Whitchurch v. Canton Marine Towing Co.
| Decision Date | 31 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 16–cv–3278,16–cv–3278 |
| Citation | 302 F.Supp.3d 986 |
| Parties | Kori WHITCHURCH, Plaintiff, v. CANTON MARINE TOWING CO., INC., and the M/V SIR J–ETTE, in rem, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Charles W. Armbruster, III, Courtney C. Stirrat, Michael T. Blotevogel, Roy C. Dripps, Armbruster Dripps Winterscheidt & Blotevogel LLC, Maryville, IL, for Plaintiff.
James K. Mondl, John Patrick Fleming, Tonkin & Mondle, L.C., St. Louis, MO, for Defendants.
Before the Court is Plaintiff Kori Whitchurch's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim (d/e 48). The Court finds that Defendant Canton Marine Towing Co., Inc. ("Canton Marine") has not alleged a cognizable claim under federal maritime law. Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED and Defendant Canton Marine's Amended Counterclaim (d/e 39) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and with leave to amend.
This action arises from claims of negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, and unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure under general maritime law. See Compl. (d/e 1). Plaintiff was employed by Canton Marine as a deckhand and member of the crew of the vessel M/V SIR J–ETTE. Id. at ¶ 4. On August 9, 2016, while the M/V SIR J–ETTE was afloat on the Mississippi River, Plaintiff alleges he hurt his shoulder pulling wire from a winch. Id. at ¶ 8. Canton Marine's paid maintenance and cure to Plaintiff until January 2017, which totaled $18,258.97. See Amend. Counterclaim at ¶ 12 (d/e 39). Plaintiff filed his Complaint on October 13, 2016.
Shortly after this injury, on August 26, 2016, Plaintiff underwent a mandated Department of Transportation ("DOT") physical. Id. at ¶ 4. During this physical, Plaintiff told the medical examiner "that he had not... sustained any recent injury, had no physical complaints, had no joint, nerve, or muscle problems, and had unlimited use of his arms and hands." Id.
Shortly after receiving a copy of the DOT physical report, Canton Marine moved to file a counterclaim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(e) on October 16, 2017, (d/e 33), which U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle–Haskins approved on November 2, 2017. See November 2, 2017 Minute Entry. Canton Marine then filed an amended counterclaim on November 15, 2017 (d/e 39). Canton Marine alleges that Plaintiff lied about the existence of his injury and fraudulently obtained benefits from Canton Marine. See Amend. Counterclaim (d/e 39). In addition to allegations relating to the inconsistent DOT physical, Canton Marine alleges that Plaintiff presented inconsistent and implausible stories as to how the accident occurred during the interviews and made inconsistent statements on a disability questionnaire that his treating physician acknowledged "were not truly representative of his capabilities." Id. at ¶¶ 3 and 10.
Plaintiff filed this Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, that Canton Marine failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and that Canton Marine has failed to meet the pleading requirements of fraud under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). See Pl. Mot. (d/e 48).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may move for dismissal of a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). "Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) are meant to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits of the case." Ctr. For Dermatology & Skin Cancer Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 588 (7th Cir. 2014). When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, this Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Alicea–Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2003). However, the claimant bears the burden of proving the jurisdictional requirements have been met. Burwell, 770 F.3d at 588–89.
A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). To state a claim for relief, a party need only provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing he is entitled to relief and giving the defendant fair notice of the claims. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). However, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court construes the pleading in the light most favorable to the pleader, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and construing all reasonable inferences in pleader's favor. Id.
Plaintiff brings this claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and alleges that the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction because maritime law applies and Canton Marine has not alleged a cognizable claim under that body of law. See Pls. Mot. at 1–2 (d/e 48). Canton Marine argues that there is a basis for supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and that its claim is cognizable under maritime law. See Defs. Resp. at 5 (d/e 52).
The Court notes that a pleading that states a claim for relief must contain a "short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction" pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1). Canton Marine's counterclaim fails to do so. However, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over any claims that are "so related to claims" over which the Court has original jurisdiction such that the related claims "form part of the same case or controversy" as the original claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The Seventh Circuit has held that "[c]laims form part of the same case or controversy when they ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.’ " McCoy v. Iberdrola Renewables, Inc., 760 F.3d 674, 683 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) ). "A loose factual connection between the claims is generally sufficient" to establish such a common nucleus. Ammerman v. Sween, 54 F.3d 423, 424 (7th Cir. 1995). In the instant case, Canton Marine's counterclaim is that Plaintiff fabricated his accident and injury in order to receive maintenance and cure payments from Canton Marine. These claims have a strong factual connection to Plaintiff's claims for negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure based on the same alleged accident and injury. Therefore, this Court would have subject matter jurisdiction over Canton Marine's counterclaim, so long as it alleges a cognizable claim under the applicable law.
Here, the applicable law is federal maritime law. Canton Marine's counterclaim does not include a jurisdictional statement and does not invoke admiralty law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h). However, regardless of whether a maritime tort claim is brought on the admiralty or the law side of a federal district court, the parties' rights and liabilities are controlled by federal principles of maritime law if the case arises from conduct that brings it within reach of the Court's admiralty jurisdiction. See Bodnar v. Hi–Lex Corp., 919 F.Supp. 1234, 1237 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (collecting cases); Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 17 F.Supp.3d 760, 766–67 (N.D.Ill. 2014) () (citing Carey v. Bahama Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d 201, 206 (1st Cir.1988) ). Here, in light of the Court's admiralty jurisdiction, federal maritime law will prevail. See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Speedboat Racing Ltd., 200 F.Supp.3d 312, 336 (D. Conn. 2016). Therefore, Canton Marine's counterclaim will only survive a motion to dismiss if there is a cognizable claim under federal maritime law.
Generally, overpayments of maintenance and cure can only be recovered as an offset to any damages a seaman may recover under the Jones Act. The McCorpen defense arises out of the Fifth Circuit case McCorpen v. C. Gulf S. S. Corp., 396 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1968), which held that an employer's obligation to pay maintenance and cure to an injured seaman is terminated upon proof that the seaman, in procuring his employment, intentionally and willfully concealed material information about a prior medical condition that is related to the later injury. Id. at 548–49. Courts have been reluctant to expand the defense, as it is in tension with Still v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., 368 U.S. 35, 82 S.Ct. 148, 7 L.Ed.2d 103 (1961). Still held "that a worker's fraud in procuring his employment does not vitiate the employment relationship, allowing him to maintain a suit for damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act." Boudreaux v. Transocean Deepwater, Inc., 721 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff argues that a claim to recover maintenance and cure obtained by fraud is not cognizable under maritime law based on the principles and holding of Boudreaux v. Transocean Deepwater, Inc., 721 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 2013), which held the McCorpen defense cannot be used as an affirmative cause of action. Canton Marine argues it has not invoked the McCorpen Defense, therefore the holding of Boudreaux and similar cases are inapplicable to their claims. See Defs. Resp. at 3 (d/e 52). The Court recognizes that the issue here is whether an employer may recoup maintenance and cure from a seaman who lied about the injury and accident itself, not whether he had an underlying injury that would have prevented the employment. However, the Court still finds that cases...
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