plateau fracture of his left knee in a motorcycle accident. He took disability leave, for which he was paid short-term disability for ten weeks. Plaintiff took five additional days off from June 23, 2011 to September 16, 2011, each day being covered by a medical certificate from his physician. On October 10, 2011, Plaintiff experiencedincreased pain in his knee but could not get an appointment with his doctor until the next day. He called Defendant to explain that he needed to take the 10th off (due to pain) as well as the 11th (for his appointment). Plaintiff saw his doctor on October 11, 2011, and received a medical certificate. After returning from his appointment, Plaintiff received a call from Defendant's Human Resources department informing him that he was terminated for excessive absenteeism.
On October 2, 2013, Plaintiff filed this action under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Generally, he alleges that Defendant violated his FMLA rights by (1) failing to offer him FMLA leave; (2) failing to offer him intermittent FMLA leave; (3) terminating his employment on October 11, 2011; and (4) otherwise discriminating against him and interfering with his FMLA entitlements in ways yet to be discovered. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has a FMLA policy, yet has never offered him FMLA leave or designated any of his absences as FMLA leave. He also alleges that Defendant terminated him for excessive absenteeism despite employing a point system for absenteeism, under which he did not have enough absences to be terminated. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that he did not have the opportunity to give Defendant his medical certificate before termination.
On October 3, 2013—the day after Plaintiff filed his Complaint—a Summons was issued [#2]. On February 7, 2014, after more than four months of inactivity, the Court issued a show-cause order for failure to prosecute [#3]. Plaintiff responded on February 12, 2014, moving to extend time for service [#4]; Plaintiff could not explain what happened to the original Summons but also did not allege any inappropriate conduct by Defendant. The Court granted the motion in a standard order on February 13, 2014, issuing a replacement Summons and ordering Plaintiff to effect service within ten days [#5].
On February 17, 2014, Wendell Crites of the Jackson County Sheriff's Department served documents on Dan Craig, who is Defendant's registered agent. Plaintiff contends that the documents included the Summons and a copy of the Complaint, as supported by Mr. Crites's signed Declaration of Service [#11-2]. Defendant, however, contends that the documents only included a copy of the Complaint, as supported by Mr. Craig's affidavit to that effect [#8-6].
On March 7, 2014, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss [#8]. On May 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Response to the Motion to Dismiss [#11].
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for three reasons: (1) failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (Rule 12(b)(6)) because Plaintiff failed to serve the Summons on Defendant before the statute of limitations expired, (2) insufficient service of process (Rules 12(b)(4) and (5)) because Plaintiff has never served the Summons on Defendant, and (3) lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant (Rule 12(b)(2)) due to failed service of process.
Specifically, Defendant argues that dismissal is proper because (1) Defendant has never received a summons; (2) another extension would be futile because the statute of limitations expired after Plaintiff failed to serve the replacement Summons; and (3) even if Plaintiff had properly served the replacement Summons, that extension was requested and granted after the statute of limitations expired.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must assess whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal underRule 12(b)(6) is proper when the applicable statute of limitations bars the claim. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007).
To properly state a claim, Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation marks omitted). Even though the complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, allegations must be "enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. Mere "labels and conclusions," "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," and "bare assertions" are insufficient. Id. at 555-56.
When reviewing the complaint, a court must accept as true all allegations other than legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Properly pled allegations must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The mere possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully does not satisfy the plausibility standard. Id.
An evidentiary hearing would have aided the Court in determining whether Defendant received the Complaint alone or with a Summons. However, such a finding would not have been dispositive of this motion for the following two reasons: (1) An extension of time for service retroactively tolls the applicable statute of limitations from the end of the 4(m) period; and (2) the Court finds that Plaintiff properly pleaded a willful violation of the FMLA, thereby entitling him to a three-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's Motion toDismiss. The Court also issues a replacement Summons and orders Plaintiff to effect proper service within ten days after entry of this order. In conducting the following analysis, the Court assumes, without deciding, that Defendant received only the Complaint on February 17, 2014.
Concerning Defendant's argument that Plaintiff cannot legally serve a summons that was extended after the statute of limitations expired, the Court first acknowledges Defendant's argument that failure to receive a summons within the two-year statute of limitations prejudices its rights under the FMLA. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1). It is well-settled that even though the core purpose of service is notice, Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 672 (1996), service of a summons is the vehicle by which a court obtains authority over the defendant, Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987). Therefore, a defendant who does not receive a summons within the applicable statute of limitations can no longer be subject to legal liability.
However, based on the underlying purpose of a court's discretion to extend time for service, any such extension retroactively tolls the statute of limitations from the end of the 4(m) period. The Court notes the uncommon circumstances of this case—plaintiff files a complaint, then fails to effectuate service before the Rule 4(m) deadline, then receives an extension after the restarted statute of limitations expired, but then fails to serve again. This begs the question: What effect does an extension of time for service have on a statute of limitations? There is a split among the few courts that have encountered these unique circumstances: Some courts have held that the statute of limitations, which starts running again after the 4(m) deadline, expires unconditionally if an extension is not obtained in time, and other courts have held that an extension granted after the statute-of-limitations period retroactively tolls the statute of limitations from the end of the 4(m) period. Compare Amnay v. Del Labs, 117 F. Supp. 2d 283,287 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ()1 with Ditkof v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 104, 105 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (). The Court believes that the latter position—that an extension of time for service retroactively tolls a statute of limitations under Rule 4(m)—is correct for two reasons: (1) The governing body charged with overseeing the Rules...
To continue reading
Request your trial